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1 Introduction
The past several decades have witnessed an unprecedented demographic change in
almost all developed countries. The speed and intensity of this demographic process
differ considerably across countries. For example, Europe and Japan already have
much older populations than the US, and South Korea is currently the fastest aging
country in the world. Even within Europe, demographic heterogeneity is large: While
Germany and Italy have a very advanced aging process, fertility rates are higher
and the age structure is much younger in the Scandinavian countries and Ireland.
However, there is one common factor: Populations in industrialized economies are
aging substantially. This is manifested in ever-rising life expectancy and fertility rates
below replacement level. Both factors lead to a dramatic shift in the age structure of
the population that will affect economic processes considerably in the next decades.
The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the impact of population ag-
ing and accompanying changes in demographics on capital, goods and labor markets.
Chapter 2 investigates the link between population aging and international capital
markets, while Chapter 3 analyzes the macroeconomic implications of demographic
change on the demand for goods and services. In Chapter 4, I take a closer look
at the consumer behavior of households shortly before and after retirement from a
microeconomic perspective. Finally, Chapter 5 shows how aging-related changes in
market work can change consumer demand and labor supply. Each of these chapters
is a self-contained paper with its own introduction that can be read independently. In
the remainder of this introduction, I briefly describe the content and results of each
chapter.
Chapter 2 deals with the role of population aging on international capital flows from
a macroeconomic perspective. Using a large cross-country time-series data set of 121
countries for the time period from 1970 to 1997, I test the hypothesis that there are
demographically-induced capital flows between countries.
The motivation for this chapter is the so-called asset melt-down hypothesis that
predicts asset returns to drop dramatically in the future. The hypothesized drop is
caused by the retirement entry of the baby boom generation upon which they will
sell their assets for consumption in old-age. Due to their smaller size, the following
generation of baby busters will have a lower capital demand, so that asset returns drop.
This hypothesis is correct only under several restrictive assumptions. One of them
is that international diversification of capital which could balance the demographic
pressures, is not possible. If cross-border capital flows were limited due to home
bias, trade restrictions or large transaction costs, capital-intensive countries with a
shrinking workforce could face an asset meltdown (Abel 2001; Abel 2003; Brooks
1
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2000a). However, in a financially integrated world, this is not likely to be the case
(Bo¨rsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter 2005).
If capital is mobile to flow freely between countries, demographic cross-country
differences create incentives to invest in younger economies characterized by higher
capital demand and higher expected asset returns. Hence, relative demographic dif-
ferences between countries should trigger international capital flows. High youth and
old-age dependency ratios should bring about a current account deficit, because a rel-
atively large population of dependent young and old has a relatively lower savings rate
(Ando and Modigliani 1963). Furthermore, countries with a large fraction of young
dependents tend to have a high investment demand, as shown by Higgins (1998).
While the link between current demography and cross-border capital flows has been
analyzed by several researchers, the role of expectations has been neglected. However,
according to the capital market theory, asset returns reflect anticipated future trends
in the moment that new information occurs. Since the future demographic trends
are well-known already today, and can be forecasted with relative certainty, future
demographic pressures should trigger current international capital flows. This chapter
puts an emphasis on analyzing whether these anticipation effects can be observed in
current international capital flows.
Even in times of global financial integration, there is consensus that integration is not
perfect. As discussed above, the occurrence of demographically induced capital flows
hinges upon the magnitude of capital market imperfections which hamper international
capital to flow freely. Hence, I use some indicators of capital market frictions to
investigate whether they are seriously hampering the international diversification of
demographic pressures on domestic capital markets.
The chapter provides empirical evidence of two substantial demographic effects on
international capital flows: First, capital flows are induced by changes in present
demography. Countries with a large working-age population tend to be net exporters of
capital, relatively younger economies importers of capital and extremely aged countries
with a major population share of elderly also tend to import capital. In particular,
high youth dependency induces current account deficits. Second, the chapter provides
evidence that future demographic changes are anticipated and affect current net capital
flows, too. The direction of the effects is the same as for present demography. This
result provides empirical support for the assumption of rational and forward-looking
agents. This assumption is often made in overlapping generation models that simulate
the evolution of asset returns in an aging population.
Furthermore, the results indicate that both demographic effects on international
capital flows are reduced by capital controls and other capital market frictions.
The next chapter, Chapter 3, focuses on the role of demographic change on the
markets for goods and services. I develop a micro-based tool for projecting macroe-
conomic changes in the structure of German demand for broad commodity groups
that are caused by population aging. The basic intuition why population aging should
affect aggregate consumer demand is the observation of age-specific consumption pat-
terns. This variation in the composition of the demand for goods and services over the
2
life cycle is likely to produce changes in the aggregate, when the whole age structure
shifts due to population aging.
This chapter contributes to the field of aging economics by projecting the impact of
demographic change on the demand for goods and services. Additionally, it makes a
contribution to the demand literature as well, since it is the first micro-based projection
of aggregate consumer demand.
In the first part of the empirical analysis, I estimate the microeconomic age-specific
household demands for a set of eight composite goods based on the German budget
survey Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe for 1978-1998 using a quadratic al-
most ideal demand model. In the second part, these age-specific demand patterns are
aggregated in order to project the macroeconomic effect of population aging on the
aggregate household demand for goods and services between 2000 and 2040. These
projections are done in scenarios. They take into account (i) the direct effect of a
shift of the age structure, (ii) accompanying changes in the level and distribution
of total expenditures, and (iii) changes in household composition. The level of con-
sumer expenditures changes due to population aging, because it affects savings and
economic growth and thus also per capita incomes and consumption at the microe-
conomic level. Aging-related changes in the distribution of consumer expenditures
are mainly caused by social security systems whose design influences the inter- and—
through re-distributional features— the intra-generational distribution of incomes. I
use the outcomes of OLG simulations by Bo¨rsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2005)
as base for the projections in this scenario. Finally, population aging is caused by
declines in fertility, increases in life expectancy and changes in the timing of family
formation and fertility decisions. All these factors affect the composition of house-
holds. I use household projections originating from the FAMY-project provided by
empirica to project the resulting demand effects.
The results point to significant increases in the expenditure shares of health and
leisure goods and a decline in necessities like food and energy in all scenarios. While
the pure effect of a shift in the population age structure does already trigger sig-
nificant demand changes, the effects are magnified when moderate growth in total
expenditures is assumed. However, changes in household composition -decreasing
average household size, but a slow reduction in the number of households- do not
affect demand substantially. The future design of the pension system has only a
minor impact on the distribution of incomes and total expenditures and thus also a
negligible impact on aggregate demand.
In chapter 4, I analyze consumer expenditures from a microeconomic perspective. I
concentrate on the consumer behavior of households shortly before and after retirement
and on the role of home production in explaining such changes.
For the US, the UK and Italy, a distinct drop in spending around retirement has
been documented. This drop has been termed the retirement consumption puzzle
because such a discontinuous drop is inconsistent with the standard life cycle the-
ory according to which households smooth consumption over their lifetime. Various
reasons have been put forward in the literature to solve this puzzle and to recon-
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cile observed behavior with the life cycle framework. They range from unexpected
health and income shocks around retirement to the cessation of work-related costs,
non-separability between consumption and leisure, and the substitution of expendi-
tures by increased home production. I analyze the patterns of home production and
expenditures at retirement.
This chapter contributes to the literature by presenting evidence on the magnitude
of the drop in expenditures in Germany. Additionally, I analyze the role of home
production in solving this empirical puzzle and reconciling it with the life cycle model.
Most studies investigate home production by looking at detailed expenditure categories
like food at home which can be substituted by home production. Disproportionate
expenditure drops in these categories have been interpreted as indirect evidence of
increased home production activities. This interpretation cannot be separated from
disproportionate expenditure cuts on some commodities that are not compensated by
increases in home production. Combining the analysis of expenditure data with time
use data, I can draw direct conclusions about the home production activities of retirees
and non retirees, and whether they complement the observed drop in spending.
Using Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) over the period 1978-1998, I
find a significant one-off drop in nondurable consumer expenses at retirement which is
comparable to those found for the US, Italy and the UK. After a descriptive analysis
of cohorts, I investigate this drop in a multivariate regression analysis controlling for
differences in household characteristics by retirement status, and by age and cohort
using the Deaton-Paxson decomposition. The results point to a 17% drop in non-
durable spending which varies across age groups. Furthermore, the analysis shows
that the drop is discontinuous and levels off partially during retirement.
Additionally, I use two waves of the German time use survey (Zeitbudgeterhebung)
from the years 1991/92 and 2001/02 to investigate whether this drop is compensated
by increased home production. This explanation for the drop in expenditures bases
on the notion that consumption does not equal expenditures. If households engage to
a considerable degree in producing goods and services themselves, they can consume
more than just their market purchased goods and services. The analysis of the time
use patterns of retirees and non retirees shows that home production is with 75 addi-
tional minutes per day significantly higher in households with a retired head. Hence,
the results are consistent with the idea of non-separability between consumption and
leisure. They show that when the time and financial budgets of households change,
they substitute between spending time to produce consumer goods and services
themselves and spending money to buy those goods and services.
The idea, that households flexibly choose their engagement in home production ac-
cording to their financial and time budget constraints, also plays a key role in Chapter
5. This chapter is based on joint work with Matthias Weiss. In a general equilibrium
model with two goods, the effect of changes in working time on the unemployment
of the unskilled is analyzed. The model links the market for goods and services with
the labor market, and thus introduces a novel argument into the debate about the
employment effects of a longer working time. This new mechanism works through
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consumer demand: If a household increases its working time—be it through a longer
weekly working time, higher labor force participation (especially of women), or a longer
working life— it has a higher income and less leisure time at its disposal. Households
react to this change in resources by purchasing some formerly home produced goods
and services in the market. This change in consumer behavior raises the demand
for substitutes to home production that can to a large extent be done by unskilled
workers. Hence, due to the outsourcing of domestic tasks to the market, consumer
demand shifts toward unskill-intensive goods. In consequence, the relative demand for
unskilled labor rises and unemployment among the unskilled decreases.
There is an additional link between Chapter 5 and the main theme of this disser-
tation apart from extending the idea of interactions between consumer expenditures
and home production activities to labor market issues. Population aging has now long
been discussed in the context of social security systems. It is well-known, at least in
“old” economies like Germany, that aging puts a significant pressure on the financial
sustainability of pension systems. An integral component of a system reform to make
it financially balanced again is the prolongation of the work life by means of raising
the official statutory retirement age (Bundesministerium fu¨r Gesundheit und Soziale
Sicherung 2003). Chapter 5 analyzes the economic effects of a longer work life on
consumer behavior and labor demand.
Furthermore, the German population of working age, i.e., between 15 and 65, will
decrease in the future. This triggers a shrinkage of the workforce from about 36 millions
in 2000 to between 26 and 34 million until 2040, depending on the assumption made
about labor force participation rates and changes in statutory retirement age (Bo¨rsch-
Supan 2003a). Policy measures geared at increasing labor force participation and
working time to mitigate the shrinkage of the workforce might be warranted. Chapter
5 analyzes the economic consequences of such a policy and concludes that it would
increase the demand for goods and services that substitute for home production and
subsequently increase the demand for unskilled labor needed to produce these services.
The predictions of this theoretical model are tested in two ways: First, based
on a microeconomic survey of time use in Germany conducted in 1991/92, the link
between labor market participation, home production and the demand for household
and similar services is analyzed. Second, cross-country time-series data on OECD
countries between 1980 and 2003 is used to directly examine the link between labor
force participation and the unemployment rate. The results corroborate the pre-
dictions from the theoretical model. They show once more that households engage
significantly more (less) in home production activities, when they have more (less)
leisure time at their disposal, i.e., work less (more). Hence, this result is consistent
with the results found in Chapter 4 for the elderly. Furthermore, the macroeconomic
part yields a significant reduction of unemployment in OECD countries with a higher
labor force participation and longer working time.
5
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2 Demographic change, foresight and
international capital flows
2.1 Introduction
The next decades will bring about a pronounced aging process, in particular in
industrialized countries. This demographic transition which is characterized by falling
mortality rates and a subsequent decline in birth rates is much less advanced in
developing countries.
There are large cross-region1 and cross-country differences in the age structure of the
population now and in the future (Fig.2.1).2 Although the world regions share the
common trend of a rising population share of the elderly and a declining share of
the young, the differences in levels are large. In order to illustrate the demographic
differences across the world, Fig. 2.2 depicts the total variation in youth and old-age
dependency rates across the world using variation coefficients.3 In particular, not only
old age dependency but also its variance is strongly increasing over time until about
2020, and falls afterwards.
These demographic changes raise questions about their economic implications.
There is an ongoing debate about the asset melt-down hypothesis which states that
the soon retiring baby boomers will create a massive supply of assets that can be
matched by the baby busters’ meager demand only at low asset prices (Poterba 2001;
Brooks 2000b). Thus returns to capital will decline. This discussion is closely related
to the focus of this study: international capital flows provide a means of mitigating or
even avoiding the expected decline in return rates, since they allow for capital to be
placed on the world capital market which channels it to relatively younger countries
with higher capital returns. This in turn will reduce the demographic pressure on the
domestic rate of return (Bo¨rsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter 2005). Returns to capital
also play a key role for the implications of designing partially funded pension systems,
since they determine where the additionally accumulated capital will be invested. Un-
derstanding the factors driving international capital flows is thus important. This
importance is underlined by the remarkable increase of the volume of international
capital flows over the 1990s (World Bank 1997) and the observation that capital mar-
1The world is divided into 18 regions, defined according to the UN classification.
2For a detailed description of worldwide demographic differences, see United Nations Population
Division (2000) for all world regions, Bo¨rsch-Supan (1996) for OECD countries, Bloom and
Williamson (1998) for Asia, and Bloom and Sachs (1998) for Africa.
3Youth (old age) dependency being defined as ratio of the population between 0-14 (65+) to the
working-age population between ages 15 and 65.
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Figure 2.1: a) Old age and b) youth dependency for selected world regions: 1950-2050
year
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Youth (old age) dependency is defined as ratio of the population between 0-14 (65+) to the working-age
population between ages 15 and 65.
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kets become more and more integrated across national borders.
In this paper, I conduct a reduced-form empirical analysis using an unbalanced panel
of 121 countries for the time period from 1970 to 1997. Demographic effects on inter-
national capital flows are analyzed taking into account capital market imperfections
and limited capital mobility. The main contribution of this paper is the analysis of
the role of anticipated demographic changes on international capital flows. Antici-
pation affects the timing of the link between demography and international capital
flows. Furthermore, this paper relates the reduced-form analysis undertaken here to
the growing literature using overlapping generations models which relies on the as-
sumption of forward-looking agents. Forward looking behavior is informally tested
here by researching into the relevance of anticipation effects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the theo-
retical foundations of demographic effects on international capital flows. The role of
anticipation effects in this study is described in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 contains a
description of the data, the regression specifications (2.4.1), the modeling of present
(2.4.2) and future demography (2.4.3), and of the financial sector variables and indi-
cators for capital mobility (2.4.4). Section 2.5 presents the results. Before I conclude,
the demographic effects found in this paper are illustrated by stylized out-of-sample
predictions for selected countries (Section 2.6).
Figure 2.2: Variation coefficients for youth and old age dependency: 1950-2050
year
 old age dependency  youth dependency
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
Source: UN Population Prospects and own calculations
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2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 The dependency debate and life-cycle savings
Whether and how demographic changes affect aggregate savings and growth outcomes
is an old question leading back to Malthus (1798) and Coale and Hoover (1958). Coale
and Hoover formulated the dependency hypothesis of a negative link between an in-
crease in the young population and savings. It is due to the low savings capacity of
children and young parents supporting children.
A second strand of studies has its theoretical foundation in the life cycle hypothe-
sis by Ando, Modigliani and Brumberg (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; Ando and
Modigliani 1963). Empirical studies suggest age-specific savings decisions of individ-
uals (Leff 1969; Fry and Mason 1982; Kelley 1988; Mason 1988; Collins 1991; Taylor
and Williamson 1994). According to the theory, savings should be low at early stages
of life due to low initial incomes and consumption-smoothing. In the course of rising
income, savings increase. The age-specific individual savings patterns imply aggre-
gate savings that depend on the national age structure. Thus, the application of the
life-cycle model to the national context points to a negative link between youth de-
pendency rates and savings. In contrast, savings are high at later stages of life and
thus positively linked to the size of the work-force.
In an empirical analysis, Mason (1988) and Collins (1991) found a negative relation-
ship between youth dependency rates and national savings rates. All these studies
however lack a proper incorporation of the capital demand side. In other words: they
do not explicitly consider the differences in savings and investment patterns of open
versus closed economies. Neglecting the demand for capital leads to biases in the es-
timated demographic effects on savings. The demographic impact on savings is likely
to be negative, but stronger than suggested by this literature. This underestimation
is due to the omission of the investment side, so that the demographic coefficients also
pick up demographic effects on investment. The nature of the link between savings
and investment patterns and the resulting differences in these patterns between open
and closed economies will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.3.
2.2.2 Analyzing savings and investment patterns jointly
In order to analyze the demographic effect on the focus variable net capital flows,
and to avoid the biases described in Section 2.2.1, a joint approach towards savings
and investment patterns is needed. In the 1990s, some effort was put into researching
demographic effects on capital demand and supply by examining the demographic
effect on the residual directly (Higgins and Williamson 1996; Higgins and Williamson
1997; Higgins 1998).
Higgins and Williamson (1996) study the demographic effect on savings, investment
and net capital flows in a neoclassical overlapping generations framework with three
periods of life. Demographic variation enters their model through cohorts of different
size. Fertility and the rate of technological progress are exogenously given, production
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has constant returns to scale and labor is inelastically supplied. The authors simulate
the effect of a stylized demographic transition process. It consists of an increase in
fertility over two periods that levels off over three periods afterwards and then falls to
a lower steady-state value. The results are that investment is tightly connected with
the growth of the labor force which needs to be equipped with capital. Furthermore,
the simulations show that savings rates are high for a large work force and decline
gradually, as the economy ages.
Countries with a large working population will thus tend to be net capital exporters
in a globalized capital market while relatively young economies tend to import capital
due to their high investment demand and low national savings. Finally, a country
with a majority of retired citizens will tend to be net capital importing.
In an empirical analysis of a large cross section of countries taken from the Penn World
Tables (Mark 5.6), Higgins (1998) finds evidence of the savings, investment and net
capital flow patterns predicted in the simulation model of Higgins and Williamson
(1996). Taylor (1998) also finds a negative link between youth dependency ratios and
net capital outflows for Argentina and other Latin American countries in the 20th
century (1885-1989).
2.2.3 Demographic effects and the role of capital mobility
The distinction between closed and open economies is crucial in the analysis of savings
patterns, since savings are independent of the demand side in the capital market only
under the assumption of perfect capital mobility. In this case, capital is traded at the
world capital market which determines the rates of return at the domestic market.
If capital is not entirely mobile internationally, domestic savings and investment are
jointly determined and can thus not be analyzed separately. This linkage between
the degree of capital mobility and savings and investment patterns in the domestic
economy is formulated in the well-known Feldstein-Horioka theorem (Feldstein and
Horioka 1980). Feldstein and Horioka as well as follow-up studies (Dooley, Frankel,
and Mathieson 1987; Hussein 1998; Jansen 2000; Shibata and Shintani 1998) found
a significantly positive, but decreasing correlation between domestic investment and
savings outcomes over time, an indicator for a limited, but increasing degree of inter-
national capital mobility.
Studies based on the examination of interest rate parities are in line with these find-
ings of limited capital mobility. Frankel (1992) and Obstfeld (1995) provide surveys
on these tests for capital mobility and their (mostly negative) results. French and
Poterba (1991) resume that there is considerable home bias in investment decisions
and the results of Portes and Rey (2005) suggest that information asymmetries reduce
international capital mobility. Thus, evidence that capital mobility is not perfect is
numerous. However, it is equally true that capital controls have been abolished on a
large scale during the last decades and that capital has become more mobile at least
within the OECD area.
The consensus in the literature is best summarized by Obstfeld (1995): As far as
industrial countries are concerned, capital mobility appears substantial...though it is
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clear that much of the developing world still stands outside the nexus of industrial-
country financial markets.
Higgins (1998) relates demographic effects and capital mobility, taking into account
that incomplete capital mobility can hamper demographically-induced capital flows.
Thus, demographic effects on capital flows should be weaker when capital controls or
other obstacles to free capital flows are present. Higgins (1998) uses the Sachs and
Warner openness measure as an index of financial openness (Sachs and Warner 1995)
and obtains the expected results: the less open a country, the weaker the demographic
effect on net capital flows. There is a certain flaw to the Sachs and Warner openness
measure: it is usually considered as an index of trade and not financial openness. I
extend this line of research by applying a broader concept of capital mobility deter-
minants in the empirical analysis.
2.3 The role of future demography
2.3.1 How anticipation affects international capital flows
This study is a first step towards evaluating the role of expectations in the analysis
of demographic effects on international capital markets. Previous studies found sig-
nificant demographic effects on international capital flows and capital market returns
(Higgins and Williamson 1996; Higgins and Williamson 1997; Taylor 1998; Taylor and
Williamson 1994). This paper researches into the effects of future demographic devel-
opments on current international capital flows. This focus stems from the notion that
actions taken on the capital market are highly driven by expected returns. Hence,
it is not sufficient to look at the present demographic situation only when analyzing
demographic effects on net capital flows. To my knowledge, this effect has been not
been studied thoroughly in the empirical literature so far.
Poterba (2001) briefly discusses anticipation effects. He notes that forward-looking
behavior by agents implies that savings and investment decisions are taken on the
basis of present discounted values of the future earnings of investment goods and the
value of savings. Poterba resumes that ”forward-looking investors should anticipate
the decreasing demand for capital and bid down shares prices and the prices for other
durable assets before the baby boomers reach their saving years.” He however does
not incorporate forward-looking behavior into his empirical analysis of demographic
effects on asset returns in the U.S. but instead confines to a steady-state focus.
To clarify how anticipation of demographic changes alters agents’ behavior, consider
the closed economy case in which there is no access to the world capital market: the
only way in which individuals can react to the anticipation of a baby boom baby bust
cycle is to intertemporally shift their savings: either they save more today in order
to ensure a sufficient retirement income, or they start consuming their savings earlier
if the substitution effect dominates. Obviously, an intertemporal shift towards earlier
consumption would reduce capital returns in the present. However, anticipation can
only smoothen the sharp decline of future returns, and it is not clear that individuals
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really choose to shift their consumption towards earlier stages of their life. Intertem-
poral substitution does not solve the asset-melt down problem because the individuals’
scope for using the information about the future is limited as there is no escape from
the (shrinking) domestic financial market.4
This closed economy result is found in a study by Brooks (2000b). Brooks’s stylized
Baby Boom-Baby Bust cycle results in an abrupt drop in cohort size between two
generations. It can be regarded as a contracted, stylized version of the long-term phe-
nomenon of demographic change. The effect of this demographic shock is analyzed
in a simulation model with rational, forward-looking agents. The simulations show
that in spite of forward-looking behavior, the transition from baby boom to baby bust
will lead to a sharp decline in asset returns. This result is not surprising: the model
ignores the ability of investors to hold an internationally diversified portfolio and an-
alyzes demographic effects in a closed economy setup only.
The virtues of integrated capital markets are modeled in Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2005):
Their simulations show that the decline in capital returns induced by the aging process
are much smaller when capital is mobile across the EU or OECD, and not bound to be
invested in Germany only. The authors find no evidence of an asset melt down effect
in an open economy setting. Thus, anticipation effects lead to a much higher extent of
smoothing of the return curve over time in an open economy. The pivotal difference
to the closed economy case is, that agents can make better use of their knowledge
about domestic demographic pressures: they can access the world capital market in
order to diversify domestic demographic risks. This mechanism of alleviating domes-
tic demographic pressure generates net capital outflows from industrialized countries
to emerging markets in the present. The size of these flows depends on the relative
difference in the age structure between the home country and the rest of the world
(Williamson 2001). Capital will flow between countries such that returns equalize
across countries and these returns will depend on the world capital market only.
In consequence, population aging in the home economy does not necessarily lead to
sharp declines in capital returns, since agents can react to demographic pressures by
investing their capital in countries where aging is less pronounced.
However, if capital is perfectly mobile and can be reallocated at any point in time,
net capital flows will depend on the change of the relative age structure in the next
period only. Although individuals anticipate long-term changes in demography, they
only need to redirect capital in each period such that the expected change in the rel-
ative age structure over the next period is balanced. Thus, one should not observe a
linkage between net capital flows and long-term future demographic change, if capital
is perfectly mobile.
In the realistic scenario of imperfect capital markets as supported by empirical evidence
(see Section 2.2.3), however, international capital flows can be affected by expected
demographic changes over a longer period as well. It might not be possible to redirect
4The effect of the increased volume of savings would further stabilize capital returns if it increased
productivity (Bo¨rsch-Supan and Winter 2001). A higher capital stock can enhance corporate
governance in the capital market and thus raise capital productivity.
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capital flows at any point in time. Furthermore, the allocation of capital across coun-
tries might depend on the degree of imperfection of the destination country’s domestic
capital market. The most obvious deterrent to the redirection of capital in each pe-
riod is the presence of transaction and information costs. They represent an incentive
towards making longer term investment decisions.5
Thus, with incomplete capital markets and farsighted agents, present net capital flows
should depend on expected relative differences in future demography between coun-
tries. The more incomplete the capital markets, the smaller should be the effect of
anticipation on international capital flows. Therefore, I construct demographic vari-
ables capturing anticipation only, and next, I also introduce interactive effects of these
anticipation variables and indicators of capital market imperfections. The variables
used in the empirical analysis are described in Section 2.4.3 and Appendix 2.8.1.
2.3.2 The formation of expectations
The studies described in the last section belong to the group of overlapping genera-
tions simulation models (see also Bo¨rsch-Supan and Winter 2001; Bo¨rsch-Supan et al.
2003; Miles 1999; Pemberton 1999; INGENUE Team 2001). They base on the as-
sumption of rational, forward-looking behavior. This paper means to be the flip side
of the coin, since it provides an informal test whether this assumption is warranted,
as anticipation effects represent an indicator for forward-looking behavior. By includ-
ing anticipation effects in the analysis, I test a joint hypothesis: (i) the availability
of credible demographic information and (ii) the farsightedness of agents. These two
hypotheses cannot be separated in the empirical analysis of this paper.
There is evidence that individuals are aware of the demographic changes ahead, i.e.
that they are in possession of reliable and credible demographic information. This
awareness is due to the drastic dimension of the aging process in industrialized na-
tions and the resulting widespread problems with financing social security systems in
the future (Boeri et al. 2002).
Demographic forecasts like the United Nations projections usually extend over a time-
span of 50 years and are considered as relatively reliable, in spite of implausible fertility
assumptions used in the past (Birg 2001). Reliability is enhanced by the fact that the
elderly of tomorrow are already born today.
In this paper, I chose the UN projections as information source for projections of the
aging process. I do so because it is a broadly cited international data source for demo-
graphic projections so that public information is mainly based on this data. Projection
errors in this database produce errors in the expectations. This is unproblematic here
since the goal of this paper is to show that expectations affect the link between demog-
raphy and international capital flows, regardless of whether individuals have perfect
information.
The various editions of UN projections over time differ from each other, mainly due
5Another example for capital flows that cannot be redirected each period is foreign direct investment
(FDI). FDI often yields positive returns only after a couple of years and is not easy to reverse -
if at all.
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to the rapid spreading of the HIV-virus and revisions of the fertility assumptions. In
consequence, every official update produces ”news” and thus a change in expectations.
I use four UN projections, issued in 1980, 1988, 1992 and 1998, to exploit this varia-
tion. Expectations are revised each year on the basis of the latest official projection
available. Since data based on forecasts before 1980 is not available, I assume that ex-
pectations about the demographic future built before 1980 were correct, i.e. matched
the demographic reality. Further details about the construction of the anticipation
variables are given in Section 2.4.3.
2.4 The econometric model
This paper uses a reduced-form approach to analyze the empirical link between current
and future demography and international capital flows. A feasible generalized least
squares panel estimator with region fixed-effects is applied to time-series cross-section
data for about 120 countries from 1970 to 1997 and to demographic projections that
reach out until 2050. The demographic data is provided by the United Nations World
Population Prospects, while the economic data of this unbalanced panel is taken from
the World Development Indicators by the World Bank. Additional data on capital
controls is provided by the IMF (International Monetary Fund 1999). The dependent
variable is capital outflows, constructed as the net value of gross domestic savings
minus domestic investments as a percentage of GDP.
The next section describes the estimation strategy. Sections 2.4.2 to 2.4.4 deal with
the explanatory variables used in the analysis and define how they are specified. They
can be grouped into four categories: region fixed-effects, present demography, expected
demographic changes, and last, financial sector variables and capital mobility factors.
The regions amount to 18 groups, defined according to the UN classification. The
measurement of the present and expected demography is explained in Section 2.4.2
respectively 2.4.3 as well as in appendix 2.8.1. The other covariates are described in
detail in Section 2.4.4.
2.4.1 The empirical specification
For the moment, consider the regression specification with present demography only:
yit = αoi + x
′
itβ +
J−1∑
j
αjdjit + uit (2.1)
where yit are net capital outflows of country i at time t, αoi represents region fixed
effects, xit are other explanatory variables capturing features of the financial sector
and of capital mobility. djit are the population age shares for j age groups in country
i at time t and uit is the error term.
I extend the analysis of Higgins (1998) by allowing for heteroskedasticity and first order
autocorrelation of the error terms. Heteroskedasticity is introduced into the model by
15
2 Demographic change, foresight and international capital flows
allowing for differences in variances by country, σ2i . Second, a first-order autoregressive
process AR(1) with country-specific correlation coefficients ρi is specified. This leads
to a variance-covariance matrix of the following form:
E[²²′] = Ω =

σ1
2V1 0 . . . 0
0 σ2
2V2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . σn
2Vn
 (2.2)
where
Vi =

1 ρi 0 0 . . . 0
ρi 1 ρi 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 0 . . . ρi 1
 (2.3)
Thus, the feasible generalized least squares estimator is given by:
β̂FGLS = (X
′Ωˆ−1X)−1X ′Ωˆ−1y (2.4)
and the estimated variance by
V̂ ar(βˆFGLS) = (X
′Ωˆ−1X)−1 (2.5)
where the Ωˆ contains the weights given to each observation according to its country-
specific variance and the autocorrelation coefficient.
2.4.2 Modeling the present age structure of the population
Most of the empirical studies of demographic effects use only two broad measures of
the population structure: youth and old age dependency rates. The reason for these
coarse measures lies in the high multicollinearity of age-specific population shares and
the reduction of degrees of freedom when including population shares for detailed age
groups.
This study tries to improve on this by modelling the current demographic situation
according to the method proposed by Fair and Dominguez (1991). It allows to use
the information on the entire age structure while avoiding the identification problem
arising from multicollinearity.
Consider the specification introduced in equation (2.1) in the last section. Now, I
constrain the age share coefficients αj to lie on a fourth-order polynomial
6:
αj =
4∑
s=0
γsj
s (2.6)
6I also used higher and lower order polynomials; the results did not change much. For more infor-
mation, refer to appendix 2.8.2.
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where s ∈ [0, S] and S = 4 is the order of the polynomial. A high order polynomial
presents a flexible framework for analyzing demographic effects. This restriction is
used to reformulate the regression specification by substituting in for the αj:
yit = αi0 + x
′
itβ +
4∑
s=0
(
γs
J∑
j=1
js · djit
)
+ uit (2.7)
I further restrict the sum of the age share coefficients αj to zero. This normalization
allows for a straightforward interpretation of the age share coefficients as deviations
from the average demographic effect on international capital flows.
This yields the following relationship of the γ:
γ0 = −γ1
J
J∑
j=1
j − γ2
J
J∑
j=1
j2 − γ3
J
J∑
j=1
j3 − γ4
J
J∑
j=1
j4 (2.8)
The parameter γ0 can be recovered from the four estimated coefficients γ1, ..., γ4. These
coefficients do not have an intuitive interpretation, but they can be used to recover
the original age share coefficients αj in the next step. The transformed regression
specification can be written as:
yit = αi0 + x
′
itβ +
4∑
s=1
γs
(
J∑
j=1
js · djit − 1
J
J∑
j=1
js ·
J∑
j=1
djit
)
+ uit (2.9)
In brief:
yit = αi0 + x
′
itβ +
4∑
s=1
γsDsit + uit (2.10)
where Ds =
∑J
j=1(j
s · djit)− 1J
∑J
j=1 j
s ·∑Jj=1 djit. The αˆj can be recovered from the
γˆs according to (2.6).
I use population shares of 17 age groups (0-4,5-9,10-14,...75-79 and 80+) to construct
the four demographic measures D1..D4. Before applying the method by Fair and
Dominguez (1991), I transform the absolute age-specific population shares into shares
relative to the rest of the world. It is well-known and often emphasized in the literature
that it is relative demographic changes that will drive capital flows. However, in
empirical studies, this insight is always neglected and only absolute changes are used
as measures for demography. The transformation of the variables is described in
appendix 2.8.1 and will be applied to the future demography variables in the next
section as well.
2.4.3 Modeling future demographic trends
To analyze expected future demographic changes as a determinant of international cap-
ital flows, I develop anticipation measures that reflect expected demographic changes
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over time (i) relative to the rest of the world, (ii) at each point in time and (iii) differ-
ing by the age structure of the population.
The effect of future demographic changes on current behavior hinges upon the fore-
sight period over which individuals anticipate demographic changes. Based on the life
cycle theory, I assume that individuals plan over their expected further lifetime. Since
further lifetime differs by age, the anticipation measures are computed for each age
group individually and are then aggregated over age groups to obtain the macroeco-
nomic anticipation measure for each country.
Figure 2.3 gives an example how the anticipated demographic changes are computed
for the 30 year olds in 1982: I determine the expected further life expectancy of the 30
year olds, here 30 years, and calculate the projected demographic changes over their
expected further lifetime on the basis of the relevant information, the 1980 projec-
tion. The expected demographic change is the difference in the old age respectively
youth dependency ratio between 1982 and 30 years later, in 2012. This procedure
is performed for each age group. Finally, I obtain the country’s composite anticipa-
tion measure by aggregating these age-specific anticipated changes over age groups,
weighting each age groups’ information with its cohort size.
Figure 2.3: Example of the anticipation effects
 
Official projection updates in the years... 
1992 1998 1980 1988 
1982 
individual of age 30 
builds expectations  
Expected further lifetime at age a: 30 years  
2012 
expected death at 60 years  
Expectations … 
 
… for the years 1982 to 1988 are built on the basis of the 1980 projection; since 
1988 on the basis of the 1988 projection and so forth 
… are built on the basis of the demographic change during the expected further 
lifetime, i.e. compute the difference between dependency ratio (old age & 
youth) in 2012 and 1982 for each age group on the basis of its expected 
planning horizon 
… are finally aggregated over age groups and the observations are weighted by 
cohort size for each year 
 
time 
One element of the computation is the expected further lifetime of each age group.
It is measurable by age-specific data on further life expectancy. However, due to
the bad coverage of data on this variable, the results are most likely to be biased,
since many developing countries would be excluded from the sample. Hence, I use
the difference between life expectancy at birth and the age at time t instead which
both vary over time and by country. This underestimates further life expectancy,
especially for elder cohorts who migh have a negative further life pectancy in
this specification. Their planning horizon will be oo short. However, robustness
checks reveal that the results are not substantially differe t from those on th basis
of age-specific life expectancies. This specification will be labeled Specification 2 in
the following. Specification 1 restricts anticipation effects to zero.
In order to investigate whether anticipation has a long or only a short-term effect on
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international capital flows, I use an additional specification for the future demography
variables, labeled Specification 3: I determine the further lifetime of each age group.
Then, I split the age groups into four categories according to their planning horizon:
0 to 10 years, 10 to 20 years, 20 to 30 years and 30 to 50 years. Next, I compute the
population shares of these four groups. Finally, I calculate the demographic changes
in the short run, i.e. t and t + 10, in the medium run for t + 20, and so forth, and
weight them by the population shares of the four groups. By doing so, I can identify
whether short- or long-term demographic changes have an effect on international
capital flows.
I construct these measures for demographic changes in youth and old-age dependency
rates seperately. These ratios summarize the broad dimensions of the demographic
changes ahead. As in the last section, I transform these ratios into relative dependency
ratios. The resulting explanatory variables in Specification 2 are labeled Y NG and
OLD. Specification 3 contains four variables on the basis of changes in relative youth
dependency, Y NG10, 20, 30 and 50, and four based on old-age dependency ratios,
OLD10, 20, 30 and 50.
2.4.4 Capital mobility factors and financial sector influences
Apart from demographic changes, capital flows crucially depend on the degree of cap-
ital mobility in a globalized capital market (see Section 2.2.3). Hence, I include a set
of variables that capture some determinants of capital mobility.
The openness of a country towards foreign capital is most directly determined by the
existence of capital controls.7 These controls can prevent capital from flowing between
countries. Therefore, I include the dummy variable (CONTROL) that takes the value
one if restrictions on the current or capital account are in place or if there exist regu-
lations for the surrender of export proceeds.
A second factor are capital gains taxes (TAX ). Foreign investors may fear high taxa-
tion of their investment returns so that high taxes will discourage foreign investors if
taxes have to be paid in the country where the funds are placed. At the same time,
high capital gains taxes also discourage investment in the home country by domestic
investors. Only a crude measure is available here: taxes on income and capital gains.
However, income taxes will also affect international capital flows via their depressing
effect on savings.
Another tax measure is taxes on international trade (TRADETAX ). Since capital
flows and trade are closely linked through national accounts, I expect that high taxes
on international trade will be a disincentive towards capital outflows.
To capture additional non-demographic effects driving capital flows, several variables
describing the financial sector in the home country are included. They are the so-
called ‘pull factors‘ that capture accessibility, development status and effectiveness of
7A detailed description of capital controls is provided in Cooper (1999) and Montiel and Reinhart
(1999).
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domestic financial markets. The size of the financial sector (SIZE) is widely used as a
measure of how accessible the capital market is (Levine and Zervos 1993). It is defined
as ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Next, PRIVATE is private credits as percentage
of GDP. Due to limited data coverage, the ratio of private to total domestic credit
ratio is not available. Therefore, I use PRIVATE as a proxy for the involvement of
private agents in the financial sector.
Next, I include the variable CIV IL from House (2002) capturing the rule of law and
the security of property rights. CIV IL is constructed from survey results in the form
of a checklist and takes values from 1 to 7 where 1 represents the highest degree of
civil liberties. Recent studies show that especially the security of ownership rights,
but also the enforceability of legal claims are vital growth enhancing factors (Knack
and Keefer 1995; Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995). If the rule of law and the security
of property rights are weak, then this also comprises capital transactions. Investors
planning a new site or production location in a foreign country will certainly be inter-
ested in securing their investments. The worse the infrastructure and security to do
so, the less they will be prepared to invest in that country. The same argument holds
for other types of investment.
Yet another variable from the Freedom House Indicators, RIGHTS, is included in the
analysis. It reflects the status of political rights and freedom and the voting rights of
the public. This variable is taken as a proxy for the political risk that investors face.
Finally, I recognize the role of education in explaining capital flow patterns. The vari-
able SCHOOL captures gross school enrollment in secondary education. It is often
argued that omitting human capital when researching the link between demography
and international capital flows leads to biased results. This bias would be present, if
aging induces a scarcity of labor associated with increased investments in education
that will make the scarce factor more productive. Furthermore, schooling might have
an effect on net capital flows since increases in schooling trigger a higher labor pro-
ductivity, raising incomes and thereby savings rates. Higher savings rates will increase
net capital outflows. Hence, the demographic effects can be separated from human
capital effects. Since the schooling variable is often reported in 5-year-intervals only,
I linearly interpolate SCHOOL.
2.5 Results
This section presents the results of the empirical model developed in Section 2.4.1.
Three specifications are estimated. The simple Specification 1 in the second column
of table 2.2 does not account for future demographic changes as a potential deter-
minant of international capital flows, but confines to present demography only. In
Specifications 2a and b, I add the future trends in youth and old-age dependency
rates, as described in detail in Section 2.4.3. The future demography variables en-
ter in a continuous way. They contain aggregated information on the demographic
changes in relative youth and old-age dependency over the individual planning horizon
of each cohort. In order to learn more about the relation between short- and long-
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term anticipation effects, Specifications 3a and b (table 2.3) contain the aggregated
future demography changes splitted into four variables each for the two dependency
ratios. These four variables are lead variables that cover expectations over different
time horizons - short-term, medium-term and long-term. Specification b differs from
a by the additional interactive term of capital market imperfections, i.e. the size of
the domestic financial sector, and the anticipation measures. These variables are sup-
posed to test the hypothesis that anticipative behavior has a larger effect when capital
market imperfectionsThe interacted variables are labeled OLD..i and Y NG..i. Table
2.1 contains the list of variables.
Table 2.1: List of variables
Dependent variable
NET CAPITAL gross domestic savings - gross domestic investment (percent of GDP)
OUTFLOWS
Present demography variables (see section 4.2)
D1..D4 Transformed present demographic variables that identify the polynomial
Future demography variables (see section 4.3)
OLD(YNG) Change in relative old-age (youth) dependency over the expected further
lifetime of each age group, aggregated for each country i at time t
OLD(YNG) 10..50 Change in relative old-age (youth) dependency over the expected further
lifetime of each age group, classified into four foresight periods and
aggregated for each country i at time t
OLD(Y NG)i interactive terms: anticipation measures OLD(YNG)*SIZE
OLD(Y NG)10..50i interactive terms: anticipation measures OLD(YNG)10..50*SIZE
Other explanatory variables (see section 4.4)
SIZE Liquid liabilities as percentage of GDP
PRIVATE Private credit as percentage of GDP
TAX Taxes on income and capital gains in percent of current revenue
TRADETAX Taxes on international trade in % of current revenue
(incl. import duties, profits of ex- or import monopolies, exchange profits,
and exchange taxes)
SCHOOL Gross school enrollment in secondary education
GROWTH GDP growth rate, lagged
CONTROL Dummy variable: 1 if capital controls present, otherwise 0
(see IMF(1999) for further details)
CIVIL Indicator capturing the rule of law, security of property rights, human and
organizational rights, freedom of expression and belief
(ranging from 1 to 7: 1 = highest degree of civil liberties, 7 = lowest)
RIGHTS Political rights indicator
(ranging from 1 to 7: 1 = highest degree of political rights, 7 = lowest)
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI) 2000, UN Population Projections (UN)1998,
Freedomhouse Indicators, and own calculations
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In the following, I discuss the results of the different specifications, as shown in
Figure 2.2. The discussion is organized along the three groups of explanatory variables:
present and future demography and other covariates.
2.5.1 Present demography
Since the four variables capturing present demography have no direct interpretation,
the bold lines in Figure 2.4 show the implied age share coefficients for Specification 1,
surrounded by a 95% confidence interval, and the other two specifications.
Figure 2.4: Age share coefficients by age group for current demography: specifications
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In Specification 1 where future demography is not considered, the age share coef-
ficients are significantly negative for ages 5 to 15. Hence, a high youth share tends
to draw the economy into a current account deficit. This finding is in line with the
theoretical argument that ”young” economies have a high investment demand while
generating few savings domestically. Even stronger demographic effects are present
in the middle of the age distribution: a large working age population in its twenties
to mid-fifties generates large net capital outflows. A one percent rise in the relative
population share of those between 35 and 40 years induces an increase in net capital
outflows of about 0.7 percent. These population groups are in their high savings
years. Finally, the results show a reverse effect for the elderly. A high relative share of
those aged 65+ is associated with a tendency towards capital inflows. This effect can
be explained by declines in savings and the repatriation of capital for consumption in
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old age. The coefficients for those of age 70 and older cannot be trusted much, since
the confidence intervals become very large at the ends of the age distribution.
These results do not change substantially when expected future demographic change
is included in the analysis in Specifications 2 and 3. The shape of the present demo-
graphic effect is very similar, as can be seen in Figure 2.4. The amplitude increases,
but the point estimates lie within the confidence interval of the estimated coefficients
from Specification 1 except for very young ages. Hence, the estimation results for
the present demography variables are robust. I also tried various other specifications
of the future demography variables based on further life expectancy instead of life
expectancy at birth. Furthermore, I estimated the three specifications without the
interpolation of the schooling variable, reducing the sample size by about 30%, and
third, I averaged the data in 5 year intervals to see whether autocorrelation effects
like business cycles drove the effects. Finally, I included lagged GDP growth in the
regressions in order to capture country-specific heterogeneity resulting from different
growth patterns (see appendix 2.8.3). The results do not change much over all these
variations of the regression specification.
2.5.2 Future demography and its interactions with capital market
imperfections
The results provide evidence that anticipation of future demographic changes does
affect international capital flows today.
The results for the future demography variables Y NG... in Specifications 2 and 3
point to a significant impact of anticipated demographic changes on current net capi-
tal flows. A rising youth dependency rate over the further lifetime of the population
affects capital outflows negatively. This is in line with the argument from Section 2.3
that a high expected youth share will induce additional investment in the domestic
economy due to the rising labor force in the future. Specification 3 shows that the
anticipation effects concerning future youth dependency are stronger for shorter plan-
ning horizons. There are a couple of reasons for this: First, capital market frictions
are more important for the short and medium-run and will be less important in the
long-run. Second, this result might be an indication that individuals do not plan over
very long horizons. And third, individuals might have a large discount factor such
that in spite of anticipation, long-term demographic changes do not strongly influence
their behavior.
An anticipated increase in relative youth dependency signifies that the age structure
in the domestic economy will become younger relative to other countries in the future;
this leads to rising demand for capital and thus attracts additional capital and keeps
domestic capital within the domestic market.
I do not find evidence of anticipation effects in old-age dependency. This is most likely
due to little variation in old age dependency over the projections and due to a problem
of multicollinearity: if a high share of elderly people is expected for the future, then
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Table 2.2: Regression results for specifications 1 and 2
Dependent variable: NET CAPITAL OUTFLOWS
SPEC 1 SPEC 2a SPEC 3a
Present demography
D1 -1.057 (5.73)*** -1.171 (6.51)*** -1.193 (5.87)***
D2 0.312 (7.02)*** 0.350 (7.95)*** 0.372 (7.35)***
D3 -0.030 (7.32)*** -0.034 (8.26)*** -0.037 (7.89)***
D4 0.001 (7.07)*** 0.001 (7.99)*** 0.001 (7.95)***
Expected future demography
OLD -0.010 (0.52)
YNG -0.089 (4.75)***
OLD10 -0.083 (0.88)
OLD20 0.017 (0.11)
OLD30 0.140 (0.98)
OLD50 -0.079 (1.52)
YNG10 -0.240 (4.34)***
YNG20 0.314 (3.47)***
YNG30 -0.208 (2.04)**
YNG50 -0.089 (1.71)*
Other covariates
SIZE -0.023 (2.05)** -0.0248 (2.27)** -0.0234 (2.08)**
TAX 0.028 (2.35)** 0.0216 (1.88)* 0.0444 (3.71)***
TRADETAX -0.126 (8.36)*** -0.1198 (8.06)*** -0.1052 (6.66)***
PRIVATE -0.034 (4.00)*** -0.0317 (3.80)*** -0.0405 (4.93)***
CONTROL -0.015 (4.34)*** -0.0162 (4.70)*** -0.0152 (4.36)***
RIGHTS -0.003 (3.53)*** -0.0025 (3.35)*** -0.0020 (2.55)**
CIVIL 0.002 (1.43) 0.0014 (1.42) 0.0022 (2.15)**
SCHOOL 0.036 (3.21)*** 0.0332 (3.01)*** 0.0271 (2.38)**
CONSTANT 0.031 (2.35)** 0.0415 (3.37)*** 0.0439 (2.91)***
Observations 1823 1823 1802
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
FGLS estimation with country-specific AR(1)-process and heteroskedasticity.
17 region dummies included.
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Table 2.3: Regression results with interactions of expected future demography*CMI
Dependent variable: NET CAPITAL OUTFLOWS
SPEC 2b SPEC 2c SPEC 3c
CMI=SIZE CMI=CONTROL CMI=SIZE
Present demography
D1 -1.006 (5.47)*** -1.088 (6.22)*** -1.280 (5.92)***
D2 0.308 (6.79)*** 0.334 (7.75)*** 0.389 (7.25)***
D3 -0.030 (7.06)*** -0.033 (8.11)*** -0.038 (7.69)***
D4 0.001 (6.80)*** 0.001 (7.89)*** 0.001 (7.69)***
Expected future demography
OLD 0.025 (0.47) -0.057 (2.38)**
YNG -0.196 (5.67)*** -0.149 (4.35)***
OLD10 -0.094 (0.40)
OLD20 -0.231 (0.65)
OLD30 0.284 (0.88)
OLD50 0.0004 (0.00)
YNG10 -0.164 (1.51)
YNG20 0.515 (2.96)***
YNG30 -0.526 (2.64)***
YNG50 0.025 (0.26)
Expected future demography (interacted with CMI)
OLDi -0.065 (0.77) 0.080 (2.47)**
YNGi 0.307 (4.12)*** 0.073 (2.16)**
OLD10i -0.058 (0.16)
OLD20i 0.745 (1.23)
OLD30i -0.488 (0.92)
OLD50i -0.128 (0.71)
YNG10i -0.088 (0.38)
YNG20i -0.682 (1.79)*
YNG30i 0.948 (2.03)**
YNG50i -0.289 (1.38)
Observations 1823 1802 1802
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
FGLS estimation with country-specific AR(1)-process and heteroskedasticity.
17 region dummies, SIZE, TAX, TRADETAX, PRIVATE, CONTROL,
RIGHTS, CIVIL, and SCHOOL included (not reported).
25
2 Demographic change, foresight and international capital flows
one observes a high youth dependency ratio in this country now. Therefore, it is likely
that the OLD... variables are highly correlated with the present demography variables.
Furthermore, since tomorrow’s elderly are already born today, there will not be much
news in the projections about their numbers in 30 or 40 years. Variation will mainly
stem from improvements in longevity. Thus, it is not surprising that significant effects
can be found only for expected changes in relative youth dependency in this study.
In Specifications 2b and 3b, I include the interactive terms of capital market imper-
fections and anticipation measures in the regressions. I also estimate Specification 2
using the capital control variable in the interactive term (Specification 2c). Fig 2.3
shows the results: The existence and nature of the capital market imperfections deter-
mines how anticipation alters international capital flows. If there are capital controls
in place, then the simple anticipation effect is reversed, as can be seen from the reverse
sign of Y NG and Y NGi in Specification 2b. The reason is the argument raised in
section 2.3.1: If the capital market is closed, then anticipation does not help much,
since capital cannot be invested abroad. Thus, the CONTROL variable is a discrete
indicator, of whether capital markets are open or not.
On the other hand, the size of the domestic variable measures, how well developed
the domestic capital market is and how open the domestic capital market is. The
more developed the market is, the more it will attract foreign, and domestic capital
and net capital outflows will decline. At the same time, if the capital market is very
well developed and open to foreign investors, then anticipation does not play a large
role. If capital were perfectly mobile, then we should not observe anticipation effects,
since capital could be reallocated at any point in time. Therefore, anticipation effects
become weaker, the more integrated the capital market is. The results for Y NGi...
in Specifications 2b and 3b show that there is evidence supporting this hypothesis in
the data, and again, the effects are significant for (interacted) anticipated changes in
youth dependency only.
On the basis of these results, the inclusion of anticipation effects in analyzing the link
between demographic change and international capital flows appears to be crucial.
The anticipation effects found in this paper are non-negligible and depend upon the
degree of capital market imperfections. Even more, the results for present demography
become more precise, when anticipation effects are included. Accounting for anticipa-
tion effects is necessary to understand the timing of the effects of demographic change.
The timing will affect capital returns as well as other economic developments in a com-
plex way.
This analysis provides evidence that savings and investment patterns today adapt not
only to present but also to expected future demographic changes. Especially economic
forecasts should therefore incorporate these effects into their simulation models, and
model capital mobility carefully since it does not only affect international capital flows
directly, but also indirectly via its interrelation with anticipative behavior.
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2.5.3 Financial sector and other explanatory variables
An increase in the size of the financial sector leads to a small decrease in net capital
outflows which is significant in all specifications. Since SIZE is a measure of how de-
veloped the financial sector of a country is, a larger size renders the domestic financial
market place more attractive for foreign investors and may also absorb a higher share
of national capital.
On contrary, high taxes on income and capital gains (relative to total revenues), mea-
sured by the TAX variable, make capital outflows more likely. Capital outflows be-
come more attractive since lower taxes are levied upon the returns abroad. The oppo-
site holds for taxes on international trade (TRADETAX) which are highly statisti-
cally significant: They include import duties, profits of export or import monopolies,
exchange profits, and exchange taxes. All these components hamper not only goods,
but also capital mobility. The results clearly show that their effect is asymmetric and
hampers capital outflows more than inflows.
The same result holds for the capital control variable (CONTROL). Explicit restric-
tions and regulations of capital flows decrease the volume of capital invested abroad.
A final indicator of the intensity of national capital market activities is the variable
PRIV ATE, a proxy for the role of private investors in the national capital market.
The hypothesis, that an active involvement of private players in the capital market
goes along with less market regulation and more competition and thus more capital
imports, is supported by the results, that show a clearly significant negative effect on
capital exports.
The two variables CIV IL and RIGHTS coarsely capture general political risk, and
the security of property rights as well as the rule of law. The results for RIGHTS
confirms the conjectures from section 2.4.4. The significant negative coefficient for
RIGHTS in all specifications implies that the stronger political rights, the higher is
the tendency towards being a capital importer. I cannot find robust evidence of a
significant relationship between civil rights and net capital flows.
At last, I include SCHOOL in the empirical model. The results show that the de-
mographic effect still exists, even when controlling for changes in human capital, or
labor productivity. Furthermore, the better the evolution of human capital, the more
capital outflows occur. This effect stems from the labor productivity increasing effect
of schooling which translates into higher savings rates and higher net capital outflows.
2.6 The demographic effect in selected countries
This section is designated to further illustrate the importance of demographic effects
on international capital flows. For that purpose, I present in and out of sample projec-
tions of the effect of the demographic variables on net capital outflows. The purpose
of this section is not to present a forecast of future net capital flows. I simply calculate
the predicted net capital outflows induced by demography only. Thus, all explanatory
factors other than present and future demography are neglected for a moment, i.e.
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all other covariates are set to zero. Thus, this section should be viewed as a thought
experiment to illustrate the demographic effects for some selected countries.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the relative differences in youth and old age dependency rates
between 1960 and 2000. The results are surprising: cross country differences in old age
dependency were not very large before 2000, but are projected to become substantial
afterwards - in some countries, old age dependency will more than double. The differ-
ences in the relative age structure before 2000 are mainly driven by large differences
in youth dependency. Even after 2000, fertility is projected to play an important role
in defining the differences in age structure across countries.
Figure 2.6 shows the projected demographically induced net capital outflows resulting
from Specification 1 with present demography only, and Specification 3a which includes
present demography as well as anticipation effects. The comparison of the relative de-
pendency ratios and the predicted net capital outflows illustrates the regression results
from Section 2.5. The cross-country comparison of the levels of demographically in-
duced capital flows shows that in 1960, age differences resulted mainly from differences
in youth dependency. Countries with a low relative population share of young people
like Canada, Sweden, Argentina and Japan, for example, display demographically in-
duced capital outflows. In 2020, countries with a relatively high share of young people
like the US and Sweden will tend to be capital importers.
The demographic effects on capital flows can be illustrated very well over time, too.
For example, Argentina’s old age dependency will change little relative to the rest
of the world, while its relative youth dependency will increase substantially. Hence,
Argentina becomes younger in relative terms and will import more and more capital
flows over time. The projected demographically induced capital flows in Figure 2.6
shows exactly this pattern. Brazil’s relative youth dependency on contrary will de-
crease and its old age dependency is roughly flat over time, such that it tends to turn
from a net capital importer to an exporter.
In general, the decline in youth dependency in European and other OECD countries
like Japan is relatively moderate compared to the decline in less industrialized coun-
tries like Brazil, China and India. Hence, in terms of youth dependency the former
are aging less than the latter. This demographic counter-movement of the two groups
becomes more and more pronounced after 2000, so that capital exports of the Euro-
pean countries tend to shrink since the differences in youth dependency dominate the
differences in relative old age.
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Figure 2.5: Relative youth and old age dependency rates, selected countries, 1960-2050
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Figure 2.6: Demographic effects on net capital outflows, predictions of the pure demo-
graphic effects, 1960-2020
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The effects of future demography are also visible: First, they become obvious when
comparing the results of the two different specifications in Figure 2.6. Second, while
relative youth dependency is increasing steadily after 1980, the increase in relative
old-age dependency will begin only around 2010. This increase is anticipated and
thus, capital exports are already starting to decline around the year 2000, i.e. before
2010.
Table 2.4 illustrates the quantitative importance of demographic effects. Following
the representation of Higgins (1998), I calculate the ’demographic swings’: For a given
period, the demographic effect on a country’s net capital outflows can be calculated
as the demographically-induced deviations from the average net capital outflows over
this period 8. The difference between these demographic effects at two points in time is
the demographic swing - the demographically induced change in net capital outflows.
I calculate the swings between 1996 and 1970 for two specifications: specification 1
which contains present demography only, and specification 2a, which also incorporates
anticipation effects.
Table 2.4: Demographic effects with and without anticipation effects, 1970 vs. 1996,
selected countries
with anticipation without anticipation
specification 2a specification 1
Argentina -1.63% -1.87%
Brazil 7.27% 6.17%
Canada 8.60% 7.00%
China 9.07% 7.64%
France 5.52% 4.39%
India 2.60% 2.07%
Indonesia 3.79% 3.04%
Italy 3.16% 1.80%
Japan -2.47% -3.33%
Sweden 4.14% 2.87%
Turkey 6.32% 5.30%
USA 8,36% 6,96%
The results show that the effects are quantitatively non-negligible, and that the
demographically induced capital flows are larger in many of the selected countries when
anticipation is taken into account. As an extreme case, the USA experienced a marked
increase of net capital outflows, amounting to 6.96 per cent of GDP in 1996 compared
to 1970. When anticipation effects are also accounted for, the demographically induced
changes in net capital outflows total to 8.36 per cent of GDP. However, even in other
8This is the sum of the product of (i) the deviations of the age shares from their country-specific
means, and (ii) the corresponding age share coefficients from the regression.
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countries, the difference of the demographic swings between the two specifications is
around 1 percentage point.
2.7 Conclusions
Demographic change has a profound impact on international capital flows. Economies
with a relatively young age profile attract foreign capital from the aging countries due
to the widening demographic gap. The strongest effect is found for the working age
population.
The contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of demographic
anticipation effects on international capital flows. Future demographic changes are
reflected in capital accumulation and investment outcomes today. In particular, future
declines in youth dependency rates are associated with anticipative capital outflows.
Additionally, the paper shows that these anticipation effects hinge upon the degree
of international capital mobility and the development state of the domestic mar-
ket. These findings emphasize the dynamic nature of the link between demographic
changes and economic outcomes.
Demographic effects are quantitatively non-negligible and will become increasingly
important during the next decades due to the unprecedented aging process in the
developed world and the large demographic heterogeneity across world regions. It
is important to identify demographic and non-demographic determinants of capital
flows at times of global capital market integration and an upswing of cross-border
transactions. Knowledge about the factors driving these capital flows is also crucial
in policy-making. As an example, these factors play a key role in the perspectives
of partially funded pension systems, since their design determines where the addi-
tionally accumulated capital will be invested. International capital flows also provide
a mechanism to dissolve demographic pressure on domestic capital returns in aging
economies that shift to a partially funded pension system.
An even more intuitive political field for application are the development and design
of capital market structures and the role of institutional investors that can help
channel domestic savings to foreign capital markets while providing for diversification
of country-specific risks.
This paper shows that international capital flows are able to mitigate the negative
economic consequences of the population age mismatch in the developed world by
reducing the demographic pressure on capital returns in domestic markets. This
mechanism has beneficial impacts on young developing countries as well since it
provides them with the additional capital supply that is urgently needed.
In terms of policy implications, this mutual benefit can be strengthened by im-
provements in the international financial infrastructure, and thus enhancements in
international capital mobility.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 The construction of the demographic variables
This section describes how the demographic variables are transformed. The basic idea
is that demography matters only in terms of relative differences to other countries.
This should be reflected in the demographic variables.
First, I calculate the weighted sum of population age shares in the rest of the world.
The weights are the average population sizes POPAV G between 1960 and 1997 of
each country.
In the next step, I calculate the population shares of each age group j in the rest of
the world from the perspective of country i at time t, FORPOPijt:
FORPOPijt =
PK
k 6=i dkjt∗POPAV Gkj−dijt∗POPAV GijPK
k 6=i POPAV Gkj−POPAV Gij
,
where dijt is the share of age group j in the population of country i at time t. The
final step consists of taking the difference between the demographic variable in country
i and in the rest of the world (FORPOPijt). The resulting variable RELPOPijt
represents the relative difference in the share of age group j between country i and the
rest of the world at time t. The same procedure is applied to the dependency rates.
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2.8.2 Robustness checks concerning the order of the polynomial
In order to check whether the polynomial of the present demography, described in
section 2.4.2, is properly specified, I also estimate polynomials of third and fifth order.
However, generally, choosing a high-order polynomial is unproblematic, because all
lower order polynomials are nested in this specification. As can be seen in Figure
2.7, the third order polynomial is obviously too inflexible and does not model the
demographic effects properly. The fifth-order polynomial displays a high sensitivity
at the ends of the polynomial function. Thus, the fourth-order specification seems to
be most suitable for analyzing demographic effects.
Figure 2.7: Estimated current age share coefficients: specification using a) a fifth order,
b) a fourth order, and c) a third order polynomial structure
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2.8.3 Sensitivity analysis: Including lagged GDP growth in the
regressions
Table 2.5: Regression results for specifications 1 and 2
Dependent variable: NET CAPITAL OUTFLOWS
SPEC 1 SPEC 2a SPEC 2b
Present demography
D1 -1.026 (5.52)*** -1.173 (6.38)*** -0.999 (5.39)***
D2 0.307 (6.81)*** 0.355 (7.80)*** 0.312 (6.75)***
D3 -0.029 (7.14)*** -0.034 (8.08)*** -0.030 (7.06)***
D4 0.001 (6.95)*** 0.001 (7.82)*** 0.001 (6.84)***
Expected future demography
OLD -0.009 (0.51) 0.035 (0.65)
YNG -0.104 (5.26)*** -0.219 (6.65)***
OLD*SIZE -0.081 (0.99)
YNG*SIZE 0.333 (4.72)***
Other covariates
SIZE -0.025 (2.26)** -0.025 (2.30)** -0.035 (3.20)***
TAX 0.032 (2.64)*** 0.028 (2.35)** 0.024 (2.06)**
TRADETAX -0.115 (7.26)*** -0.119 (8.06)*** -0.114 (7.29)***
PRIVATE -0.030 (3.62)*** -0.030 (3.80)*** -0.027 (3.49)***
CONTROL -0.014 (3.89)*** -0.015 (4.36)*** -0.014 (4.14)***
RIGHTS -0.003 (3.38)*** -0.003 (3.30)*** -0.002 (2.94)***
CIVIL 0.001 (1.09) 0.001 (0.83) 0.002 (1.53)
SCHOOL 0.035 (3.12)*** 0.031 (2.73)*** 0.034 (3.06)***
GROWTH(t-1) -0.053 (3.12)*** -0.056 (4.41)*** -0.056 (4.67)***
CONSTANT 0.026 (1.87)* 0.039 (2.84)*** 0.035 (2.48)**
Observations 1804 1804 1804
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
FGLS estimation with country-specific AR(1)-process and heteroskedasticity.
17 region dummies included.
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goods & services
3.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes how population aging can affect the aggregate national struc-
ture of the demand for goods and services. Individual consumer spending for different
goods change markedly over the life cycle. In an aging economy like Germany,
these individual profiles translate into changes in the aggregate composition of goods
demand.
The consumption and savings literature has become increasingly aware of the ne-
cessity to study the consumer behavior of households around retirement (Banks,
Blundell, and Tanner 1998; Gustman and Steinmeier 1999; Hurd and Rohwedder
2003; Hamermesh 1984; Lundberg, Startz, and Stillman 2001; Miniaci, Monfardini,
and Weber 2003). The behavior of retirees might differ substantially from that of
working citizens, if one considers their time budget for leisure activities, their health
status and the changes in income at retirement. In the course of the aging process,
these households play an increasing role in the economy.
However, not only the behavior of the elderly attracts more interest in the course
of an unprecedented aging process. What will be the macroeconomic changes? Will
the differences in consumer demand over the life cycle change the national demand
structure? If, for example, the share of health in overall expenditures rises significantly
due to the needs of the elderly, this will affect the production of health goods in the
future. More generally, changes in the age structure of the population are likely to
trigger substantial sectoral shifts. Thus, predicting long-term demographic trends
on demand is important for the planning of long-term investments. Such demand
changes will also affect other areas of the economy. The effect on national production
depends on the trade activities, which might react to demand changes as well. In
addition, sectoral employment is closely linked to sectoral production. If sectoral
mobility of employees is low, adjusting the sectoral production to changes in demand
might be difficult, which increases the value of long-term predictions. Thus, this
chapter is part of a broader research agenda investigating the effects of demographic
change on capital, labor and goods markets at the macroeconomic level and the above
mentioned interactions between these effects.
A shift-share analysis by Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003a) gives a coarse first investigation of
the aggregate aging effects on the composition of consumer expenditures. Projected
expenditures for health in Germany are found to be increasing with population aging,
while transportation expenditures decrease markedly.
35
3 Population aging and the demand for goods & services
The chapter contributes to the aging literature by extending this analysis, and to
the demand literature by providing macroeconomic projections of the demand for
various goods based on a micro-level analysis of age-specific household behavior.
The analysis is conducted for West German households between 1978 and 1998. I
apply the quadratic extension of the classical Almost Ideal Demand System model
(QUAIDS) by Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997) to household data from five waves
of the EVS (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe), a German household budget
survey.
Micro- and macroeconomic estimates of consumer demand are often difficult to
reconcile. Blundell, Pashardes, and Weber (1993) find that micro-level forecasts of
consumer demand do not necessarily outperform macro-level ones. In order to avoid
aggregation bias, some basic distributional weights have to be included in macroe-
conomic forecasts. The stability of the macro-level results hinges upon low variation
of these aggregation weights respectively their predictable evolution. I argue in this
chapter, that the aging process does not only alter the population age structure, but
also other household characteristics. Hence, an aggregation of micro-level demands
seems preferable given the expected instability of the aggregation weights over time.
I aim at disentangling various effects of population aging on demand. Thus, I construct
four scenarios: First, I investigate the isolated effect of a change in the population age
structure on demand. Second, I take economic growth into account, which leads to
increasing household incomes and increasing total expenditures. Next, I analyze two
indirect effects of population aging: The first is associated with the social security
system. Demographic pressures in financing old-age pensions have to be borne either
by higher contributions or lower benefits in a pay-as-you-go system. Depending on
how the system is designed, the intergenerational distribution of this burden is in
favor of the young or the old, creating different income distributions and consumer
budgets. I analyze this change in the intergenerational distribution of economic
resources by computing aggregate demand under two extreme pension schemes, that
have been discussed in Germany. Second, aging goes along with changes in household
composition. These are caused by lower fertility since the baby bust, the increasing
number of single households and childless two-person households and the high number
of elderly single households. This scenario technique helps understanding the various
mechanisms through which population aging affects the aggregate demand for certain
goods and services.
In the microeconomic analysis, I find strong age-specific differences in the demand of
households for the eight composite goods considered. In the course of the life cycle,
goods and services in the categories health and education & leisure become more
important components of total nondurable expenditures. In an aging economy like
Germany, these age effects translate into demand changes over time on the macroeco-
nomic level. I show that these changes are substantial. Especially furniture, clothing,
transport and education & leisure expenditures become less important factors in
total spending - their share in total expenditures decreases by up to 20 percent. On
contrary, the share of health in aggregate spending increases by 6 to 9 percent and
Other goods sizeably gain in weight as well.
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Analyzing the direct and indirect effects of aging, I find the following: While the pure
effect of a shift in the population age structure does already trigger significant demand
changes, the effects are magnified when moderate growth in total expenditures is
assumed. Furthermore, different intergenerational distributions of total expenditures
-as modelled by the two pension schemes- do not result in large differences in the
projected evolution of aggregate demand composition. This is due to the small
distributional changes that are assumed, although two extreme pension schemes are
modelled. Hence, even under extreme reform proposals, the effect of expenditure
growth is much stronger than the indirect effect resulting from a pension reform and
its effect on the spending power of households.
Finally, accounting for changes in family formation which lead to a rapidly decreasing
household size, but a slow decrease in the number of households, does not alter the
results substantially either. The effect of population aging becomes slightly smaller,
but the qualitative results are the same.
In summary, the results indicate that future trends in consumer demand caused by
population aging. However, these changes are not caused solely by age-specific tastes,
but also to a large extent by the different spending power of the age groups.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 contains the es-
timation of the age-specific demand patterns of households. Section 3.3 uses these
estimates and projects the macroeconomic effects of population aging on demand.
First, the aggregation procedure is developed (Section 3.3.1). Second, I describe the
scenarios (Section 3.3.3) and subsequently present the results of the demand projec-
tions in the four scenarios (Section 3.3.4). Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The microeconomic analysis of the life cycle
demand patterns of households
In this first part of the chapter, I investigate the effects of household characteristics,
especially the age of the household head, on the allocation of household expenditures
to consumer goods. I estimate a demand system of eight composite goods.
3.2.1 Data
The data are five cross-sections of budget survey data on West German households,
the German Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS). Although many house-
holds are recorded in multiple waves, it is not possible to track households over time.
Hence, I conduct the analysis on pooled data, and thus cannot account for unobserved
heterogeneity.
The EVS slightly over-samples middle-income households. However, sampling weights
have been supplied by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) to con-
trol for this. These sampling weights stem from the comparison between (representa-
tive) German micro census information and the EVS.
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The consumption module of the survey contains diary information on expenditures
for several categories of goods and services. These categories are quite comprehensive,
but it is obvious that they do not capture all expenditures. Missing expenditures are
those not paid for by the household directly. An example are subsidies like studying
at university, which is being paid for by all citizens, but consumed only by those who
receive it. Also missing are expenditures for goods and services, that contain an in-
surance component, like health insurance or liability insurance. These might also be
partly subsidized like German public health insurance.
Figure 3.1: Mean expenditure shares by age, averaged over the sample years 1978-1998
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Total expenditures are not equivalent to total consumption for additional reasons.
First, changes in relative prices trigger changes in expenditures which might even be
reverse, depending on the income and substitution elasticities. In the empirical anal-
ysis, overall inflation does not affect the results because I investigate expenditures for
certain goods as a share of total expenditures, so that such price trends cancel out.
Additionally, I account for commodity-specific price trends by including a time trend
as will be explained in more detail in section 3.2.3.
Second, consumption is the outcome of a home production function which uses both
expenditures and time as inputs (Becker 1965). So, households produce some goods
and services at home and can substitute between market-purchased goods and self-
produced ones according to their preferences and in reaction to changes in relative
prices. The role of home production is analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5. In this chapter,
I do not take home production into account and I assume, that relative price changes
between goods reflect respective quality changes between them.
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I use expenditure data for eight composite categories of goods and services: Food,
Clothing & Shoes, Energy, Furniture & Home Electronics, Health & Body Care, Trans-
portation & Communication, Education & Leisure Goods, and Other Goods including
jewelry, holiday expenditures and travel costs.1 Housing expenditures are omitted for
reasons explained later, so total spending is computed as non-housing expenditures.
In addition, a set of socioeconomic variables is available. Price information is taken
from an online time series compilation of the Statistisches Bundesamt.
Figure 3.1 depicts the allocation of total spending on the eight goods by age, aver-
aged over the sample period. The share of food stays roughly constant for households
between ages 35 and 66, and increases thereafter. Young households spend an increas-
ing share of their expenditures on furniture and household goods up to age 30, then
this expenditure share remains constant at about 8 per cent. Health and body care
expenditures gain an increasing weight in total spending from age 45 onwards; their
expenditure share roughly doubles between age 45 and 75. A very similar pattern
can be seen for the Energy expenditure share. The expenditure share of Transporta-
tion & Communication, on contrary, is highest at young ages and strongly declines
until age 35 and again after age 60. The hump shaped age profile for the category
”Other Goods” including holiday expenses is consistent with a strong rise in travelling
activities around retirement between ages 60 and 70. However, note that Figure 3.1
confounds age, year and cohort effects. The displayed trends also do not disentangle
the accompanying effects of household composition, income differences between house-
holds and the influence of other household characteristics. Thus, it only serves as a
descriptive starting point for the analysis.
3.2.2 The theoretical framework
Preferences over all available consumer goods are represented by the utility function
of the household U(q, z) where q is a vector of the quantities of the composite goods
consumed by the household and z is a vector of household characteristics. Households
maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint x = pT q, where pT is the
transposed price vector and x is total consumer spending.2
One might ask where the savings decision enters in this framework and why I use
non-housing expenditures as a measure of total expenditures. The decision problem
is separated into a general consumption-savings decision and a subsequent decision
about the allocation of total expenditures on different goods (Blundell 1988). By this
separability assumption, I only need to model the decision at the second stage, where
the household allocates its consumption budget to the different goods. This so-called
two-stage budgeting is consistent with the intertemporal additive utility function of
1Appendix 3.5.1 describes how equivalent categories are created across the five waves of the survey.
A detailed description of the goods and services contained in each composite group can be found
in Appendix 3.5.1.
2Usually, x is referred to as income so that the budget constraint balances incomes and expenditures.
I do not model the consumption-savings decision and use total expenditures instead of income as
the disposable budget for consumption purposes.
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the standard life cycle model (Blundell and Walker 1986). In addition, I assume sepa-
rability between the durable good housing and the other, non-durable (or less durable)
goods. In addition to the problems generally associated with infrequently purchased
goods, housing expenditures represent to a large part an investment and thus part
of the asset portfolio of households. Therefore, total spending is calculated exclud-
ing housing expenditures. In the same fashion, I assume weak separability between
labor supply and consumer demand. This is done simply due to data constraints:
the Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS) does not provide information on
the employment status of the spouse and no information on hours worked for either
member of the household.
The utility maximization problem of each period is transformed into a cost minimiza-
tion problem at given prices p and given utility level u for the cost function of each
good i in a system of I goods. Thus, the underlying assumption is that prices are
exogenously given for the household. I choose the classical functional form of the
Quadratic Almost Ideal demand system :
ln c(u, p, z) = ln a(p, z) +
u · b(p, z)
1− u · g(p, z) (3.1)
where a(.), b(.) and g(.) are functions of prices and household characteristics. For a(.)
and b(.), I choose the translog respectively the Cobb-Douglas form, and for g(.), I use
the specification from Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997):
ln a(p, z) = α0 +
∑
k
ζikzk +
∑
i
(αi +
∑
k
ηikzk) ln pi
+
1
2
∑
i
∑
j
γij ln pi ln pj
(3.2)
b(p, z) =
∏
i
p
βi0+
P
k
βikzk
i (3.3)
ln g(p, z) =
∑
i
(λi0 +
∑
k
λikzk) ln pi (3.4)
zk denotes the household characteristic k, pi is the price of good i and pj is the price
of good j. αi, βi, γi, ηi, λi and ζi are the structural parameters of interest in the model.
The time subscript is omitted here for ease of notation.
Shephard’s Lemma (Shephard 1953) gives the Hicksian demand for each good i,
hi(u, p, z), here denoted as expenditure shares wi(u, p, z) due to the log specification
of the cost function:
∂ci(u, p, z)
∂pi
= hi(u, p, z) = qi and
∂ ln ci(u, p, z)
∂ ln pi
=
piqi
c(u, p, z)
= wi(u, p, z)
(3.5)
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Using that ln c(u, p, z) = ln x, inverting and substituting gives the Marshallian de-
mands in expenditure shares wi(x, p, z) as:
wi(x, p, z) = αi +
∑
k
ηikzk +
∑
j
γij ln pj + (βi0 +
∑
k
βikzk) ·
[
ln
x
a(p, z)
]
+
λi0 +
∑
k
λikzk
b(p, z)
·
[
ln
x
a(p, z)
]2 (3.6)
where x is total expenditures on all goods in the demand system.
In order to estimate this system, several constraints derived from economic theory are
imposed on the parameters (Deaton 1986). The adding-up property requires that:
n∑
i=1
αi = 1
n∑
i=1
ηik = 0 ∀k
n∑
i=1
γij = 0
n∑
i=1
βi0 = 0
n∑
i=1
βik = 0 ∀k
n∑
i=1
λi0 = 0
n∑
i=1
λik = 0 ∀k
(3.7)
Homogeneity (of degree zero) of the indirect utility function in x and p adds further
restrictions on the price parameters:∑
j
γij = 0 ∀i and γij = γji (3.8)
Due to the adding-up condition, one equation can be left out and the remaining (I−1)
equations are estimated. The parameters of the left out equation can be recovered
using the constraints.
3.2.3 Estimation
I estimate the system using an instrumental variables approach with demands of the
general form of equation (6), but restricting the price coefficient γij to zero:
wi = αi +
∑
k
ηikzk +
(
βi0 +
∑
k
βikzk
)
·
[
ln
x
a(p, z)
]
+
(
λi0 +
∑
k
λikzk
)
· 1
b(p, z)
·
[
ln
x
a(p, z)
]2
+ ²i
(3.9)
where ²i is a randomly distributed error term.
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The price restriction is imposed because of too little price variation in the data.3 If
there are any price trends, they will be absorbed by the time trends included in the
estimation. Any other short-term price fluctuations like cyclical fluctuations can be
neglected here, since the focus of this study is on long-run trends.
The key explanatory variables are the age and time effects. The next Section contains
a discussion of the identification approach for these effects. In addition, I control
for household characteristics like household size, the number of children, and the em-
ployment status of the household head. Last, I include total non-housing consumer
expenditures and squared expenditures in order to capture income effects. The en-
dogeneity of non-housing expenditures (henceforth: total expenditures) is taken into
account by instrumenting the expenditure variable with disposable household income.
I also control for owner-occupier status, i.e. whether the household is renting his home
or owning it, and also interact this dummy variable with the other household char-
acteristics in order to capture behavioral differences between the renter and owner
households.
The quadratic model is used because Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997) showed that
Engel curves are nonlinear, but well approximated by a quadratic functional form.
Furthermore, I interact the two expenditure terms with a second order polynomial of
age in order to allow for different shapes of the Engel curves for different age groups.
Total expenditures are calculated as nominal expenditures divided by the price index
a(p, z). Since each household consumes individually composed sets of goods aggregated
into the eight composite goods, I calculate a Stone price index for each household h
as an approximation to a(·).4
3.2.4 Identification of age, cohort and time effects
The identification of age, cohort and time effects is a crucial step in this analysis.
The identification problem arises from the fact that the age of the household head
can be inferred by subtracting the year in which the household is born, i.e. his co-
hort information, from the sample year. In consequence, identifying assumptions are
needed which are inherently untestable. In the following, I will describe the chosen
identification approach (Variant 1). Furthermore, I will carry out a sensitivity analysis
using two alternative identifying assumptions (Variants 2 and 3), and show that the
resulting estimated age effects do not differ substantially:
- Variant 1: I assume cohort effects to be zero. Thus, I model demands to be
age- and time-variant only. I expect strong cohort effects in the consumption-
savings decision, e.g. behavioral differences between the post-war generation
and the generation growing up during the German economic miracle. However,
3I only have eight price observations for each of the five waves, one price for each commodity group.
Due to overall price trends, there is additionally a high correlation between the time series of the
commodity prices.
4The Stone price index is the weighted sum of the prices pi and the expenditure shares wih of the
composite goods i: pih =
∑
i
piwih.
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due to the two-stage budgeting approach, I am focusing on the decision how to
allocate total expenditures to different goods, which I expect to be less prone to
cohort effects. If the post-war generation is a high-saving one and the younger
generations is more inclined to spend than to save, the former generation is likely
to make its choice in a similar way as an individual of the latter one with a low
income, given that their total expenditures will be similar.
- Variant 2: This identification strategy follows the approach by Deaton and Pax-
son (1994). Their decomposition attributes behavioral changes to cohort and
age effects, and constrains the time effects to capture cyclical fluctuations or
business-cycle effects that average to zero in the long-run. A more detailed
description can be found in Appendix 3.5.2.
- Variant 3: This third approach is based on statistical identification. It includes
age, time and cohort effects in the regressions by choosing different functional
forms for either one.
For the age effects, I chose a 5-year dummy specification for all three variants. Variant
1 assumes that there are no cohort effects. The cohort variables in variants 2 (3)
are cohort dummy variables in 5-year (10-year) intervals. Finally, time enters as
transformed time dummies in the Deaton-Paxson approach in variant 2 (see Appendix
3.5.2), while it takes the form of a linear trend in the other specifications. Table 3.1
summarizes the estimated variants.
Table 3.1: Summary of the three alternative identification variants
Variant Age effect Cohort effect Year effect
1 * 5-year dummies none linear trend
5-year dummies 5-year dummies transf. year dummies (see App. 3.5.2)
3 5-year dummies 10-year dummies linear trend
* All results presented in the subsequent sections are based on Variant 1.
The pure age profiles for all eight composite goods are depicted in Figure 3.2. The
estimated coefficients for the dummies show that the age profiles are distinctly non-
linear. A comparison of the profiles under these different identification approaches
shows that there are no large differences in the estimated age coefficients. Hence, I
will use variant 1 as the basis for the projections throughout this chapter. It has some
suitable properties that are helpful for the projections. For example, the absence of
cohort effects rules out the necessity to make ad hoc assumptions about the cohort
effects of newly born future cohorts.
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Figure 3.2: Estimated age coefficients using Variants 1 to 3
Variant 1: No cohort effects
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Variant 2: Deaton-Paxson decomp. Variant 3: Statistical identification
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Annotation: The coefficients are normalized to an initial zero at age 20 for ease of comparison.
3.2.5 Results
Table 3.2 shows the results of the demand system estimation based on Variant 1. The
regression includes age and time dummies, a linear and quadratic log expenditure
term, and household characteristics such as a dummy which takes the value 1 if there
are children at all in the household, the number of children and the number of chil-
dren squared as well as log household size, a dummy variable indicating whether the
household head is working, and a dummy for self-employed household heads.
Furthermore, I include additional interactions of all covariates with owner-occupier
status. There might be systematic differences in the composition of demand depend-
ing on the decision whether to rent or own a house or a flat. Housing expenses can
be pure consumption, but if a house or flat is owned by the household, expenses are
also part of the savings of a household. In order to capture potential non-separability
between the decision whether to own or rent a house and other consumer expenses,
I introduce these interactions with the dummy of owner-occupier status taking the
value one, if the household owns the flat or house it lives in (see Figure 3.3).
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Finally, I interact the log expenditure terms with age and age squared in order to get
age-specific Engel curves (see Section 3.2.5).
Figure 3.3: Estimated age coefficients using Variant 1 with ownership interactions
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Annotation: The coefficients are normalized to an initial zero at age 20 for ease of comparison.
Age effects
Figure 3.2 illustrates the substantial age affects. While the expenditure shares for
food, furniture and energy increase strongly with age, the shares spent on leisure,
clothing and transport decline substantially. The pattern of health is hump-shaped.
These patterns are surprising since one would expect health expenditures to increase
even at advanced ages. However, one has to bear in mind that the category ”Health
& Body care” includes only out-of-pocket health expenditures. These may decrease to
a minimum for the older old because their health costs are covered to a larger extent
by health insurance and are thus not measured here. The treatment of major or more
serious health problems which typically occur in older ages is much more likely to be
covered by health insurance. The older old often have some chronical diseases like
high blood pressure etc. and usually have to take prescribed pills on a daily basis.
Additionally, they often receive assistance they do not pay privately.
Furthermore, Figure 3.2 does not incorporate the effect of total expenditures which
also varies by age, due to the unequal distribution of overall expenditures over age
groups. Therefore, one has to look at the age-specific Engel curves as well when
trying to untangle the age profiles of demand.
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Table 3.2: Regression results
food clothing energy furnit. health transp. leisure
age dummies
age21-24 -0.0093 -0.0407 0.0649 0.0245 0.0248 0.0165 -0.0294
(1.17) (8.52)*** (18.00)*** (3.02)*** (4.76)*** (1.65)* (4.96)***
age25-29 -0.0219 -0.0851 0.1504 0.0489 0.0605 0.0470 -0.0881
(1.41) (9.15)*** (21.43)*** (3.10)*** (5.95)*** (2.41)** (7.63)***
age30-34 -0.0484 -0.1286 0.2521 0.0868 0.0962 0.0765 -0.1584
(1.91)* (8.51)*** (22.12)*** (3.39)*** (5.83)*** (2.41)** (8.44)***
age35-39 -0.0649 -0.1652 0.3406 0.1159 0.1210 0.1048 -0.2194
(1.90)* (8.11)*** (22.14)*** (3.35)*** (5.43)*** (2.45)** (8.66)***
age40-44 -0.0878 -0.1907 0.4235 0.1434 0.1377 0.1319 -0.2745
(2.09)** (7.61)*** (22.37)*** (3.37)*** (5.02)*** (2.51)** (8.81)***
age45-49 -0.1101 -0.2081 0.4975 0.1659 0.1481 0.1595 -0.3268
(2.25)** (7.14)*** (22.60)*** (3.36)*** (4.64)*** (2.61)*** (9.02)***
age50-54 -0.1309 -0.2240 0.5616 0.2007 0.1502 0.1777 -0.3688
(2.39)** (6.86)*** (22.77)*** (3.62)*** (4.20)*** (2.59)*** (9.09)***
age55-59 -0.1593 -0.2293 0.6172 0.2261 0.1435 0.1990 -0.3981
(2.67)*** (6.44)*** (22.98)*** (3.75)*** (3.69)*** (2.66)*** (9.00)***
age60-62 -0.1725 -0.2323 0.6623 0.2488 0.1260 0.2189 -0.4226
(2.71)*** (6.13)*** (23.14)*** (3.87)*** (3.04)*** (2.75)*** (8.97)***
age63-65 -0.1869 -0.2306 0.6871 0.2644 0.1132 0.2285 -0.4327
(2.86)*** (5.91)*** (23.31)*** (3.99)*** (2.65)*** (2.79)*** (8.92)***
age66-69 -0.1913 -0.2277 0.7065 0.2720 0.0974 0.2339 -0.43874
(2.86)*** (5.69)*** (23.40)*** (4.01)*** (2.23)** (2.79)*** (8.83)***
age70-74 -0.1938 -0.2257 0.7343 0.2796 0.0695 0.2390 -0.4440
(2.82)*** (5.51)*** (23.74)*** (4.02)*** (1.55) (2.78)*** (8.72)***
age75-79 -0.1977 -0.2223 0.7578 0.2954 0.0281 0.2474 -0.4428
(2.83)*** (5.33)*** (24.04)*** (4.17)*** (0.62) (2.82)*** (8.54)***
age80+ -0.1942 -0.2128 0.7783 0.3032 -0.0232 0.2553 -0.4398
(2.76)*** (5.07)*** (24.55)*** (4.26)*** (0.51) (2.90)*** (8.43)***
time trend
year -0.00144 -0.00113 -0.00044 -0.00087 0.00143 0.00089 0.00186
(43.08)*** (56.81)*** (29.35)*** (25.91)*** (65.95)*** (21.43)*** (75.15)***
The reference category for the age dummies is the age group between 18 and 20 years.
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Table 2 (continued): Regression results
food clothing energy furnit. health transp. leisure
log total expenditures
ln(x) -0.3757 -0.0522 0.1216 0.2298 0.2078 0.4124 -0.0816
(9.68)*** (2.25)** (6.96)*** (5.85)*** (8.20)*** (8.48)*** (2.84)***
ln(x)2 0.0265 0.0036 -0.0090 -0.0168 -0.0175 -0.0385 0.0010
(7.74)*** (1.78)* (5.86)*** (4.84)*** (7.82)*** (9.00)*** (0.38)
ln(x) 0.0056 0.0040 -0.0075 -0.0024 -0.0064 -0.0061 0.0043
∗age (4.99)*** (5.97)*** (14.93)*** (2.15)** (8.71)*** (4.33)*** (5.17)***
ln(x)2 -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 0.0006 0.0007 -0.00009
∗age (6.02)*** (4.20)*** (10.14)*** (1.37) (8.79)*** (5.49)*** (1.25)
ln(x) -0.00004 -0.00003 0.00004 0.00001 0.0001 0.00004 -0.00002
∗age2 (5.71)*** (5.91)*** (10.76)*** (1.65)* (13.55)*** (3.96)*** (3.98)***
ln(x)2 0.00001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.00001 0.0000 0.0000
∗age2 (7.36)*** (2.88)*** (5.18)*** (1.07) (13.10)*** (5.42)*** (1.13)
household composition
ln(size) 0.0874 -0.0114 0.0054 0.0109 -0.0143 0.0105 -0.0247
(83.68)*** (18.32)*** (11.48)*** (10.31)*** (20.91)*** (8.03)*** (31.83)***
nokids 0.0132 -0.0085 -0.0073 -0.0101 -0.0028 0.0053 0.0128
(3.98)*** (4.29)*** (4.90)*** (3.02)*** (1.30) (1.27) (5.20)***
#kids -0.0173 0.0073 -0.0001 -0.0150 0.0081 -0.0252 0.0230
(4.62)*** (3.28)*** (0.07) (3.97)*** (3.31)*** (5.38)*** (8.30)***
#kids2 0.0025 -0.0013 0.0005 0.0027 -0.0019 0.0035 -0.0039
(2.72)*** (2.39)** (1.13) (2.90)*** (3.19)*** (3.09)*** (5.67)***
self− 0.0156 0.0005 0.0061 -0.0081 -0.0004 -0.0021 -0.0023
empl. (14.45)*** (0.76) (12.55)*** (7.42)*** (0.53) (1.55) (2.89)***
not 0.0000 -0.0060 0.0088 -0.0088 0.0022 -0.0191 0.0048
work. (0.00) (9.58)*** (18.51)*** (8.26)*** (3.27)*** (14.51)*** (6.15)***
owner 1.1298 -0.4654 0.7469 -0.6265 -0.4353 -0.5044 -0.8316
occup. (8.01)*** (5.53)*** (11.75)*** (4.39)*** (4.73)*** (2.85)*** (7.95)***
Obs. 203746 203746 203746 203746 203746 203746 203746
R2 0.29 0.04 0.43 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.08
Annotation: Further covariates are interacted terms of owner-occupier status with the household
composition variables, the age dummies and the expenditure terms. The results are reported in
Appendix 3.5.3. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at 10, 5,
1%
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Estimated Engel curves
As Table 3.2 shows, total expenditure affects the composition of demand in a sig-
nificant and nonlinear way, as the significance of the quadratic term in most of the
estimated equations shows. Furthermore, the interaction between age-specific and
budget-specific demand is important. Most of the interacted terms are significant.
Figure 3.5 underlines the role of age in the relation between income, respectively total
expenditures, and demand for the different composite goods.
The Engel curves of transportation and furniture are distinctly hump-shaped. How-
ever, while transport shares decrease distinctly with age, conditional on total expen-
ditures, furniture shares decrease with age only for households with large spending,
and decrease significantly otherwise.
Health & Body Care is also inversely u-shaped and its share increases substantially
with age. The latter is consistent with common knowledge that health expenditures
increase almost exponentially with age. It is obvious from the figure that there is not
much heterogeneity in the Engel curves of the age groups until age 50. It is only for
the retirees of 60 years and over, that the share spent on out-of pocket health increases
strongly with the level of total expenditures.
Figure 3.4: Average log total real expenditures over age groups by sample years 1978-
1998
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Food and energy shares are necessities that decline with rising total expenditures.
Food expenditures are the largest part of total nondurable expenditures of households
of medium age, and is smaller for young and older households. The share spent on
energy, on contrary, is increasing remarkably by age, especially for households with
lower total expenditures. For richer households, the share increases by much less, with
the exception of those aged 80 years or more.
Considering total spending, it is important to understand that much of what we inter-
pret as an age effect on expenses actually confounds with effects of total consumption,
or, loosely speaking, income effects. Household resources change over the life-cycle -
often as a function of age, and thus influence household behavior in addition to poten-
tial age-related taste changes. For example, households usually experience income cuts
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when they enter retirement, probably be even so in the future when the demographic
pressure on the social security systems becomes even more severe.
Therefore, it is important to look at the age distribution of total expenditures which is
depicted in Figure 3.4 (without correcting for cohort effects). The age profile of total
expenses, however, is very pronounced and of a hump-shaped form. This distinct age
profile has to be accounted for when analyzing the aggregate effects of aging: although
elderly households gain weight in the aggregate by simply becoming more numerable,
they have, on average, a smaller budget than prime-age households.
Figure 3.5: Engel curves for some selected composite goods
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The other explanatory variables are set to their age-specific means.
Total expenditures are allowed to vary around the mean by two standard deviations.
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Household characteristics
The relative small set of household characteristics included in the analysis results
mainly from data restrictions. The more recent waves of the EVS (1993 and 1998)
contain richer information about households including education variables and female
employment status. However, this information is not available for the older waves.
As expected, larger households have a higher expenditure share for goods that cannot
be shared, like food, energy, furniture and transportation. Synergy effects within the
household decrease the share spent on furniture and transportation & communication.
On contrary, large households tend to reduce their expenditures for luxury goods like
education & leisure expenditures.
Households without children spent a lower share on clothing, energy and furniture,
but relatively more on food and leisure goods. If there are kids in the household,
the shares of leisure and clothing initially rise in the number of children and decline
above the threshold of three children. The opposite holds for furniture, food and
transportation: shares decrease with the first two children and increase after the third
child. Only the energy share is monotonously increasing.
Households with a non working head spend a significantly higher share of their
total expenditures on health, energy and leisure activities, and less on clothing,
furniture and transportation than their employed counterparts. This is intuitive
since work-related expenditures for transportation and clothing cease to apply. At
the same time, non workers have more leisure and want to complement them with
leisure goods. They spend probably more time at home, therefore energy demand rises.
The age-specific expenditure patterns found in this section are not only relevant for
determining household demands for goods and services at the micro-level - they also
affect the aggregate demand structure of an economy. The aging of societies across
the world does not only alter the functioning of social security systems and capital
markets. It is also likely to affect the market for goods and services, in particular
through the distinctly age-specific expenditure patterns shown in this section which
trigger changes in aggregate demand.
3.3 Effects of aging on aggregate demand
As is widely known, the demographic changes have been substantial in the last decades
and the aging process of the population will become even more severe in the future.
Within Europe, the aging process in Germany is among the most pronounced.
Figure 3.6 shows population pyramids for the years 1980, 2010, 2030 and 2050. It
clearly illustrates the significant drop in the population share of the young and the
increase in the elderly population. While in 1980, the majority of the population
was younger than age 45, this pattern reverses until 2030. The intensity of the aging
process underlines the importance of researching into its macroeconomic consequences,
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e.g. the implications for goods markets and demand composition.
Hence, I explore how population aging can affect the aggregate demand structure of
the household sector. First, I explain the aggregation procedure which is based on
the micro-economic estimates conducted previously (Section 3.3.1). Second, I carry
out an aggregation of the West German demand structure for the in-sample years
1978, 1983, 1988, 1993 and 1998 (Section 3.3.2). Then, I project changes in the
demand composition induced by population aging using demographic projections by
the Ru¨rup Kommission (Bundesministerium fu¨r Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung
2003).5. Section 3.3.3 gives an overview of the scenarios that are used in the analysis.
The demand changes that result from these scenarios are then discussed in Section
3.3.4.
Figure 3.6: Population by age (in 100 thousand), 1980-2050
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In the demand projections presented in the following, I neglect all supply side effects
by assuming that supply is perfectly price-elastic. This assumption is certainly not
warranted in the short-run. However, demographic change is a long-term phenomenon.
In the long run it is not clear, whether the relative prices react to the demographically
5This commission was appointed by the German government in order to work out reform proposals
for the German social security system. The projections build on a set of demographic assumptions
that were agreed upon by leading experts in the field. They are deemed more precise than the UN
projections for Germany, however, the results do not change much if one uses the UN projections.
51
3 Population aging and the demand for goods & services
induced demand changes at all, and if, in which direction they change. This depends
on the evolution of technical progress and other factors. Thus, instead of making ar-
bitrary assumptions about the future evolution of these variables, I present the ceteris
paribus results of demographically induced changes to isolate the influence of popu-
lation aging and associated foreseeable changes in household characteristics. These
are threefold: From the demographic projections, one can derive the future path of
household composition including the partnership decision and the fertility decisions.
Second, the evolution of total expenditures over time can be approximated by projec-
tions of future economic growth. Third, the distribution of total expenditures across
households depends on the social security reforms carried out, since they substantially
influence the intergenerational distribution of income.
I approach the projection task in scenarios. They are designed to disentangle the
direct effect of a shift in the population age structure and the above mentioned ac-
companying effects of aging. These scenarios start with a simple baseline case where I
assume that all household characteristics etc. remain at the base year level of 1993.6
The only variation in the future stems from the changing age structure of the popula-
tion. In the subsequent scenarios (see Section 3.3.3), I relax some of these restrictive
assumptions: I allow for growing incomes, and investigate two accompanying effects of
aging, namely changes in the household composition and changes in the distribution
of spending power over age. Next; I explain the aggregation procedure.
3.3.1 The aggregation procedure
The aggregation idea is simple. The estimation results from section 3.2.5 shed light on
the household behavior during the sample years. I assume that the behavior of house-
holds with the same socio-economic characteristics and the same age does not change
over time. However, due to population aging, the number of households with the same
characteristics changes. This accords well with the identifying assumptions made in
the estimation where I excluded cohort effects and identified household behavior by
age and time effects. In the projections, I assume a constant time effect at the base
year level of 1993. Then, I predict the expenditure shares for the various goods of the
base year sample population and aggregate them using household weights.
To aggregate over households, I have to map the households observed in the micro-
data onto the population data which displays the number of individuals per age group.
Therefore, I cannot simply use the population age shares as weights in the aggregation.
Instead, these age shares have to be transformed into weights at the household level.
The idea for constructing the weights is simple: From aggregate population data, I
know the number of West German citizens of age a at each point in time t. Using the
6The most recent sample year, 1998, was not used as the base year, because the survey design
changed between 1993 and 1998. The changes affect the grouping of goods into categories and
the way, in which households were asked to record their expenses. Therefore, I chose 1993 as the
base year, because the survey design in 1993 is very consistent with that of the former years, and
closest to that of the year 1998. Appendix 3.5.1 describes the procedure that I used to make the
1998 data consistent with the older waves of the EVS.
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sampling weights provided in the EVS, I can calculate the age distribution of house-
hold heads in West Germany for the sample years. Next, I impose the restriction that
the household characteristics change over age, but not over time.7 According to the
definition of the sampling weights, each household of age a in the EVS in year t is
representative for a certain number of households of age a in the population at time t.
By the assumption made above it will also be representative for households of age a in
any other year. Therefore, with changes in the population age structure, the number
of households of age a will vary. The weights used to aggregate the data are thus:
weighta,h,t =
swa,h,93
popa,93
· popa,t · xa,h,t (3.10)
where swa,h,93 is the sampling weight of a household h with a head of age a in the
base year 1993, popa,t is the population of age a at time t, popa,93 is the respective
population in the base year, and xa,h,t are total expenditures of the household at
time t. By using total population figures per age group instead of age shares, the
weights reflect not only changes in the age structure, but also changes in population
growth. The first and second terms in the weighting function reflect the assumption
that household characteristics for households with a head of age a are time invariant,
while the number of similar households of the same age varies over time. By the third
term, I take into account that households differ in total spending due to differences in
incomes and consumption-savings decisions. Thus, they also have different weights in
aggregate spending, reflected by their total expenditures expa,h,t. Finally, the weights
are normalized by the sum of all household-specific weights.
3.3.2 Population aging and the aggregate demand structure from
1978-1998
In this section, I present the inter-sectoral demand shifts that have already taken
place within the sample period. I calculate it by simply multiplying the predicted
expenditure shares for the eight goods by the weights for each household and summing
over all households. The weights simplify to
weighth,t = swh,t ∗ xh,t (3.11)
since the sampling weights allow the direct aggregation from the sample population
to the West German population.
Figure 3.7 compares the actual aggregated demand shares for the eight goods with
the fitted ones. It shows that the specification of the demand system fits the data
quite well in general. Disparities are only visible between the actual and fitted values
for transportation which pass through to the left-out quantity Other goods. This is
7This restrictive assumption about the evolution of the covariates is made only for the baseline
scenario. It will be relaxed step by step in the other scenarios to allow for changes in income and
household composition.
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potentially due to the durable nature of part of the transportation category which I
cannot model in detail due to the lack of data on car ownership. However, even for
these two categories, the prediction error is not larger than 10 percent.
Figure 3.8 shows a clear upward trend in the shares of health and education & leisure
expenditures as well as a decline in the shares of food and clothing. However, this
might be also due to time trends like the erosion of health insurance benefits resulting
in higher health costs, the spreading of cheap food discounters and more competi-
tion among food retailers etc. The time trend also picks up short-term price trends,
therefore I also looked at the in-sample projections keeping time constant at the base
year level of 1993. When doing so, the demand trends over time become much less
pronounced. The downward trend in Food and the upward trend in Other Goods are
strong, but there are only small increases in health (about 4%) and small decreases in
clothing and energy expenditure shares.
Figure 3.7: Fitted and actual aggregate expenditure shares during the sample years:
1978-1998
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Figure 3.8: Fitted aggregate expenditure shares during the in-sample years: 1978-1998
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3.3.3 Projecting aggregate demand in scenarios
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the impact of population aging and various
socio-economic changes associated with it. Therefore, the projections are done in four
scenarios. The comparison of the scenarios allows to separately analyze the effects of
changes in socioeconomic variables in the course of aging.
Scenario I: pure population aging
In this scenario, I assume that the composition and characteristics of households of
the same age contained in the EVS 1993 remain constant. Of course, this assumption
is not innocent. Family formation, the timing of entry into the labor force and other
important life cycle decisions underly changes over time. Hence, this scenario serves
as a baseline and illustrates the isolated direct effect of population aging on consumer
demand without any accompanying effects.
Scenario II: population aging and expenditure growth
In this scenario, I relax the assumption that all household characteristics remain
constant over time. The first household characteristic that is modelled as changing
over time is household income. Income growth triggers changes in total expenses.
Therefore, I include a general growth trend in incomes which passes on to total
expenditures. I assume that total expenditures rise by 1.4% each year. This cor-
responds to the growth assumptions made in official forecasts (Sachversta¨ndigenrat
Zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 2005). Additionally, some
sensitivity checks are performed assuming alternative growth rates.
This scenario helps to answer the question whether aggregate demand changes are
mainly caused by the shift in the population age structure itself, i.e. a genuine taste
shift between young and old. If the demand changes in this scenario are considerably
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stronger than in the baseline scenario, then it is mainly the difference in spending
power between the age groups which causes demand changes.
Scenario III: population aging and increasing intergenerational hetero-
geneity in total spending
This scenario explores the question whether aggregate demand reacts to changes in
the distribution of income and hence of total spending. Distributional changes in total
expenditures between old and young or rich and poor households might be an accom-
panying effect of population aging, since pension reforms necessary to sustain social
security systems are not neutral in terms of inequality. They change the intergenera-
tional distribution of income.
The projection of the future distribution of total expenses is based on the multi-
country OLG model described in Bo¨rsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2005). A brief
description of the features of the model can be found in Appendix 3.5.4. The OLG
model simulates the pattern of net income under different pension systems respectively
reform proposals which change the intergenerational distribution of income.
I assume that the age- and time-specific changes in net income lead to equivalent
changes in total expenditures. This assumption rules out adjustments in the savings
behavior of households in response to such permanent income changes. However, I
compute the growth rate of each age group’s projected income over time and compute
the time pattern of expenditure changes based on the level of total expenditures in the
base year. Thus, I only assume that expenditures rise proportionally with incomes, but
take the observed (initial) consumption-savings decision into account. This assump-
tion is supported by (Blundell, Browning, and Meghir 1994) who find that income and
consumption move closely together and that consumption tracks income closely over
the life cycle.
Assuming a representative agent per age group, the OLG model does not reflect
that pension reforms might also change the intra-generational distribution of total
expenditures. In the German expenditure survey (EVS), I observe heterogeneity in
total expenditures and incomes between and among age groups. To maintain the
intra-generational heterogeneity in the sample, I calculate the income growth rate
from the OLG projections for the different age groups. Then I assume that the in-
tra-generational heterogeneity remains constant and allow for changes in the inter -
generational heterogeneity only. The weights developed in section 3.3.1 then change
accordingly:
weighta,h,t =
swa,h,93
popa,93
· popa,t · xa,h,t,OLG (3.12)
where xa,h,t,OLG is:
xa,h,t,OLG = xa,h,t ∗ (1 + ∆a,t(xOLG)) (3.13)
In contrast to scenario I, which assumed that everybody’s total expenditures rise by a
fixed rate, total expenditures are now increasing heterogeneously over time according
to the projection from the OLG model.
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Figure 3.9: Monthly total expenditures by age under alternative pension schemes,
1995-2040
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I use two extreme scenarios for pension reform in Germany in order to show the
upper and lower bounds of the effects: The first case assumes no pension reform.
Retirement benefits are held constant at a replacement rate of 70% of the former
labor income. Contributions are variable in this scenario and have to increase from
20% to 32% of labor income in 2040 in order to keep the pension system financially
sustainable. This scenario will be labelled ”no pension reform”. It imposes the
entire demographic burden on the working population - to the benefit of the retirees.
With no pension reform, there will be virtually no change in the distribution of total
expenditures, as can be seen in the left part of Figure 3.9. This scenario also includes
expenditure growth in the magnitude of about 1.22 percent which is only slightly
lower than in scenario II. Hence, I compare the results of the two pension reforms
with scenario II.
The second pension reform proposal postulates the other extreme. The contribution
rate is frozen at the current level of 20%. I henceforth call this scenario ”freezing
reform”. Under this reform, benefits are variable and the replacement rate falls from
70% to only 42% of former labor income in 2040. Total expenditures increase for all
age groups, but the elderly loose relative to the younger age groups (see Figure 3.9).
This is not surprising since this reform proposal freezes the contribution rates so that
the demographic burden is borne by the retirees alone.
Scenario IV: population aging and a changing household composition
Average household size shrinks in the course of population aging. This is partly due
to the decreasing number of children. Furthermore, little downsizing is observed in
housing demand when children leave the house or when spouses die. On contrary, the
better health status of today’s elderly enables them to live on their own for a longer
time. Due to these factors, the number of households shrinks much more slowly than
the population. According UN data, the German population will start to shrink in
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2005, while the number of households will decline only after a 15 year delay in 2020
(Bo¨rsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Sommer (2003)). However, in the meantime, households’
demographics like household size and the number of kids will change. In consequence,
I relax the assumption of time-constant household characteristics to incorporate the
reduction in household size in the fourth scenario.
The projections will be conducted using the FAMY household projection by the Statis-
tisches Bundesamt (2003).8 The tool provides age-specific projections of the average
household size. I relax the assumption of the base scenario, that the characteristics of
a household of age a do not vary over time. Instead, I assume that the socio-economic
characteristics of households with a head of age a and household size s do not vary
over time. The weights used to aggregate the data are:
weighta,h,s,t =
swa,h,s,93
hhpopa,s,93
· hhpopa,s,t · xa,h,s,t (3.14)
where hhpopa,s,t denotes the number of households with size s and age of the head
a at time t. Again, I use 1993 as base year. Notice that it is no longer necessary
to map the individual demographic data to the household data. Instead, I directly
use a demographic projection based on households. This new weighting procedure
captures changes in the age structure of the population and changes in the number
and composition of households. It reflects the trend towards a higher fraction of single
households and small families. No change in incomes over time is modelled in this
scenario.
3.3.4 Projection Results
Scenario I: The direct effect of an aging population on demand
Table 3.3 displays the projected aggregate demand of the household sector and its
total percentage change between 1995 and 2040. At first glimpse, the aging effects on
the aggregate do not appear large. Looking more closely at the percentage changes
over time, however, increasing health and energy shares in the order of about 5 to 7
percent are to be expected until 2040 and the share of the category Other increases
by about 16 percent. These increases are counteracted by a decline in the share of
transport goods and services of about 7.6 percent and smaller declines in the share
spent on leisure and clothing of about 3 to 4 percent.
8A detailed description of FAMY can be found in Appendix 3.5.5.
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Table 3.3: Projected aggregate expenditure shares (in %), 1995-2040, base line scenario
year 1995 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 % change
1995-2030 1995-2040
food 25.0 25.1 25.0 24.9 24.9 24.9 -0.7
clothing 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.3 -3.0
energy 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 5.3
furniture 9.1 9.2 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.0 -2.1
health 7.8 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.2 8.3 6.6
transport 18.7 18.5 18.2 18.0 17.7 17.3 -7.6
leisure 12.0 12.0 11.9 11.7 11.6 11.5 -4.4
other 10.6 10.7 11.1 11.4 11.8 12.3 16.3
Thus, if aging took place without any accompanying changes of the socio-economic
environment of households, the demand composition would change in an intuitive
way: The higher fraction of elderly people in the economy would lead to relatively
higher energy demand and higher demand for health goods. Furthermore, the demand
for personal goods, hotels and package holidays (Other goods) would increase as well.
The results are due to the fact that in 2040, the age group under 40 years will have
a low weight in the aggregate demand. On contrary, not only people above 60 years
will be numerous, but also the age group 40-60 years will form a large fraction of
the West German population - and will therefore have an important weight in the
aggregate. This latter group has much higher total expenditures than the elderly and
will heavily influence the aggregate demand structure.
However, as has been shown by other authors (e.g. Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003a, Bo¨rsch-
Supan, Ludwig, and Sommer (2003)), the age structure of the population brings
about and is accompanied by additional changes in the socio-economic situation of
households. Some of these are reflected in the following.
Scenario II: population aging and economic growth
The results in Table 3.4 show that population aging in a growing economy would lead
to an increase in the share of health expenditures of about 9 per cent until 2040, and
raise the expenditure shares of Other goods like holiday travel by more than 90 percent.
This massive increase is due to the high income elasticity of this category. All other
expenditure categories including energy would experience declines measured in shares.
The difference to the baseline scenario is caused by the increases in consumer expenses
over time. Since I let expenditures rise by the same percentage for all households,
this scenario shows the demand changes if we all become richer in addition to the
demographic changes ahead. The increase in the health share is due to the rising
expenditures for out-of-pocket health with age, and due to the low income elasticity
of health expenditures. The Engel curve for health depicted in Figure 3.5 shows this
effect clearly. On contrary, the expenditure shares of necessities like food and energy
would decrease by about 18 respectively 13 percent. Furniture and transport shares
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are cut back in the same range. Appendix 3.5.6 contains the projection results for
alternative assumptions about expenditure growth. Higher growth rates obviously
yield more pronounced changes of the demand pattern over time, and vice versa. The
qualitative trends are robust.
Table 3.4: Projected aggregate expenditure shares (in %), 1995-2040, scenario II
year 1995 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 % change
1995-2030 1995-2040
food 24.5 24.0 22.9 21.9 21.0 20.1 -18.0
clothing 9.6 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.2 9.0 -6.3
energy 6.9 6.8 6.5 6.2 6.1 6.0 -13.0
furniture 9.1 9.0 8.7 8.5 8.1 7.6 -16.5
health 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.4 8.5 9.0
transport 18.6 18.3 17.8 17.3 16.5 15.7 -15.6
leisure 12.1 12.0 11.9 11.7 11.6 11.3 -7.1
other 11.4 12.3 14.6 16.7 19.2 21.8 91.2
However, one may ask how plausible the assumption of symmetric growth in in-
comes and expenditures is. The intensive political discussion about the sustainability
of social security systems and intergenerational fairness shows, that aging leads to
changes in the income distribution through the pension system. It is the goal of most
pension reform proposals to ”correct” this built-in automatism of a pay-as-you-go
system towards a more equal burden-sharing between generations. The following
section uses projections of the future income distribution under alternative pension
reform proposals.
Scenario III: population aging and increasing intergenerational hetero-
geneity in total spending
In this scenario, I compare the effects of the two extreme pension systems, the ”no
pension reform” case and the ”freezing reform”. The results, depicted in Table 3.5,
show that the effects of the reforms are very similar. The high population age share
of the old and the middle-aged decreases the share of transportation expenditures in
both scenarios. Food and energy erode even more strongly than in the first two sce-
narios. Meanwhile, the fraction of total expenditures spent on health increases slightly
less. Finally, the decrease in the education & leisure expenditure share is slightly more
under the freezing reform than under the current system.
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Table 3.5: Projected aggregate expenditure shares (in %), 1995-2040, scenario III
year 1995 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 % change
1995-2030 1995-2040
current system
food 24.4 24.0 22.9 22.1 21.3 20.7 -12.9 -15.5
clothing 9.6 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.1 -3.5 -5.3
energy 6.9 6.8 6.5 6.3 6.2 6.1 -11.1 -12.1
furniture 9.1 9.0 8.7 8.5 8.2 7.8 -9.5 -13.5
health 7.8 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.5 7.1 8.1
transport 18.6 18.3 17.8 17.4 16.7 16.1 -10.1 -13.6
leisure 12.1 12.0 11.9 11.8 11.6 11.4 -3.5 -5.0
other 11.4 12.4 14.5 16.3 18.3 20.3 60.1 77.6
freezing reform
food 24.4 24.0 23.4 22.5 21.7 21.0 -11.4 -14.3
clothing 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.3 -1.7 -2.8
energy 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.3 6.2 6.0 -11.0 -13.0
furniture 9.1 9.0 8.8 8.7 8.4 8.1 -7.3 -11.1
health 7.8 8.0 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.3 5.6 6.3
transport 18.6 18.3 18.0 17.7 17.2 16.6 -7.8 -10.8
leisure 12.1 12.0 11.9 11.9 11.8 11.7 -1.9 -2.8
other 11.4 12.4 13.6 15.2 17.1 19.0 49.2 65.7
Generally, the freezing reform triggers slightly smaller changes in aggregate demand,
because it redistributes toward the younger population with lower spending power,
while maintaining the current system accelerates the demographic burden on the
working population. The difference is small because of the small expected difference
in the income distribution profiles shown in Figure 3.4. The reforms yield relatively
similar outcomes because they do not model the intra-generational redistribution of
the pension system. The pension system in the OLG model is an insurance system in
which benefits are paid according to contributions.9 Both reforms, however, once more
illustrate the influence of rising total expenditures on the composition of demand: the
age dependency of total expenditures has a hump-shaped profile. Thus, the growth
in expenditures, which is present in both scenarios, will increase the weight of the
middle-aged in aggregate demand due to their higher absolute spending.
In summary, the range of proposed pension reforms in Germany will not have strong
effects on the demand patterns. The macroeconomic implications of aging societies
are caused primarily by the direct effect of aging on capital, labor and goods markets,
9Hence, the impact of a pension reform like the proposed “Grundrente”, which redistributes towards
the poor, is not incorporated here.
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and not by indirect effects via the social security system.
Scenario IV: population aging and a changing household composition
In this scenario, I account for age-specific changes in the household size. These are
natural accompanying effects of population aging, as i) the number of single house-
holds among the younger population increases, ii) fertility is low, iii) increased life
expectancy implies that parents live on their own for a longer time, after their chil-
dren have left home, and iv) more elderly will live in single households after the death
of the partner. All these factors contribute to a decreasing average household size.
Moreover, iii) and iv) delay the reduction of the number of households. According
to the underlying household projection, the number of single households is going to
almost double until 2030, while the number of households larger than two persons is
going to shrink by about 30%. Average household size is projected to fall from 2.44
to 2.07 between 2000 and 2030.
What effects on the composition of aggregate demand should be expected when ac-
counting for changing household size? It is most likely, that a larger number of single
households in the population is associated with a higher demand for a certain range
of goods, i.e. washing machines, furniture, energy etc. Especially those goods that
exhibit returns to scale should be demanded relatively more in societies with many
single households than in a society with a larger average household size. In addition,
the trend towards larger apartments and houses in the last decades in spite of decreas-
ing average household size is also expected to increase aggregate demand for durables
like furniture and also for energy.
Table 3.6: Projected aggregate expenditures shares (in %), 1995-2030, scenario IV
year 2000 2010 2020 2030 % change
1995-2030
food 26.4 26.3 26.3 26.3 -0.2
clothing 9.9 9.8 9.8 9.7 -1.6
energy 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.2
furniture 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.5 -1.4
health 7.6 7.8 7.9 8.0 6.1
transport 19.7 19.1 18.9 18.6 -5.6
leisure 12.3 12.3 12.2 12.2 -0.8
other 7.2 7.6 7.6 7.7 6.5
Table 3.6 shows that the demand changes are much more moderate than in sce-
nario I, where I did not account for changing household composition. However, the
demand change in favor of health has with 6.1 percent about the same size as in
the baseline scenario. The results show that the assumption of constant household
composition in scenario I does not hold. By this assumption, one underestimates the
demand changes for energy and Other goods and overestimates the change in demand
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for furniture, clothing, transport and leisure. This is due to the fact that the num-
ber of households decreases more slowly and average household size decreases faster
than assumed in scenario I. Hence, the the increasing number of single households is
accounted for in this scenario. In consequence, the future demand share for energy is
higher, since economies of scale cannot be realized in single households and a lower
decrease of the share for expenses on clothing and leisure. The latter accord well
with the microeconometric results in Section 3.2.5, as clothing and leisure expenditure
shares decrease in household size.
However, some caveats have to be mentioned: First, the changes are smaller, because
we look at the shorter timespan between 2000 and 2030. Comparing the results from
this scenario and scenario I for 2000 until 2030, however, does not alter the differences
substantially. Second, the household projection does not reach back to the past so far,
so I proxy the household distribution in the base year 1993 by the distribution in the
year 2000. This approximation renders the computation less precise and potentially
leads to a slight underestimation of the demand changes.
3.4 Conclusions
In the microeconomic analysis, strong age-specific differences in household demand
structures in West Germany are identified. In the course of the life cycle, health, and
education & leisure goods become more important components of total nondurable
expenditures—mainly due to their higher total expenditures compared with young
households. In an aging economy like Germany, these age effects translate into aggre-
gate demand changes for the composite goods over time. These changes are substan-
tial. Especially furniture, clothing, transport and education & leisure expenditures
become a less important factor in total spending, while health and Other goods gain
in weight in aggregate demand.
The use of separate scenarios, which separate various aspects of population aging,
helps to better understand the transmission mechanisms of population aging. While
the pure effect of a shift in the population age structure does already trigger significant
demand changes, the effects are magnified when moderate growth in total expendi-
tures is assumed. Furthermore, changes in the intergenerational distribution of total
expenditures do not result in large differences in the projected evolution of aggregate
demand composition. This is due to the small distributional changes that are assumed,
although two extreme pension schemes are modelled.
Hence, even under extreme reform proposals, the effect of expenditure growth is much
stronger than the indirect effect resulting from a pension reform and its effect on the
spending power of households.
Finally, taking into account the changes in family formation which lead to a rapidly
decreasing household size, but a slow decrease in the number of households, does not
alter the results much. The effect of population aging becomes slightly smaller, but
the qualitative results are the same.
In summary, the results indicate that future trends in consumer demand caused by
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population aging. However, these changes are not caused solely by age-specific tastes,
but also to a large extent by the different spending power of the age groups.
These effects trigger changes in sectoral production and employment. If relatively more
of health and leisure goods are demanded then sectoral production has to adjust, too.
Thus, there might be a higher demand for professions associated with health services
and pharmaceutical production as well as for services in the leisure goods sector which
comprises sports activities, cultural activities like cinema, theater etc., gardening, and
so forth. This way, population aging does not only change demand trends in the
(West) German economy substantially, but can also affect the German labor market
unless the changes in demand are absorbed by changing trade patterns.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Description of the composite goods & services
In the four EVS waves 1978, 1983, 1988 and 1993, the eight composite goods cat-
egories are defined in the same way. The single exception are travel expenditures:
they are contained in the category ”Other goods” in 1993 while they form a separate
category in the older waves. Therefore, I construct a category ”travel & other” which
is consistent over the four waves.
In 1998, the European COICOP classification of goods was adapted so that the cat-
egories are now consistent with those in other European surveys, but not consistent
with the definitions in the preceding waves. Therefore, I reconstruct the classification
adapted for the older waves for 1998. The detailed information on the subcategories
available in the EVS 1998 enables me to regroup expenses.
The resulting eight categories are:
Food Food at home, food out, tobacco, alcohol
Clothing & Shoes Mens’, womens’, childrens’ and sports clothing, shoes;
repairs and amendments of shoes & clothing
Energy Energy (excluding fuel)
Furniture &
Home Electronics
Furniture, home textiles, furnishings, electrical appli-
ances, other household equipment, household consum-
ables, repairs
Health & Body
Care
(Out-of-pocket) health goods and services, body care
goods and services
Transportation &
Communication
Motor vehicles, bikes, fuel, repairs of and services for
motor vehicles & bikes, car travel expenses, driver’s li-
cence fees, travel fares, telephone charges, mail charges
Education &
Leisure
Holiday expenses, audio-visual equipment, records, toys,
photo & sports goods, personal articles, books &
newspapers, gardening products, subscriptions, lesson
charges, theater, cinema etc., petcare
Other goods Personal goods, hotels and similar expenses, package
holidays
3.5.2 The Deaton-Paxson decomposition
This decomposition is achieved by making the time effects orthogonal to a time trend
(Deaton and Paxson 1994). The year dummies have to be replaced by:
dt
∗ = dt − [(t− 1)d2 − (t− 2)d1] (3.15)
where dt is a year dummy for the year t, and d1 and d2 are the dummies for the first
two years in the sample. The ”base year” is thus a timeless average of all years, and
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any time trend is attributed to cohort and ages, rather than to time. Due to the
additional restriction, that the time effects sum to zero, the dummies for the years 78
and 83 are left out in the estimation.
Moreover, I estimated different specifications of the cohort effects. First, the cohort
effect enters as a spline function with kinks at birth years 1930 and 1950. This is
advantageous compared to using cohort dummies, because this parameterization allows
straightforward projections in the second part. With dummies, I would have to make
ad hoc assumptions about the cohort effects of newly entering cohorts that are not
included in the sample. The spline function avoids such ad hoc assumptions. However,
this specification of the cohort effect might be too restrictive, so I also show results
with a full set of dummies.
3.5.3 Regression results: owner-occupier status
This section contains the estimated coefficients for the interaction variables of house-
hold characteristics and income with the owner-occupier dummy not reported in Table
3.2:
food clothing energy furnit. health transp. leisure
log total expenditures interacted with owner-occupier status
ln(exp) -0.54527 0.25214 -0.37914 0.36865 0.14381 0.19278 0.45435
(6.84)*** (5.30)*** (10.56)*** (4.57)*** (2.76)*** (1.93)* (7.69)***
ln(exp)2 0.04142 -0.01821 0.02851 -0.03062 -0.01022 -0.0135 -0.03456
(6.28)*** (4.62)*** (9.59)*** (4.58)*** (2.37)** (1.63) (7.06)***
ln(exp) 0.0131 -0.00735 0.00921 -0.0105 -0.00068 -0.00312 -0.01237
∗age (5.91)*** (5.56)*** (9.23)*** (4.68)*** (0.47) (1.12) (7.53)***
ln(exp)2 -0.00097 0.00051 -0.00068 0.00091 0.00002 0.00018 0.00095
∗age (5.16)*** (4.56)*** (8.05)*** (4.78)*** (0.17) (0.78) (6.84)***
ln(exp) -0.00007 0.00005 -0.00005 0.00007 -0.00002 0.00002 0.00008
∗age2 (4.91)*** (5.12)*** (7.46)*** (4.57)*** (1.67)* (1.09) (7.01)***
ln(exp)2 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00001
∗age2 (3.96)*** (3.68)*** (5.81)*** (4.68)*** (1.99)** (0.61) (6.12)***
age21-24 -0.15202 0.05564 -0.05862 0.08828 0.03568 0.07837 0.07166
(4.94)*** (3.03)*** (4.23)*** (2.83)*** (1.78)* (2.03)** (3.14)***
age25-29 -0.29768 0.13414 -0.14726 0.18222 0.05297 0.09088 0.18561
(7.04)*** (5.32)*** (7.73)*** (4.26)*** (1.92)* (1.72)* (5.92)***
age30-34 -0.44514 0.21654 -0.25763 0.27755 0.07839 0.13009 0.31625
(7.35)*** (5.99)*** (9.44)*** (4.53)*** (1.98)** (1.72)* (7.04)***
age35-39 -0.58425 0.29472 -0.35136 0.36703 0.10677 0.15561 0.43726
(7.45)*** (6.29)*** (9.94)*** (4.62)*** (2.09)** (1.58) (7.51)***
age40-44 -0.70551 0.35763 -0.43851 0.44303 0.13533 0.19447 0.53995
(7.44)*** (6.31)*** (10.26)*** (4.61)*** (2.19)** (1.64) (7.67)***
age45-49 -0.81881 0.40913 -0.51514 0.51616 0.16336 0.22361 0.63826
(7.48)*** (6.26)*** (10.44)*** (4.66)*** (2.29)** (1.63) (7.86)***
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food clothing energy furnit. health transp. leisure
age dummies interacted with owner-occupier status
age50-54 -0.91712 0.45672 -0.58202 0.56945 0.19525 0.25286 0.71771
(7.51)*** (6.27)*** (10.58)*** (4.61)*** (2.45)** (1.65)* (7.92)***
age55-59 -0.99496 0.48979 -0.63994 0.62357 0.22739 0.26618 0.78492
(7.50)*** (6.18)*** (10.70)*** (4.64)*** (2.62)*** (1.60) (7.97)***
age60-62 -1.06767 0.51837 -0.68983 0.65962 0.2625 0.28172 0.84345
(7.55)*** (6.14)*** (10.83)*** (4.61)*** (2.85)*** (1.59) (8.04)***
age63-65 -1.09586 0.53166 -0.71741 0.67233 0.28579 0.28678 0.87166
(7.53)*** (6.12)*** (10.94)*** (4.56)*** (3.01)*** (1.57) (8.07)***
age66-69 -1.13342 0.54085 -0.7377 0.69226 0.30996 0.29039 0.89652
(7.60)*** (6.08)*** (10.98)*** (4.59)*** (3.19)*** (1.55) (8.11)***
age70-74 -1.17377 0.55381 -0.76395 0.71099 0.34181 0.2922 0.92197
(7.69)*** (6.08)*** (11.10)*** (4.60)*** (3.43)*** (1.53) (8.14)***
age75-79 -1.21126 0.55945 -0.78643 0.724 0.38719 0.28894 0.93986
(7.79)*** (6.03)*** (11.22)*** (4.60)*** (3.82)*** (1.48) (8.15)***
age80+ -1.22977 0.55058 -0.8064 0.71974 0.42929 0.28782 0.9543
(7.86)*** (5.90)*** (11.44)*** (4.55)*** (4.21)*** (1.47) (8.23)***
household composition interacted with owner-occupier status
ln(hhsize) -0.00274 0.00699 0.00037 -0.01945 -0.00509 0.00464 0.00063
(1.74)* (7.43)*** (0.52) (12.20)*** (4.95)*** (2.35)** (0.54)
no kids -0.01293 0.0068 0.00424 0.01696 0.00386 -0.02136 -0.00399
(2.86)*** (2.52)** (2.08)** (3.71)*** (1.31) (3.78)*** (1.19)
#kids -0.00184 -0.00008 -0.00177 0.01458 -0.00101 -0.00061 -0.00046
(0.37) (0.03) (0.79) (2.90)*** (0.31) (0.10) (0.12)
(#kids)2 0.00018 0.00011 0.00015 -0.00247 0.00105 -0.0009 0.00078
(0.15) (0.15) (0.29) (2.05)** (1.35) (0.60) (0.88)
not working -0.00817 0.00221 -0.00238 0.00784 0.00507 0.00703 -0.00329
(4.98)*** (2.26)** (3.23)*** (4.72)*** (4.73)*** (3.42)*** (2.71)***
constant 1.4085 0.18163 0.15867 -0.43255 -0.42951 -0.72629 0.05683
(22.67)*** (4.90)*** (5.67)*** (6.88)*** (10.59)*** (9.33)*** (1.23)
3.5.4 Description of the OLG-model
In scenario III, I use income predictions from the OLG model by Bo¨rsch-Supan, Lud-
wig, and Winter (2005) which is based on the traditional model of Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987). It is a large scale simulation model comprising 80 overlapping gen-
erations and multiple countries respectively world regions. The model simulates the
key macroeconomic variables such as GDP, savings and consumption over the period
2000 to 2050. It is especially designed to simulate international capital flows between
countries and world regions, and for the evaluation of policy reform, in particular pen-
sion reform.
The model contains one representative agent per generation who maximizes her utility
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fully rationally over the life cycle. The agent’s utility depends on his consumption.
Labor is exogenous and is calibrated according to a projection of labor market par-
ticipation. This forecast originates from a demographic projection by the UN and
additional assumptions about female labor force participation, a decline of EU-wide
unemployment to the natural rate of 5 per cent until 2030, and a rise in the retirement
age in the same period.
The total consumption of the representative agent of age a is the difference between
net labor and asset income minus savings.
3.5.5 Description of the FAMY-model
In scenario IV, I use the household projections that are derived from demographic
projections using the Pro-FAMY simulation model. This tool was developed jointly
by the Bundesinstitut fu¨r Bevo¨lkerungswissenschaft, the Max-Planck Institut fu¨r De-
mografie and empirica. The projections have kindly been provided to me by Harald
Simons.
The Pro-FAMY model combines demographic projections with projections about the
changes in living arrangements, i.e., the composition of households, marital status, and
the number of children. For a detailed description of Pro-FAMY see Hullen (2003).
3.5.6 Alternative growth rates in Scenario II
The section shows the results of scenario II if one makes alternative assumptions
about the growth rate of income. In addition to the assumption of 1.4 percent growth
annually, the demand changes are projected in a low variant assuming 0.5 percent,
and a high variant assuming a growth rate of 1 percent annually.
Figure 3.10: Projected percentage change in aggregate expenditure shares under vari-
ous growth rates in total expenditures
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4 Consumer expenditures and home
production at retirement - New evidence
from Germany
4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates whether consumer expenditures change around retirement in
Germany and whether this is accompanied by changes in home production. A distinct
drop in spending around retirement has already been documented for the US, Italy
and the UK. This drop has been termed the retirement consumption puzzle because
standard life cycle theory predicts that forward-looking agents with concave utility
functions smooth consumption over time, such that no drop is to be expected. Various
reasons have been put forward in the literature to solve this puzzle and to reconcile
observed behavior with the life cycle theory. They range from unexpected health
and income shocks around retirement to the cessation of work-related costs, non-
separability between consumption and leisure, and the substitution of expenditures
by increased home production.
This chapter contributes to the literature by presenting evidence on the magnitude of
the drop in expenditures in Germany. Additionally, I analyze the role of home produc-
tion in solving this empirical puzzle and reconciling it with the life cycle model. Home
production has been investigated so far by looking at detailed expenditure categories
like food at home which can be substituted by home production. Disproportionate
expenditure drops in these categories have been interpreted as indirect evidence of
increased home production activities. This interpretation cannot be separated from
disproportionate expenditure cuts on some commodities that are not compensated by
increases in home production. Combining the analysis of expenditure data with time
use data, I can draw direct conclusions about the home production activities of retirees
and non retirees, and whether they complement the observed drop in spending.
Since the structure of the German and Italian expenditure data is very similar,
the empirical analysis conducted in this chapter is very much inspired by Miniaci,
Monfardini, and Weber (2003) who investigate the retirement consumption puzzle
in Italy. I restrict the analysis to nondurable expenditures and do not decompose
expenses by types of commodities.
Using the German budget survey (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe (EVS))
over the period 1978-1998, I find a significant one-off drop in nondurable consumer
expenses at retirement which is comparable to those found for the US, Italy and the
UK. After a descriptive analysis of cohorts, I investigate this drop in a multivariate
regression analysis controlling for differences in household characteristics of retired
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and not retired households1, and for age and cohort effects using the Deaton-Paxson
decomposition. The results point to a 17% drop in nondurable spending which varies
across age groups. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the drop is discontinuous and
levels off partially during retirement.
Additionally, I use two waves of the German time use survey (Zeitbudgeterhebung)
from the years 1991/92 and 2001/02 to investigate whether this drop is compensated
by increased home production. This explanation for the drop in expenditures bases
on the notion that consumption does not equal expenditures. If households engage to
a considerable degree in producing goods and services themselves, they can consume
more than just their market purchased goods and services. The analysis of the time use
patterns of retirees and non retirees shows that home production is with 70 additional
minutes per day significantly higher in households with a retired head.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Since the literature on the
retirement consumption puzzle is quite recent, and no comprehensive survey has been
published yet, I give an extensive overview over the literature in Section 4.2. Next, I
describe the data (Section 4.3) and give some basic facts about retirement behavior in
Germany and the retirement definition used (Section 4.4). Then, I provide first results
on the puzzle and its potential explanations for Germany in a descriptive analysis on
the basis of the Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe and the Zeitbudgeterhebung in
Section 4.5. Third, I refine this analysis using regression techniques and complement
the analysis of expenditure data by an analysis of the time use of the elderly in Section
4.6. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Literature review
The life cycle model predicts that rational forward-looking agents make their sav-
ings decisions such that consumption is smoothed over the life cycle (Modigliani and
Brumberg 1954). In spite of several extensions of the life cycle model which comprise
uncertainty about the length of life, precautionary savings motives, and bequest mo-
tives, the model has recently been challenged by empirical studies showing that US
and British households reduce their consumer expenditures significantly upon entry
into retirement (Banks, Blundell, and Tanner 1998; Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg
2001; Hamermesh 1984; Hurd and Rohwedder 2005; Miniaci, Monfardini, and Weber
2003). This phenomenon has been termed the retirement consumption puzzle.
The drop in consumer expenditures is sizeable: Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg
(2001) find that 31% of US households reduce their expenses by at least 35 percentage
points at retirement, while Hamermesh (1984) found that 53% of the retired couples
reduced their spending by more than 10% relative to the average change in real spend-
ing between 1973 and 1975. Laitner and Silverman (2005) report the drop to amount
to 16% for the US on the basis of the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
1Throughout the chapter, I use the terms “households with a retired head” and “retired households”
synonimously. This is done to simplify the formulation.
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Contradictory evidence is provided by Christensen (2004) who uses Spanish panel
data, the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares, to isolate the effect of
retirement, i.e., the increase in leisure time, on expenditure. Due to special features
of the Spanish pension system, income does not change upon retirement for a group
of retirees, so that the income effect and the effect of additional leisure on consumer
behavior are not confounded. Christensen does not find evidence of a drop in con-
sumer expenditures and also the estimation of a demand system does not provide any
significant changes in consumer behavior around retirement.
There are a few studies based on food expenditures. Based on this subset of total
consumer expenditures, Smith (2004) draws a less drastic picture—at least regarding
the consistency with the theoretical predictions of the life cycle model. She finds that
57% of retirees in the UK experience no drop in food expenses at retirement. Out
of the remaining 43%, the majority of 24 percentage points experienced a decline in
expenses which was associated with involuntary retirement due to a bad health status
or unemployment. Thus, only 19% of the households in the British Household Panel
experience a puzzling decline in food spending. On the contrary, Bernheim, Skinner,
and Weinberg (2001) find that total food expenditures of the average US household
decline by roughly 30 % between the pre and post retirement periods. Similarly,
Aguiar and Hurst (2004) investigate food spending using data on US household food
diaries (Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals) and find a decline in food
spending by an average of 11%.
4.2.1 Work-related costs
Several reasons have been put forward to explain this puzzle, and to reconcile it with
the life cycle theory. The first argument is that total consumer expenditures decrease
due to the cessation of work-related expenses upon retirement. “Households with
higher work-related expenses should accumulate less wealth and experience larger de-
clines in consumption at retirement” (Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg 2001). Hence,
the idea behind this argument is that households simply re-optimize their consump-
tion bundle because formerly necessary expenses related to work are now redundant.
These work-related expenses consist of meals purchased out of home, adult clothing,
transport costs for travelling to and from work, and expenses for domestic services.
Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) for the UK, Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg
(2001) for the US, as well as Miniaci, Monfardini, and Weber (2003) for Italy have
explored whether work-related expenses are large enough to account for the sizeable
one off-drop in consumption. The general finding is that the cessation of work-related
costs reduces spending in old age to some extent, but cannot explain the magnitude
of the observed drop.
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4.2.2 Unanticipated income shocks around retirement
A second explanation are unanticipated shocks occurring around retirement, i.e., in-
dividuals expect a larger retirement income ex ante than they receive ex post. Such
an unanticipated negative income shock reduces lifetime wealth and hence induces
households to re-optimize and adjust their expenditures downward. Bernheim, Skin-
ner, and Weinberg (2001) find that “even when we remove the effects of unexpected
retirement, the size of the consumption discontinuity is still strongly related to wealth
and income” (p.854). In a study of British households, Banks, Blundell, and Tan-
ner (1998) find that differential mortality risk and work-related costs, i.e., anticipated
changes at retirement, explain a large fraction of the observed fall in consumption.
However, about one third of the drop cannot be explained by these factors. Hence,
the authors argue that this must be due to “unanticipated shocks occurring around
the time of retirement” (p.784).
Evidence that individuals overestimate their pension benefit entitlements has been
provided by Dilnot, Disney, Johnson, and Whitehouse (1994) using the Retirement
Survey. They find that 40% of individuals had expected more benefits than they re-
ceived, and expectations were too pessimistic only for one tenth of the sample. Thus,
when individuals learn about the incorrectness of their expectations, they realize that
their lifetime resources are smaller than they thought and adapt their consumption
level accordingly.
The most direct evidence on whether unexpected shocks can explain the retirement
consumption puzzle has been provided by Hurd and Rohwedder (2003,2005). In a
supplement to the Health and Retirement Survey called Consumption and Activities
Mail Survey (CAMS), workers are asked directly how much they expect their spending
to change when they retire and they ask retirees about their actual retirement income.
They find that individuals anticipate their future spending correctly: Among singles
(couples), the average anticipated drop in spending is about 20% (for both groups)
compared to an actual decline of about 17% (12%). In Hurd and Rohwedder (2005),
the authors refine their evidence by asking those respondents who retired during the
first and second wave of CAMS whether their spending changed when they retired.
Using this small panel, they find similar numbers. 46% of those retiring between the
two CAMS waves experienced a decline in spending, confirming the expenditure drop.
But even a larger fraction of people, namely 59%, anticipated a decline in spending.
The relative difference between anticipations and recollections is about the same as in
the cross-section, namely 13-16 percentage points of consumer expenditures. Thus, the
share of respondents anticipating a decline is larger than the share reporting a decline
in spending after retirement entry. The authors conclude that based on cross-sectional
as well as on panel data, there is little indication for unexpected income shocks at re-
tirement. Furthermore, they conclude that these results are in line with the estimated
reduction in spending of 14% in Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001) which they
attribute to unexpected shocks. However, Table 6 in Hurd and Rohwedder (2005)
shows that though the majority of 49.8% of those retiring between the waves antici-
pates their spending in retirement correctly, the other 50.2% of people anticipates their
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spending in retirement wrongly. While 16.3% fare better than they thought, 33.9%
fare worse than anticipated. Taking the difference between these groups, a net frac-
tion of 17,6% of those retiring experiences an unexpectedly lower spending than they
thought before retiring. This unexpected drop suggests that some people experience
an unexpected shock around retirement.
4.2.3 Unanticipated health shocks
Another unexpected shock which could explain the drop in expenditures could be
a sudden deterioration of the health status which induces a person to retire earlier
than planned. Hence, they forego additional earnings and their lifetime resources are
reduced. Hurd and Rohwedder (2005) use the self-reported health status and find that
subjective health can explain some part of the observed drop, but again does not fully
account for the magnitude of the drop. More precisely, Hurd and Rohwedder (2005)
exploit a question on whether health was an important reason for retiring. Among
those households for whom health was an important reason (21.9% of the sample),
68% had a decline in spending with an average magnitude of around 25%. The other
two-thirds of respondents who did not state health to be a retirement reason reduced
spending by 11% only. This represents evidence that people who retire early because
of bad health also reduce spending more in retirement. However, this approach does
not allow to separate an expected from an unexpected health deterioration. While
expected health shocks lead to a reduction in lifetime resources and hence to lower
overall expenditures, unexpected health shocks which lead to early retirement involve
a reduction of expenses following the shock. Thus, the results are consistent with the
idea of unexpected health shocks (otherwise one would expect lower total spending
compared to the healthy households, but one would not expect a larger reduction in
spending upon retirement), but they do not represent direct evidence.
4.2.4 Substitution between consumption and leisure
Another explanation for the retirement consumption puzzle becomes evident when
one generalizes the standard life cycle model to have more than one argument in
the utility function. Assuming that utility depends on consumption and leisure, the
within-period utility function is u(f(ct, lt)). Laitner and Silverman (2005) show that
there should not be a discontinuous drop in consumption growth at retirement if the
utility function is separable. However, if one does not make this restrictive assumption,
then the marginal utility of consumption depends on leisure. The direction can go
either way: If consumption and leisure are complements, then households will want
to increase their consumption after retirement to take advantage of the increased
marginal utility of consumption via higher leisure. If they are substitutes though, the
marginal utility of consumption will decrease with higher leisure, such that households
compensate the higher leisure by consuming less goods and services. This second
case would be consistent with the observed drop in consumer expenditures and the
life cycle hypothesis. Furthermore, one would also expect the discontinuous jump in
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leisure to translate into a drop of expenses which is also discontinuous. Laitner and
Silverman (2005) summarize this argument as follows: “Intuitively, if a household’s
taste for intertemporal smoothing is sufficiently high, it will choose to decrease its
consumption at retirement so that lost utility from consumption offsets gains from
additional leisure. If it has a lower desire for intertemporal smoothing, on the other
hand, the household might want to increase its consumption at retirement to take
advantage of the complementarity of consumption and leisure.” (p. 28).
Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) expect that the substitution elasticity between con-
sumption and leisure differs across households due to “differences in tastes and eco-
nomic resources” and they also suppose heterogeneity across types of goods and types
of leisure activities.
4.2.5 Changes in home production
Related to the issue of non-separability between consumption and leisure, an alter-
native way to reconcile the empirical facts with the life cycle theory becomes evident
when one extends the standard model framework to comprise two consumer goods.
If one good is purchased at the market and one can either be bought or produced
at home, the theoretical predictions change depending on the substitution elasticity
between the consumer good and the home production good (see Chapter 5, and Lait-
ner and Silverman 2005). To put it differently, when workers retire, they have more
leisure time at their disposal given constant hours spent on work at home. In con-
sequence, their marginal utility of leisure falls, thus reducing the opportunity cost
of working in home production: Retirees can make up for their reduced retirement
income by producing consumer goods at home because they have substantially more
(leisure) time. Additionally, households might just purchase goods less costly as be-
fore, e.g. by comparing prices more intensively or by shopping at more shops in search
of lower prices. In the presence of such substitutional behavior households do not
reduce their consumption, but only their expenses.2 In contrast, households will offset
the increased utility from leisure by reducing consumption expenses, if leisure and
consumer goods are complements, and if households have a high intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution. In a two good model, one would not expect consumer expenses
to remain constant, and one would expect consumption and consumer expenditures
to differ. The home production argument differs from the non-separability argument
made above: Even if one does not allow for goods and services to be produced at
home, the leisure abundance in relation to the pre-retirement situation can lead to a
consumption drop, depending on the substitution elasticity between consumption and
leisure. If leisure time can additionally be used to produce consumer goods, the drop
in consumer expenditures will be larger.
2If one assumes that utility is derived from consumption and leisure and home production is not pos-
sible, households can only reoptimize their utility by varying their level of consumption and their
leisure time. On contrary, if one allows for home production, then households can additionally
substitute between self-produced consumption and purchased consumer goods.
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The scope for substituting market goods by home-produced ones is large: House-
holds can cook more at home rather than eat out, cook more from basic ingredients
which are cheaper, spend more time searching for good bargains in all consumer goods
categories, do home cleaning and garden maintenance themselves, repair and wash
their clothing themselves, perform simple repairs and clean their car themselves. Hurd
and Rohwedder (2005) investigate whether time spent on home production changes
upon retirement, and they find that time spent on these substitutes for market goods
increases from 14 to roughly 20 hours per week for males aged 60-64 and from 24 to
29 hours for females.
Aguiar and Hurst (2004) compare food spending and food intake (measured in calo-
ries or vitamins) and find no evidence of reduced consumption. They interpret their
findings as evidence of a change in food production which uses less or cheaper market
goods and more time. Using additionally the National Human Activity Pattern Sur-
vey, they find matching evidence of a strong increase in time spent on food production
which amounts to 21% for households in past-peak-retirement age 66-68 compared to
pre-peak-retirement age 60-62. They also do not find evidence of a decline in food
quality among retirees: they are just as likely to consume brand name products as
workers and they do not switch to fattier cuts of meat. What they do, however, is to
reduce their visits at fast food restaurants. “The probability of dining at a restaurant
with table service does not vary across retirement status” (p.2). Hence, Aguiar and
Hurst (2004) show that consumption is not equal to expenditures. Especially when
comparing workers and retirees who have substantially different budgets of (leisure)
time, consumption might be generated using strongly heterogeneous combinations of
the inputs time and money.
Another study on food consumption using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
finds a reduction in expenditures on food at home and food out of 9% for married
couple households with a retired male head (Lundberg, Startz, and Stillman 2001).
This drop cannot be found among single households. Hence, the authors attribute the
drop in expenditure to a change in marital bargaining power at retirement. Wives
use their increased bargaining power to raise household savings because they expect
a longer retirement period than their husbands due to a higher life expectancy.
The scope of studies using food expenditures in explaining the retirement consump-
tion puzzle is limited for various reasons. First, food spending is just a subset of total
expenditures. Browning, Crossley, and Weber (2003) argue that it is a good proxy
for total nondurable expenditures, but Attanasio and Weber (1995) argue that this
procedure is unsuitable. Their argument is that preferences are nonseparable between
food and other nondurables, and that the relative price of food is very variable. Sec-
ond, food is a necessity. Abstracting from home production for a moment, one would
not expect households to cut their expenses on this item first in reaction to lower in-
comes. Hence, if households experience a drop in total nondurable expenditures, using
food spending as a measure would lead to an underestimation of the drop. Third, the
scope for home production, by which a household can substitute expenses by time, is
potentially very large in food production.
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4.3 The data
The empirical analysis in this chapter is based on two data sets: fives cross-sections of
the large-scale expenditure survey Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe with over
200,000 households from 1978 to 1998, and two cross-sections of the time use survey
Zeitbudgeterhebung for the years 1991/92 and 2001/02, with roughly 15,000 house-
holds. In the EVS, respondents are asked to record their expenses in a housekeeping
book. In the time use survey, respondents also keep a diary, but record their activities
during the day for two (three) days in the 1991/92 (2001/02) survey.
The dependent variables are (i) nondurable expenditure (and its log) which I de-
flate by the consumer price index provided by the Statistisches Bundesamt, and (ii)
time spent on home production in the household in minutes per day. I will confine
the analysis to nondurable consumption throughout the whole chapter. On the as-
sumption of separability between durable and nondurable goods, this is an appropriate
consumption measure.3 The second dependent variable, home production, is defined
as cooking and preparing meals, washing and repairing clothes, maintenance, repairs
and cleaning of house and garden, caring for children and elderly people, and shopping
activities. For both surveys, I use the provided sampling weights.
The empirical model in this section incorporates identifying assumptions about the
nature of age, cohort and time effects. Since I use a dataset of repeated cross-sections, I
can treat the data as a synthetic panel of cohorts.4 The well-known identification prob-
lem between these three components is “solved” using the Deaton-Paxson approach
which assumes time effects to be zero in the long-run. In the estimation, transformed
year dummies are used which allow for short-run time effects like business cycles, but
rule out a long-run time trend (Deaton and Paxson 1994). Hence, all remaining time
variation is attributed to age and cohort effects. To control for age and cohort effects,
I define age and cohort dummies in 5 year intervals, except for the age groups 60-62,
63-65, 66-69 which are defined over three year intervals. Since the Zeitbudgeterhebung
has only been conducted twice, I do not have enough waves to separate age and co-
hort effects, so the cohort and year dummies are omitted in this part of the empirical
analysis. However, in comparison to the EVS, a richer set of household characteristics,
especially education and home ownership, is available which I use in the multivariate
analysis in Section 4.6.
3If, however, households’ substitution between durable and nondurable goods is related to retire-
ment, then one might miss important dynamics in consumer behavior at retirement when exclud-
ing expenses on durables from the analysis. In order to capture interactions between both groups
of goods, I condition the nondurable demands on ownership of the most sizeable durable, namely
house ownership.
4A detailed discussion of this approach can be found in Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985). The
underlying assumption of this approach is that each cross sectional sample is a random draw
the population, and that the panel identifier, here the birth year, does not change over time. A
selection problem can arise due to changes in household composition and differential mortality.
Both factors induce a change in the sample of a cohort from one survey year to the other. By
including household size as a regressor in the estimation, I account for this selection problem.
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4.4 Measurement of retirement status and retirement
incentives in Germany
The key explanatory variable in this chapter, retirement status, is a dummy taking
the value 1 if the household head rates herself as retiree or if she reports any type of
pension income as main income source (Definition 1).5 An alternative measure is to
declare every household head who is not self-employed or a farmer, as retired if he
or she is beyond age 65. In this second definition of retirement status, I additionally
declare every household as retired in which one person is retired and the other one
declares herself as out of the labor force (Definition 2). Official statistics show that
retirement incentives work in the way that roughly every employee is retired beyond
the official retirement entry age 65.
Figure 4.1 displays the fraction of retired respondents by age under the two alter-
native definitions of retirement status, as observed in the two data sets. The first
observation is that the two definitions of retirement status yield similar results. Only
after age 64, the probability of being retired is higher under Definition 2—and only in
the time use survey. I will use the more conservative Definition 1 in the following.
The second observation is that the retirement probability differs between the two
data sets beyond age 65. This is likely due to the much smaller sample size in the
time use data. The data cells of the very old ages are relatively small, such that a
few outliers can dominate the average. However, up to age 64, the shape and level
of the probability to be retired is about the same in the two samples.6 10% of the
household heads are already retired at age 55, and most retirement entries are observed
between ages 56 to 64. Over 90 percent of respondents are retired at age 65, and the
remaining non-retirees are most likely self-employed or farmers. These two groups
face completely different retirement incentives because their old-age provision system
works much differently than that for employees.7
5This definition is likely to lead to an underestimation of the fraction of retired people at any point in
time, because the German pension system offers a large variety of pathways into retirement. One
of the most prominent ones was to retire early and receive unemployment benefits for some period
until becoming eligible for early retirement benefits. Since I do not observe enough information
about the work history of the sample households, I cannot account for all these pathways, and
hence restrict the analysis to the ones that can be observed unambiguously.
6A breakdown of the retirement probabilities by survey year shows that the difference in time periods
within and between the two samples does not account for the differences in retirement.
7Self-employed often run a family business and keep assisting in the family business. Hence, many
self-employed might retire gradually or not at all.
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Figure 4.1: Retirement frequency of household head: Expenditure Survey vs. Time
Use data
Expenditure Survey data (1978-98) Time Use data (1991 & 2001)
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The wide age range over which people retire in Germany is partly due to differences
in statutory retirement ages for different population groups. For example, women
(men) were allowed to retire at the age 60 (65) until 1992. This differential retire-
ment age was removed in 1992 and set to 65 for both sexes and workers. Workers
with a long work history, usually those with lower education, could retire earlier, at
age 63, after 1992. However, the main reasons are generous early retirement schemes
that were in place. Especially, disability benefits were easily available until 1992,
and were paid without a downward adjustment of pensions. Hence, the German pen-
sion system sets very different retirement incentives for different workers, depending
on the work history, gender, whether they are public or private sector workers, and
so forth. For an overview of the incentive structure of the German pension system,
see Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004), Bo¨rsch-Supan and Wilke (2004) and Bo¨rsch-
Supan, Schnabel, Kohnz, and Mastrobuoni (2004). Except for a few self-employed,
retirement is completed around age 65. Unfortunately, neither the Einkommens- und
Verbrauchsstichprobe nor the Zeitbudgeterhebung record any information on the work
history of retired respondents. If one had data on contribution years, type of employ-
ment (civil servant, worker or private sector employee), or past earnings, one could
exploit this information to properly model the retirement timing. The lack of any
instruments for the retirement probability and for retirement income limits the scope
of this analysis. Given the differences between households in the timing of retirement,
many researchers have decomposed their results by age groups. Interacting the retire-
ment dummy with age allows for heterogeneous effects of retirement on consumption
and time use.
In the retirement consumption puzzle literature, this heterogeneity of retirement
decisions, which stems mainly from differential retirement incentives set by the rules
of the pension system (Bo¨rsch-Supan, Kohnz, Mastrobuoni, and Schnabel 2004), has
not yet received much attention, although strategic retirement entry has been in-
tensely studied and the patterns are well known (see e.g. Bo¨rsch-Supan, Reil-Held,
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and Schnabel (2001) and Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004)). The main reason for this
negligence is that information on work histories is missing in most of the surveys that
have been used to study the puzzle. The tradeoff in the choice of the data is that most
household panel surveys do not contain information on total expenditures and even
more seldom detailed expenditure data. For this reason, most studies are based on
repeated cross-sections which, however, do not record any information on past work
histories. The first exception are Hurd and Rohwedder (2005) who analyze two panel
waves who were designed to record detailed expenditure information. The drawback
of their study is that the number of respondents who retired between the two waves is
relatively small. The second exception is Christensen (2004) who uses Spanish panel
data.
Table 4.1: Expected and actual retirement age in Germany in 2003
expected retirement age actual retirement age
all 45-49 yr old sample official stat.
men 65.7 64.1 59.9 60.5
women 64.8 59.5 59.5 60.9
total 65.3 64.3 59.7 60.7
Sources: Retirement Survey described in Bo¨rsch-Supan, Heiss, and Winter (2004), and official
retirement statistics from Verband Deutscher Rentenversicherungstra¨ger (2004)
Looking at a German cross-sectional survey conducted by the Mannheim Research
Institute for the Economics of Aging in 2003, I compare the expected and actual re-
tirement entry ages to get an idea whether expectations and behavior are coherent in
the aggregate. Table 4.1 displays the average expected and actual retirement ages of
the respondents in the survey and additionally the average retirement age according
to official statistics. It illustrates that average actual retirement age is much lower
than expected retirement age, namely 5.8 respectively 5.3 years earlier. The average
retirement age of the survey respondents is between half a year and a year lower than
in the population. This discrepancy is also found in Bo¨rsch-Supan, Essig, and Wilke
(2005) who show in a recent survey of German Households, SAVE, that the expected
retirement entry age exceeds the average retirement entry age in the population sub-
stantially. This difference between expectations and realizations can be due to various
reasons: (i) today’s expectations incorporate expectations about tomorrow’s pension
reforms whose directions is towards longer working lives and lower benefits. Hence,
the pension timing of people retiring today and younger generations might be very
different. (ii) people might experience a “surprise” at later stages in life, and realize
that they accumulated more wealth and benefit entitlements than they expected so
that they can retire earlier than planned, and (iii) there might be unexpected health
shocks which force a fraction of workers to retire earlier than planned. In consequence,
one would need information about expected and realized replacement rates in order
to distinguish between the possible explanations for the discrepancy. To see how se-
riously explanations (i) and (ii) affect retirement age expectations, column 2 of Table
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4.1 depicts the expectations of the age group between 45 and 49 years, i.e., the group
which is closest to retiring. The rules and incentives of the pension system that this
age group is facing is closer to those who are already retired. Furthermore, one would
expect this age group to know most about the conditions they are in and the retire-
ment incentives they are facing. And indeed, the results are consistent with these
hypotheses: Expected retirement age in this group is lower among the 45 to 49 year
old than overall average expected retirement age.
4.5 Descriptive evidence on consumer expenditures
and time use
4.5.1 Is there a consumption drop?
The standard method of investigating consumption in repeated cross-sectional data is
to construct pseudo-panels of cohorts. The underlying assumption for following co-
horts over time is that survey respondents of each cohort are randomly drawn from the
cohorts in the population. Such cohort data cannot tell us anything about dynamics
within cohorts, but it helps analyzing the average evolution of cohort behavior and
cohort characteristics over time. In particular, it can be used to control for unobserv-
able fixed effects over time - with cohort fixed effects replacing the household fixed
effects (Deaton 2000).
Many studies of income, savings and consumption dynamics work on the assumption
that behavior differs across cohorts (Bo¨rsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel,
and Winter 2001; Bo¨rsch-Supan 2003b). I follow this approach and begin with pre-
senting some descriptive evidence using cohort data.8
Figure 4.2: Nondurable expenditures by age and cohort (in 1000 DM per year)
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8I use 5 year bands to define cohorts and assume time effects to be zero.
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Figure 4.2 shows age cohort profiles for nondurable expenditures. Expenditures start
to drop after age 45, the age where retirement probability starts to increase as seen in
Figure 4.1. In comparison with Italy and the US, the drop is 5 years earlier. However,
this is probably mostly a statistical artefact which is due to the 5 year averaged age
variable. Furthermore, the age profile drops significantly after age 45.
Figure 4.3: Expenditures by age and retirement status (in 1000 DM per year)
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Figure 4.3 plots total and log nondurable expenditures by age and retirement status,
neglecting cohort heterogeneity for the moment. The results show a dramatic drop
in expenses which amounts to roughly 20% of nondurable pre-retirement spending.
Furthermore, the Figure suggests that there is again a reduction in spending during
the retirement phase after age 66. The figure also suggests potential selection effects in
retirement entry. The increase in spending among non-retirees beyond age 60 and the
increase in spending among retirees in the same age group suggests that some of the
wealthier households with higher expenses enter later into retirement.9 The increase
of expenditures after age 80 is likely a statistical artefact resulting from small cell sizes
in that group.
Decomposing this picture additionally by cohort for those beyond age 50, one gets
Figure 4.4. It shows that the observation of a spending drop is not obscured by cohort
effects. Even when comparing retirees and non-retirees of the same cohort, there is
a distinct fall in expenses. Surprisingly, the age profiles of households with a retired
head are increasing for the younger retiree cohorts and decreasing for the older ones.
Alternatively, assuming cohort effects to be zero and allowing for time effects, the drop
is similarly dramatic, but the age profiles are relatively flat until age 65 and decreasing
afterwards.
9In these figures, I plot the group of not retired households only until age 65, because over 99% of
employees are retired at age 66.
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Figure 4.4: Expenditures by age, retirement status and cohort
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Note: Expenditures are in 1000 DM per year.
4.5.2 Does home production jump at retirement?
Now, I turn to the descriptive analysis of home production based on the time use
survey. Since I have only two cross-sections of data, I cannot separate cohort and age
effects well. Hence, I neglect the cohort variation in this part of the analysis.
Figure 4.5: Household home production time by age
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Figure 4.5 depicts household home production time by age. The graph has two
humps: the huge increase in home production time between 20 and 35 can be at-
tributed to the large time requirements of caring for and raising children. As they
grow older, the time needed for child care becomes lower. Then, after age 50, home
production time increases again and decreases only after age 70, probably due to func-
tional limitations and worsening health conditions. This can be due to various factors:
(i) the graph confounds age and cohort effects. (ii) As proposed in this chapter, home
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production time might increase due to the reduction in resources and the abundance
of leisure time after entry into retirement. (iii) Age 50-70 might be the age group
where parents become grandparents, so this age group might engage in caring for
their grandchildren. Additionally, the parents of 50-60 year old might be in need of
care, as they enter the group of the oldest old, if they are still alive. Hence, there are
various reasons, why home production might increase from age 50 onwards.
To analyze the importance of reason (ii) in more detail, I now plot home produc-
tion ba age and retirement status. Consistent with the home production argument,
Figure 4.6 shows a similarly dramatic increase in the time households spend on home
production after entry into retirement. The difference between households with a re-
tireed and those with a not retired head is roughly 40 minutes per day and roughly
a 15 percent increase relative to the 270 minutes of home production that not retired
households in the age group 55 do per day.
Figure 4.6: Household home production time by retirement status and age
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4.6 Regression analysis
In this section, I turn to a multivariate analysis of the drop in spending as well as the
increase in time spent on home production at retirement. In order to check whether
retirement entry affects spending additionally to age-related changes, I estimate age
profiles, and additionally use retirement status and other household characteristics as
regressors. In both subsections, I use an OLS estimator with robust standard errors.10
10I obtain a robust variance estimator using the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator which gives
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
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4.6.1 Nondurable expenses
In this first part, where I investigate consumer expenditures, the following empirical
specification is used:
lnxh =
ch∑
cl
αccohhc +
ah∑
al
βaageha +
th∑
tl
γttimeht +
K∑
k=1
ηkZhk
+δ · reth +
ah=65∑
al=50
ζ · reth · ageha + ²ht
(4.1)
where xh are log nondurable expenses of household h, coh are cohort, age are age,
time are the transformed time dummies, and Z are household and other character-
istics.11 The key variables of interest are retirement status ret, and four interacted
age-retirement dummies for the age groups close to retirement.
Table 4.2 shows the estimation results. I start with the age cohort profiles in col-
umn (1), identified using the Deaton-Paxson decomposition and augmented by the
retirement dummy. Figure 4.7 plots the estimated age coefficients from column (1).
The age profile is hump-shaped and peaks already at ages 40-44.
Figure 4.7: Estimated age profile of log nondurable expenditures
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In column (2), I add retirement status and the age-specific interactions with the
retirement dummy. Overall, consumer expenses of the retired are 29% lower than the
spending of not retired households. The interactive effects show that those who are
retired at age 50-54 experience an even larger drop in expenditures which is significant
at the 5% level. While I do not find a significant additive effect of retirement for
households with a retired head in the age group 55 to 59, I find a lower impact
of retirement on the age groups 60 to 65. For these age groups, spending is only
about 20% lower than that of not retired households whose head is in the same age
group. However, these results are biased, as the next column (3) shows. Here, I
add some omitted household characteristics. The retirement dummy reduces to 0.17
11Time subscripts are omitted to keep the notation simple.
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when I control for household characteristics, but remains significantly negative. The
interactive age-retirement coefficient for the age group 50 to 54 is about the same as
before, and the estimated coefficient for the next age group (55 to 59 years) is very
similar and significant. On the contrary, the interaction dummies for the age groups
60 to 65 turn insignificant.
Figure 4.8 compares the age profiles of households with a retired head with those of
households whose head is not retired. The profiles show the distinct effect of retirement
on nondurable spending which is largest for the early retiring households between age
50 and 54. The drop becomes much smaller beyond age 59.
Figure 4.8: Age profiles of log consumption by retirement status
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One of the additional household characteristics that are included in column (3) is
household size which I measure as the log number of equivalent adults living in the
household. To compute this number, I use a coarse equivalence scale where each child
(adult) obtains a weight of 0.5 (1). The estimated coefficient is highly significant
and positive, but with 0.43 well below unity. This implies that I cannot split up the
households into individuals by using per capita expenditures. Additionally, it might
also indicate that the equivalence scale is not well chosen.12
Those with larger houses or apartments (measured in m2) have higher spending—
probably due to higher incomes or higher wealth. I include additional controls for self-
employed and farmer households because they face entirely different pension schemes
and often do not retire at all or retire gradually. Self-employed have higher nondurable
spending which is probably a wealth effect. The estimated coefficient for the farmer
dummy is significant and negative. One measurement problem in the data is that I
do not observe self-employment or farmer status when a household declares itself as
retired. As a robustness check, I also estimated column (3) without the self-employed
and the farmer variable and the results are basically unchanged.
12The negative significant coefficient of the number of kids might be an additional indication that
the equivalence scales are not very precise.
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Another group who should have lower consumption levels are the unemployed. The
lifetime resources of unemployed households are lower due to foregone earnings, such
that I expect consumption to be adjusted downwards when a household experiences
periods of unemployment. The significant negative coefficient confirms that. Again,
I do not observe former unemployment for households with a retired head, so I also
experimented with omitting this variable—with similar results. The effect of retire-
ment reduces to 0.14 and the counteracting effects of the interaction terms for the age
groups between 60 and 65 years become larger. However, the adjusted R2 also falls
from 0.49 to 0.46.
The other control variables indicate that couples spend more than single households,
and households with a female head spend less than those with a male one. The latter
is probably an income effect originating from the fact that many of these households
are headed by widows who receive (lower) widow pensions.
In order to further enhance the understanding of household spending behavior
around retirement, I explore in column (4) how much of this “retirement effect” on
spending is due to income differences between retirees and non retirees. Secondly, I
investigate whether retired households differ in their spending reductions conditional
on whether they are poorer or richer. I concentrate on income rather than wealth,
because the EVS does not provide good wealth measures. As a measure of the income
position of a household, I use quintile dummies based on disposable income, and to
look at heterogeneous behavior of retirees, I additionally interact them with retirement
status.
Column (4) shows that households with a higher income spend more than house-
holds with a lower income. This seems to contradict the life cycle hypothesis, but
given that I cannot condition on wealth, income also serves as a wealth proxy in the
regression. The column also illustrates that the income effect on expenditures is of
different size for the retired households. This might be due to households’ reaction
to unexpected income shocks around retirement. Furthermore, it might reflect the
fact that retired households are more frequently found in the lower quintiles that non
retired households. The coefficient of the retirement dummy becomes smaller when
one includes an income measure in the regression (11% instead of 17%), but it remains
strongly significant. Hence, the results suggest that the consumption retirement puzzle
is also due to factors that are independent of income changes, e.g. differential home
production.
Summarizing, I find a significant expenditure drop upon retirement of about 17%
when I control for age and cohort effects and household characteristics. The drop is
different for retired households of different age groups. It is largest for early retired
households between ages 50 and 60, and lower thereafter. A caveat of this analysis
is the lack of suitable instruments for strategic retirement timing of households.13
I partially account for the heterogeneous retirement timing by allowing for an age-
specific retirement effect.
13For more detailed information on the design of the German pension system and the retirement
incentives it sets, see Bo¨rsch-Supan, Schnabel, Kohnz, and Mastrobuoni (2004).
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In the next section, I turn to the analysis of changes in home production time upon
retirement. The underlying question is: Do retiree households really consume less or
do they substitute market purchased goods in part by home-produced ones?
Table 4.2: Regression results: Consumption
dependent variable: log(total nondurable expenditures)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
retired head -0.28705 -0.17333 -0.1122
(-16.81)*** (-12.79)*** (-8.61)***
age50 ∗ ret -0.05789 -0.04553 -0.03399
(-2.03)** (-2.05)** (-1.85)
age55 ∗ ret -0.01185 -0.04043 -0.04015
(-0.51) (-2.26)** (-2.63)***
age60 ∗ ret 0.08165 0.00806 0.0012
(3.46)*** (0.44) (0.08)
age63 ∗ ret 0.07384 0.01986 0.01952
(2.60)*** (0.92) (1.06)
2nd inc.quint. * ret 0.13014
(16.94)***
3rd inc.quint. * ret 0.16725
(20.32)***
4th inc.quint. * ret 0.1951
(21.69)***
5th inc.quint. * ret 0.1806
(18.30)***
2nd inc.quint. 0.32399
(57.51)***
3rd inc.quint. 0.4882
(86.27)***
4th inc.quint. 0.64365
(110.86)***
5th inc.quint. 0.88063
(145.03)***
age25 0.26303 0.25321 0.03063 0.00573
(19.38)*** (18.73)*** (2.64)*** (0.53)
age30 0.38555 0.36864 -0.00065 -0.05116
(27.44)*** (26.31)*** (-0.05) (-4.61)***
age35 0.41448 0.39504 -0.01943 -0.08121
(28.57)*** (27.33)*** (-1.55) (-7.10)***
age40 0.41512 0.39598 -0.03331 -0.10012
(27.30)*** (26.14)*** (-2.57)** (-8.47)***
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
age45 0.37335 0.35724 -0.06763 -0.13453
(23.84)*** (22.92)*** (-5.11)*** (-11.21)***
age50 0.27473 0.2735 -0.10814 -0.16285
(16.77)*** (16.62)*** (-7.83)*** (-13.02)***
age55 0.13469 0.16119 -0.14913 -0.19023
(8.08)*** (9.56)*** (-10.63)*** (-14.98)***
age60 0.0472 0.1206 -0.15174 -0.19625
(2.63)*** (5.99)*** (-9.13)*** (-13.43)***
age63 0.00184 0.14103 -0.15267 -0.21697
(0.10) (5.26)*** (-7.30)*** (-11.75)***
age66 -0.0867 0.15173 -0.1781 -0.23966
(-4.82)*** (6.42)*** (-9.09)*** (-13.84)***
age70 -0.24958 -0.00602 -0.24831 -0.29445
(-13.34)*** (-0.25) (-12.34)*** (-16.47)***
age75 -0.32152 -0.0758 -0.29514 -0.34423
(-15.69)*** (-2.92)*** (-13.59)*** (-17.61)***
age80 -0.43394 -0.18651 -0.37996 -0.43226
(-18.70)*** (-6.65)*** (-16.08)*** (-20.29)***
age85 -0.52287 -0.27272 -0.45885 -0.50683
(-13.42)*** (-6.55)*** (-12.59)*** (-15.19)***
coh1900 0.07557 0.07419 0.03444 0.03339
(2.48)** (2.43)** (1.32) (1.37)
coh1905 0.11088 0.11105 0.06433 0.06517
(3.76)*** (3.75)*** (2.55)** (2.77)***
coh1910 0.16168 0.16535 0.09874 0.08806
(5.45)*** (5.54)*** (3.87)*** (3.71)***
coh1915 0.23759 0.24277 0.15267 0.1174
(7.89)*** (8.03)*** (5.93)*** (4.90)***
coh1920 0.27354 0.28242 0.1623 0.11636
(8.94)*** (9.20)*** (6.19)*** (4.76)***
coh1925 0.30146 0.30861 0.15274 0.10588
(9.79)*** (9.98)*** (5.79)*** (4.31)***
coh1930 0.30986 0.31411 0.13599 0.09002
(9.96)*** (10.05)*** (5.09)*** (3.63)***
coh1935 0.29848 0.29504 0.14169 0.08013
(9.54)*** (9.39)*** (5.27)*** (3.21)***
coh1940 0.27223 0.26766 0.15143 0.06356
(8.59)*** (8.41)*** (5.58)*** (2.53)**
coh1945 0.2206 0.21586 0.11767 0.02876
(6.87)*** (6.70)*** (4.28)*** (1.13)
coh1950 0.12433 0.11931 0.05218 -0.01831
(3.86)*** (3.69)*** (1.90) (-0.72)
coh1955 0.04255 0.03557 0.00931 -0.05138
(1.31) (1.09) (0.33) (-2.00)**
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
coh1960 -0.0478 -0.0595 -0.03566 -0.08959
(-1.46) (-1.81) (-1.27) (-3.46)***
coh1965 -0.08661 -0.10435 -0.05676 -0.10438
(-2.62)*** (-3.14)*** (-2.00)** (-3.98)***
coh1970 -0.09691 -0.12096 -0.09681 -0.13741
(-2.75)*** (-3.42)*** (-3.21)*** (-4.92)***
coh1975 -0.15582 -0.18665 -0.22553 -0.24515
(-3.40)*** (-4.06)*** (-5.88)*** (-6.78)***
year1988 -0.02123 -0.02364 0.00507 0.00224
(-6.12)*** (-6.82)*** (1.78) (0.90)
year1993 0.05007 0.0506 0.06592 0.0248
(13.73)*** (13.86)*** (23.40)*** (10.02)***
year1998 -0.02034 -0.01886 -0.03816 -0.01435
(-7.25)*** (-6.72)*** (-17.43)*** (-7.40)***
nkids -0.04139 -0.00007
(-18.69)*** (-0.04)
ln(eq.adults) 0.43315 0.16011
(51.71)*** (22.57)***
female head -0.04713 0.00734
(-10.17)*** (1.79)
couple 0.13861 0.11945
(19.16)*** (19.49)***
self-empl. 0.02768 -0.05359
(4.42)*** (-10.31)***
farmer -0.2723 -0.08756
(-27.85)*** (-11.16)***
unemployed -0.40478 -0.19263
(-53.67)*** (-26.74)***
house size 0.00361 0.00143
(77.27)*** (35.62)***
city size 0.04341 0.02201
(32.71)*** (19.26)***
Constant 9.95015 9.98053 9.62873 9.71141
(290.43)*** (290.49)*** (328.94)*** (356.63)***
#Obs. 201826 201826 201826 201826
Adj. R2 0.20 0.21 0.49 0.63
Robust t statistics in parentheses. **, *** significant at 5%, 1%
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4.6.2 Home production
The estimations in this section are based on the Zeitbudgeterhebung. The empirical
specification replicates to a large degree the one in the preceding section and is as
follows:
lnhpht =
ah∑
al
βaageha +
K∑
k=1
ηkZhk + δ · reth +
ah=65∑
al=50
ζ · reth · ageha + ²ht (4.2)
where the dependent variable is household home production time per day, hp. I make
use of the richer set of household demographics available in this data set, e.g. education
and home ownership, and control for the weekday at which time use was recorded in
the diary.
The results are shown in specification (1) of Table 4.3. The estimated coefficient
for the retirement dummy is consistent with the hypothesis that households substitute
consumer expenses in part by increased home production in retirement. The increase is
in the magnitude of 70 minutes per day, an increase of almost 30%, and the coefficient is
highly significant. The interacted age-retirement dummies are not significant, so there
is no indication of age-specific retirement effects. Figure 4.9 illustrates the estimated
age profiles for retired households and not retired ones. The age profile of not retired
households is increasing until age 60-65, and falls rapidly after age 75, probably due
to functional limitations and the deterioration of health conditions. For households
with a retired head, home production time increases discontinuously at age 50. Thus,
the drop in consumer expenses is met by a significant and discontinuous increase in
home production.
Figure 4.9: Age profiles of home production by retirement status
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The household characteristics have the expected signs: More home production is
done in households with children, particularly young children who require a large
amount of care. Female headed households spend more time on home production. The
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same applies to house ownership which indicates a higher required effort in maintaining
the home. The self-employed do less home production which corresponds with their
higher spending from the last section, while unemployed people do more.
Again, as in the former section, I look at whether the retirement effect could be
mainly due to income differences. Including income quintiles and their interactions
with retirement status in specification (2) again does not change the results drastically.
Naturally, it reduces the “retirement effect”, but only by one sixth. As expected,
people in the upper income quintiles engage less in home production activities. On
the contrary, however, retired people in the 2nd lowest income quintile do significantly
less home production. This unexpected result might be explained by the relation
between income an health status, i.e. poorer people tend to be more affected by
health problems which might prevent them from engaging in home production. Since
no health information is contained in this survey, I cannot pin down this potential
explanation.
Table 4.3: Regression results: Home Production
dependent variable: household home production time (in mins per day)
(1) (2) (1) (2)
retired head 70.569 60.083
(4.21)*** (3.26)***
age50 ∗ ret 41.368 46.004 2nd inc.quint. -28.394
(1.18) (1.29) * ret (2.31)**
age55 ∗ ret 35.303 42.332 3rd inc.quint. -23.514
(1.36) (1.62) * ret (1.62)
age60 ∗ ret 31.137 32.965 4th inc.quint. 21.438
(1.27) (1.31) *ret (1.23)
age63 ∗ ret 8.053 7.065 5th inc.quint. -0.291
(0.26) (0.23) *ret (0.01)
age25 22.325 22.427 age60 113.289 122.305
(1.55) (1.51) (6.11)*** (6.37)***
age30 38.888 45.157 age63 133.317 142.662
(2.87)*** (3.24)*** (4.99)*** (5.30)***
age35 46.019 55.285 age66 123.428 137.611
(3.36)*** (3.91)*** (5.77)*** (6.24)***
age40 48.603 59.146 age70 109.757 123.453
(3.55)*** (4.17)*** (5.01)*** (5.48)***
age45 72.475 85.269 age75 107.166 120.678
(5.25)*** (5.97)*** (4.77)*** (5.19)***
age50 94.109 101.939 age80 118.703 136.111
(6.86)*** (7.19)*** (4.82)*** (5.34)***
age55 110.104 114.929 age85 63.339 78.846
(7.79)*** (7.82)*** (1.95)* (2.42)**
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(1) (2) (1) (2)
ln(eq.Adults) 44.295 40.523 2nd inc.quint. -13.645
(4.53)*** (4.06)*** (1.58)
nkids0-5 143.321 143.352 3rd inc.quint. -28.920
(26.77)*** (26.14)*** (3.14)***
nkids6-18 35.799 35.178 4th inc.quint. -57.151
(10.00)*** (9.90)*** (5.67)***
female head 31.772 30.340 5th inc.quint. -87.229
(5.15)*** (4.83)*** (8.39)***
couple 224.047 246.087 Central 1.788 0.732
(25.77)*** (26.49)*** (0.37) (0.15)
schoolyears 1.469 2.770 East 2.695 -12.954
(2.01)** (3.49)*** (0.46) (2.08)**
self-empl. -76.179 -68.550 Tuesday -3.918 -6.035
(10.36)*** (9.23)*** (0.54) (0.81)
unempl. 92.793 70.757 Wednesday -1.922 -4.034
(10.36)*** (7.20)*** (0.26) (0.53)
app. Owner 1.205 8.644 Thursday 3.195 -0.831
(0.14) (1.03) (0.43) (0.11)
house owner 25.614 24.574 Friday 19.317 17.810
(3.97)*** (3.78)*** (2.57)** (2.36)**
garden 41.561 41.303 Saturday 62.682 60.586
(7.78)*** (7.60)*** (7.75)*** (7.36)***
house size -0.002 0.131 Sunday -83.438 -87.408
(0.03) (1.69)* (10.67)*** (10.98)***
const. 53.968 54.895
(3.54)*** (3.52)***
#Obs. 13548 13140 Adj. R2 0.44 0.44
Robust t statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%
4.7 Conclusions and directions for further research
In this chapter, I have used a large expenditure data set of repeated cross sections
spanning the period 1978 until 1998 to study the changes in consumer expenditures at
retirement. The results show that there is a similar drop in expenditures in Germany
as in other countries like the UK and the US. The magnitude of the drop is around
17% of pre-retirement expenses on nondurable consumption. Taken together, there
is empirical evidence in many developed countries now that households reduce their
consumer expenses at retirement. Thus, in spite of different pension systems and
differential retirement incentives, one even finds drops of similar magnitude in some
countries, for example in Germany and the US.
To investigate whether this expenditure drop causes a consumption drop of equal
size, I analyze time use patterns at retirement, also on the basis of a large data set
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of repeated cross-sections. If households engage more actively in home production
during retirement, then the expenditure drop is offset at least partially by increased
consumption from home produced goods and services. I analyze the role of home
production directly by looking at the time spent on such activities, while other studies
often infer a changed home production from changed spending on commodity groups
that can be produced at home. The main finding is that there is a discontinuous
increase in home production at retirement which amounts to an additional 70 minutes
per day. This significant and sizeable increase indicates that households flexibly adapt
to the change in time and money resources in retirement, and that home production
can explain a good part of the expenditure drop.
In the following, I discuss some directions for further research that extend the
analysis conducted in this chapter and mitigate some shortcomings of this analysis.
Endogenous retirement age
As already described in Section 4.4, individuals make an active retirement choice
which depends on various factors like their past work career, their leisure preferences,
the design of the pension system, etc. A complicated set of rules within the pension
system and generous early retirement schemes create strong incentives to retire at a
certain age conditional on the work history and characteristics of the individual. The
retirement timing strongly determines resources in retirement in Germany, and hence
also consumer expenditures in old age via their influence on lifetime wealth. The EVS
does not offer any information on the work history of respondents which I could use in
order to instrument retirement status. In further research, one could use the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to analyze changes in time use and food consumption.
Also based on the SOEP, Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004) have computed option
values which reflect the trade-off between retiring now versus retiring later for every
retirement entry age. This incentive variable posits an ideal instrument for retirement
entry age.
Decomposing consumption by commodities
A logic extension of this analysis is to decompose the expenditure data by commodity
groups. The decomposition allows to analyze how much of the overall expenditure
drop is due to the cessation of work-related costs. Additionally, there are some goods
and services that can be produced at home rather than purchased. An example is food
consumed at home. Some studies have shown that food spending drops significantly
at retirement, and that this is due to more home production (Aguiar and Hurst 2004).
Decomposing expenses by commodities would allow to directly compare whether the
spending cuts in a category is counteracted by increased home production in the re-
spective home production activity. Hence, a more detailed analysis of the expenditure
and time use categories would allow to directly match them. This undertaking could
be conducted on the basis of the two data sets used in this analysis.
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Unanticipated income shocks
A new wave of the German panel data set SAVE which will be released soon, allows
to analyze whether households face unanticipated income shocks around retirement.
In addition to the question about expected and actual retirement age, respondents are
also asked about their experience and expectations about the replacement rate, which
is defined as the fraction of the last pre-retirement income that the household receives
as retirement income. Differences between expectations before and realizations after
retirement can be used to verify, whether households experience income shocks that
force them to reduce consumption in old age.
Health shocks
Hurd and Rohwedder (2005) have investigated the role of health shocks for consump-
tion at retirement, using self-reported health. The same data set, the Health and
Retirement Survey, also contains detailed “objective” health measures, in particular
information on major health events like strokes, heart attacks and the like. Possibly,
these major health events are more precise measures of health shocks than changes
in self-reported health, since major health events generally happen as real shocks.
Exploiting this information could yield new insights.
Consumption during retirement
The discontinuous drop of consumption at retirement has received much attention.
However, consumer behavior over the entire retirement phase is at least equally in-
teresting. For example, one could imagine that the sudden abundance of leisure time
requires an adjustment of the newly retired to the changed daily rhythm. Further-
more, one might think of the time after retirement as a learning process during which
retirees discover new ways to spend their time which was formerly structured to a
large extent by their work schedule. Additionally, it would be interesting to study the
linkages between health and consumption during retirement when bad health does not
directly affect lifetime wealth anymore via foregone earnings.
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5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present and test a general equilibrium model in which increases in
labor supply trigger an increase in the relative demand for unskilled labor and therefore
improve the labor market prospects of unskilled workers. This feedback effect works
through changes in the composition of consumer demand respectively changes in home
production.
We consider three margins at which labor supply can change: labor force participa-
tion, (weekly) working time and retirement age. Debates on increasing versus cutting
down on weekly working time1, prolonging working life by raising the retirement age2
and increasing labor force participation particularly among women resurface period-
ically in the political discussion. The arguments against or in favor of these policy
measures are well known. Opponents of increased labor market participation think
that—for want of jobs—it does not make much sense to have people work longer (hours
or years) or to have more people enter the labor force in times of high unemployment.
This view is based on what has become known as the “lump of labor fallacy”. It does
not take into account that changes in labor supply entail changes in income and con-
sumer demand and thus ultimately in labor demand. In other words, the amount of
work to be done is not a fixed lump. This idea that the economy adjusts to changes in
labor supply—at least in the long run—is well established among economists. Empir-
ical studies on employment effects of working time reduction are inconclusive. They
generally suffer from the fact that changes in working time usually involve changes
in unit wage costs (e.g., working time reduction with compensatory wage increases)
and the effects of the two are hard to separate (Calmfors and Hoel 1988; Calmfors
and Hoel 1989; Hunt 1999; Logeay and Schreiber 2003). A thorough review of the
literature can be found in OECD (1998), pp. 117-148.3
1An increasing number of firms in Europe is currently returning to longer working hours in the face
of increasing global competition.
2Measures to increase retirement age have been set in place and are currently being discussed again
in order to finance pay-as-you-go funded social security systems in times of population aging.
3Calmfors and Hoel (1989) give five reasons of why working time reduction might actually lead to
a reduction in labor demand: (i) Wage rates per unit of time may rise. (ii) Even if wage rates
remain constant, wage costs per unit of time may rise due to the existence of fixed costs per
employee. (iii) Labor productivity per hour may fall because the proportion of ”non-productive”
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This chapter presents and tests a new argument in this old debate. While a vo-
luminous empirical and theoretical literature on the employment effects especially of
working time reduction already exists, very few studies look at how different types
of workers are affected by these measures.4 In this chapter, we show that changes in
labor supply effectuate changes not only in the level but also in the composition of
the demand for labor.
A rise in labor supply has two direct effects: Workers have higher incomes and less
(leisure) time. This change in the endowment of people is likely to have effects on the
composition of consumer demand. People with higher incomes can consume more. At
the same time, they have less time at their disposal. Due to these endowment changes,
they raise expenditures on those goods or services, that they have “produced” on their
own so far. Examples of such outsourcing of home production are house cleaning,
preparing food (using a pizza delivery service rather than making it at home,...), car
washing, fixing bicycles, ironing shirts, walking dogs, repairs at home, do-it-yourself,
child care, etc. The goods that everyone can make on their own are exactly those
that can be “produced” by unskilled workers. So, as a consequence of growing labor
supply, consumer demand shifts towards goods and services that are supplied mostly
by unskilled workers and the relative demand for unskilled labor rises. Thus, measures
geared at changing labor market participation do not only result in level effects on
employment, but also affect workers with different skill levels asymmetrically.
In the model economy considered in this chapter, individuals maximize their utility
over consumption and leisure and allocate their time over three types of activities:
market work, home production, and leisure. Consumption is not equal to expendi-
tures in our model, but consists of goods and services purchased on the market as well
as self-produced goods.5 We study the effects of changes in labor market participa-
tion in the absence of compensatory wage changes or any other change in unit labor
costs. Hence, our argument is independent of potential union or policy-induced wage-
setting schemes. Unemployment in this model emerges because wages are downwardly
rigid.6 The adverse effects of this rigidity of wages are (obviously) especially strong
at the lower end of the skill distribution. Given this concentration of unemployment
at unskilled labor, exogenous changes that increase the demand for products that are
intensive in the use of unskilled labor have positive employment effects. The employ-
ment effects are shown to be more severe, the more complementary are the consumer
goods and leisure.
time devoted to starting up and finishing work may rise. (iv) The factor cost of employing new
workers rises relative to the cost of increasing overtime when standard hours are cut. (v) Capital
utilization will decrease to the extent that the operating time of the capital stock is reduced pari
passu with working time.
4Corneo (1995) is a notable exception.
5The argument that consumption is more than expenditures goes back to Becker (1965) and Gronau
(1977).
6Labor market frictions that entail downward rigidity of wages include unemployment benefits,
minimum wages, welfare aid, wage-compression due to strong unions, etc.
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In the second part of this chapter, we test the basic mechanism of our model. We
analyze the empirical link between market work, home production and the demand
for goods and services that are substitutes for home production at the household
level, and we test the macroeconomic relation between labor supply measures and
unemployment.
We proceed in three steps: First, we use the German time use survey from 1991/92
and investigate whether the time spent on home production activities differs by house-
hold labor supply. We find evidence of decreasing time spent on home production
upon higher labor supply, encompassing working hours and labor force participation.
However, looking at the allocation of time does not clarify whether home production
is simply reduced without any compensatory outsourcing.7 Furthermore, we cannot
control for potential productivity differences in home production between working and
non-working individuals, such that heterogeneity in time allocation does not necessar-
ily translate into differences in the amount of outsourcing of the two groups. In a
second step, we therefore look at a well-defined subset of services substituting for
home production using the same survey and analyze whether outsourcing increases
upon higher labor supply. Again, we find evidence supporting our hypothesis, that
outsourcing increases when market work rises. The third hypothesis of our model,
that this increased outsourcing of home production raises the demand for unskilled
labor, cannot be quantified using this data, since there is no matching information on
sectoral production functions. Hence, we use macroeconomic panel data on OECD
countries and directly test the reduced form relation between labor supply measures
and unemployment. The results corroborate the prediction from the theoretical model.
A number of studies has provided empirical support for some of the mechanisms
of our model: The research project DEMPATEM surveyed in Schettkat and Salverda
(2004) presents evidence that the demand for services in general has increased over
time, partly due to the increased labor force participation of women. The focus of
DEMPATEM is on international differences in the structure of consumer demand,
especially in the types of services demanded. The German case study in this inter-
national comparison project analyzes the determinants of changes in the structure
of consumer demand, including labor force participation as an explanatory variable
(Van Deelen and Schettkat 2004). However, the authors only investigate the differ-
ences between workers and nonworkers and do not take into account the amount of
time worked. They find that “the second earner seems to push up (general) service
expenditures”.
Special attention to household services is given in Bru¨ck, Haisken-DeNew, and Zim-
mermann (2003). They show that the demand for household services is very income-
elastic, and that there is potentially a large market for such services. We addition-
ally show, that not only an increasing income, but also the decrease in disposable
time raises the demand for household services and other substitutes for home produc-
7In the following, we will use the term “outsourcing” to describe the act of buying household services
and other home-producible goods and services instead of producing them in the household.
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tion. Both effects together imply that increased labor supply can create jobs for the
unskilled—via changes in consumer demand.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2, we develop
the theoretical model. In Section 5.3, we provide empirical support for the theoretical
predictions of our model. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.4.
5.2 The theoretical model
The economy is populated by a continuum of measure 1 of heterogeneous households
indexed by skill level j ∈ [0, 1]. Within each household, all members have the same
skill level. For simplicity, we assume that the entire age distribution is represented
in each household. A share λ of household members per cohort participates in the
labor force. Working age ranges from 0 to retirement age ρ. Life ends at age 1. For
a worker’s labor market prospects, only the skill level plays a role while age (as long
as it is below ρ) is irrelevant. Working time per worker is ω units of labor per period.
Labor supply of each household ξ is equal to the individual working time ω times the
integral over all cohorts (within that household) from 0 to ρ and over those workers
who actually participate in the labor force:
ξ = ρ · λ · ω.
In order to be able to make comparative statics with respect to labor supply, we
model λ, ρ, and ω as exogenous. For simplicity, we set these parameters equal across
households, skill-levels, and cohorts. Heterogeneity with respect to these parameters
would amplify the complexity of the model without generating any further insights.
Households have preferences over two consumer goods and leisure. One good can
be produced at home or purchased on the market, while the other one can only be
purchased at the market and is the nume´raire. Unemployment arises because of a
minimum wage which depends on the average income level (see Subsection 5.2.2.8
5.2.1 Production in firms
Both goods are produced by a continuum of measure 1 of homogenous firms using all
types of labor. Good 1 is the self-producible good and good 2 is the market good.
The technology for good i is
yi =
∫ 1
0
ej·(1+χi) · ni,j · dj (5.1)
where ni,j is labor input of skill type j for the production of good i. Marginal pro-
ductivity ∂yi
∂ni,j
= ej is increasing with skill level j for both goods.9 χ is a productivity
8If wages were perfectly flexible, i.e., without unemployment, the model would yield similar effects:
An increase in market work would lead to higher employment, especially among the unskilled,
and to a decrease in wage inequality. Only if labor demand were perfectly inelastic, employment
would remain unchanged and we would only observe a change in wage inequality.
9The exponential specification implies that the distribution of labor income is skewed to the right.
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parameter reflecting differential comparative advantage of skills. χ2 > χ1 implies that
the production of good 2 is more skill-intensive, i.e., the productivity advantage of
workers with higher skills (higher j) is larger in sector 2. For simplicity, we set χ1 = 0
and χ2 = χ. Firms act as price-takers on input and output markets. Maximizing
profits
pii = pi ·
∫ 1
0
ej·(1+χi) · ni,j · dj −
∫ 1
0
wj · ni,j · dj (5.2)
leads to demand for type j labor in sector i:
ndi,j =

∞ ⇔ wj < pi · e(1+χi)·j
[0,∞) ⇔ wj = pi · e(1+χi)·j
0 ⇔ wj > pi · e(1+χi)·j
(5.3)
where wj is the wage for type j labor and pi is the price of good i.
Figure 5.1: Allocation of Types j to Sectors
Figure 5.1 illustrates the allocation of types to sectors. On the horizontal axis is
the space of types. On the vertical axis are the wages in the two sectors as functions
of the type j. Workers supply labor to the firm that offers the highest wage. In
equilibrium, firms in sector 1 pay wj = p ·ej while firms in sector 2 pay wj = e(1+χ)·j.10
This difference in wages determines the allocation of types to sectors. Type ˆ = ln p
1
χ
is indifferent between working in sector 1 and working in sector 2. All lower types
prefer working in sector 1 while all higher types prefer working in sector 2. The higher
10The price of the nume´raire, good 2, is normalized to 1. We assume that parameter constellations are
such that production is positive in both sectors. This implies a relative goods price p = p1p2 larger
than 1.
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is the relative price of good 1, the more skill types prefer to work in sector 1. The
productivity advantage χ of sector 2 has a negative direct effect on ˆ but an indirect
effect through p which might counteract the direct effect. For a discussion of the
interaction between these two effects, see Weiss (2004).
Equilibrium wages for different types of workers are thus
wj =
{
p · ej ⇔ j < ln p 1χ
e(1+χ)·j ⇔ j ≥ ln p 1χ . (5.4)
Retirement age ρ ∈ [0, 1], labor force participation λ ∈ [0, 1], and fixed working time
ω ∈ [0, 1] restrict labor supply of households at each skill level j to ξ ∈ [0, 1]. Labor
supply in the two sectors is thus given by
ns1,j =

ξ ⇔ j < ln p 1χ
∈ [0, ξ] ⇔ j = ln p 1χ
0 ⇔ j > ln p 1χ
ns2,j =

0 ⇔ j < ln p 1χ
ξ − ns1,j ⇔ j = ln p
1
χ
ξ ⇔ j > ln p 1χ
. (5.5)
Goods supply is given by
y1 =
∫ ln p 1χ
0
ej ·ξ ·dj = ξ ·
(
p
1
χ − 1
)
y2 =
∫ 1
ln p
1
χ
e(1+χ)·j ·ξ ·dj = ξ · e
1+χ − p 1+χχ
1 + χ
.
(5.6)
Supply of good 1 (2) is increasing (decreasing) in the relative goods price p. Supply
of both goods is increasing in labor supply ξ. χ which represents the productivity
advantage of sector 2 has a negative (positive) effect on the supply of good 1 (2).
5.2.2 Wage rigidity and unemployment
Unemployment in this model is due to a downward rigidity of the wages. We assume
that the wage cannot fall below a minimum w˜ which is indexed to the average income
level in the economy.11 This assumption introduces a rigidity that keeps relative wages
from adjusting perfectly to changes in relative labor demand. Therefore, changes in
relative labor demand affect employment. This sort of rigidity in the relative wage
arises if strong unions ensure a compressed wage structure, if a legal minimum wage
exists that is indexed to the average wage, or if welfare aid or unemployment benefits
depend on the average income. Another source of such a rigidity in the relative
wage could be considerations of fairness as, e.g., put forward in the “fair wage-effort
hypothesis” by Akerlof and Yellen (1988) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and recently
11In France, Japan, Spain (among others), the legal minimum wage is explicitly indexed to the
average wage (see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), page 715). In other countries, this link might
not be as explicit, but by and large, wages at the lower end of the distribution are usually somehow
tied to the evolution of average wages over time. This assumption is not crucial for the results.
On the contrary, the endogeneity of the minimum wage is moderating the employment effect of
changes in labor supply.
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confirmed in a series of experimental studies surveyed by Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000).12
In this model, w˜ should be seen as a simple means to capture all these phenomena
leading to a rigidity in the relative wage.13
We assume that the “minimum wage” w˜ is a constant fraction θ of the average wage:
w˜ = θ ·
∫ 1
j˜
wj · dj = θ ·
(
χ · p 1+χχ + e1+χ
1 + χ
− p · ej˜
)
(5.7)
where j˜ is the type whose market wage is equal to the minimum wage. All higher
types receive higher wages while all lower types are unemployed. So, j˜ also represents
the fraction of unemployed workers.
The unemployment rate j˜ is determined by the equality of the minimum wage w˜
and the market wage of a type j˜ worker, wj˜ :
θ ·
(
χ · p 1+χχ + e1+χ
1 + χ
− p · ej˜
)
!
= p · ej˜.
Solving for j˜ yields the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The rate of unemployment j˜ is given by
j˜ = ln
(
θ
1 + θ
· χ · p
1+χ
χ + e1+χ
p · (1 + χ)
)
. (5.8)
It is increasing in θ and decreasing in p.
Not surprisingly, the more generous is the minimum wage (the higher θ ), the higher
is the rate of unemployment.
The effect of the relative goods price p corresponds to the so-called Stolper-
Samuelson-Effect in trade theory. An increase in the relative price of good 1 leads
to an increase in the relative demand for lower types of labor (in which the production
of good 1 is intensive). This change in relative labor does not fully translate into
respective changes in the relative wage so that employment increases.14
Note that working life ρ, working time ω, and labor force participation λ do not
have any direct effect on unemployment j˜ in the model. It is shown in the next section
that they affect employment through their effect on the relative goods price p.
12The fair wage-effort hypothesis is motivated by equity theory in social psychology and social ex-
change theory in sociology. According to this hypothesis, workers withdraw effort as their actual
wage falls short of what they consider their “fair wage”. Such behavior causes unemployment by
introducing a downward rigidity in wages. Kahnemann, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) have shown
that individual conceptions of fair wages often diverge substantially from the levels that would
clear competitive labor markets. See Weiss and Garloff (2005) for a detailed discussion of causes
and effects of rigidities in the relative wage.
13In a system of union wages classified by skill levels, w˜ can be seen as the lowest wage level in
this classification. For ease of labelling, we will in the remainder of the chapter refer to w˜ as the
minimum wage.
14If wages were perfectly flexible, unemployment would not exist and an increase in labor supply
would—via this Stolper-Samuelson-Effect—translate into a decrease in wage inequality.
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Figure 5.2: Allocation of Types j to Sectors and Unemployment
Figure 5.2 illustrates the effect of the minimum wage on employment. For the high
types, the wage they can earn in sector 2 exceeds the wage they would receive in sector
1. Therefore, they work in sector 2. The medium range types earn a higher wage in
sector 1 than in sector 2. These types work in sector 1. The low types, whose market
value in both sectors falls short of the minimum wage, cannot find a job.
An increase in the relative price of good 1, p, exerts an upward pressure on the wage
in sector 1. In terms of Figure 5.2, an increase in p implies an upward shift of the
solid line. For the highest unemployed types, the wage is pushed above the minimum
wage. They find employment, so that total unemployment decreases.15
The effect of the fixed working lifetime on the relative goods price p depends on
consumer demand which is analyzed in the next subsection.
5.2.3 Consumption and home production
All households share the same preferences over consumption and leisure
Uj (c1,j, c2,j, lj) =
(
cγ1,j + c
γ
2,j + l
γ
j
) 1
γ (5.9)
15The intersection between the solid line (wage in sector 1) and the dotted line (minimum wage)
moves to the left. In fact, the dotted line (the minimum wage) shifts upward as well, but this shift
is less pronounced because the minimum wage is indexed to both, the wage in sector 1 (which
increases) and the wage in sector 2 (which remains unchanged).
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where lj is leisure time of a type j household, ci,j is consumption of good i, and σ =
1
1−γ
is the elasticity of substitution between consumption of good 1, consumption of good
2, and leisure.16
Good 1 is either bought on the market at price p or produced at home with tech-
nology
yh1,j = α · hpj (5.10)
where nhj is the time that a type j household devotes to home production and α
is a productivity parameter. We assume that at home, skill types do not differ in
productivity. This assumption is made for simplicity. It has no qualitative effect on
the results as long as lower types have a comparative advantage in the production of
the good that can be produced at home. Good 2 is bought on the market at price 1.
For employed households, the budget and time constraints are respectively
p · (c1,j − yh1,j)+ c2,j = wj · ξ and lj + phj + ξ = 1 (5.11)
For unemployed households, the budget and time constraints are respectively17
p · (c1,j − yh1,j)+ c2,j = 0 and lj + hpj = 1 (5.12)
Maximizing utility (5.9) subject to the constraints (5.10) through (5.12) yields
c1,j =

α
1
1−γ
1+α
γ
1−γ ·
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
« ⇔ j < j˜
α
1
1−γ ·
“
wj ·ξ
α·p +(1−ξ)
”
1+α
γ
1−γ ·
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
« ⇔ j ≥ j˜
c2,j =

(α·p)
1
1−γ
1+α
γ
1−γ ·
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
« ⇔ j < j˜
(α·p)
1
1−γ ·
“
wj ·ξ
p·α +1−ξ
”
1+α
γ
1−γ ·
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
« ⇔ j ≥ j˜
(5.13)
lj =

1
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
⇔ j < j˜
wj ·ξ
α·p +1−ξ
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
⇔ j ≥ j˜
nhj =

„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
⇔ j < j˜
(1−ξ)·
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ −wj ·ξ
α·p
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
⇔ j ≥ j˜
(5.14)
Consumption of good 1 (2) is decreasing (increasing) in the relative goods price.
Leisure is also decreasing in the relative price of the home-producible good 1. The
higher the price for good 1, the higher is the opportunity cost of leisure because time
can also be used to produce good 1. Home production time is increasing in the relative
price (of the home-producible good 1).
16For simplicity, we assume, that within a household, consumption and leisure of all household
members are aggregated before they enter the joint utility function.
17To keep things simple, we assume that there are no unemployment benefits. Unemployed house-
holds live on their home production.
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5.2.4 General equilibrium
In the following, we assume that the parameter constellation is such that (i) production
in both sectors is strictly positive, (ii) unemployment is strictly positive and strictly
below 100%, and (iii) all types of households spend some strictly positive amount of
time on home production. These assumptions restrict the analysis to interior solutions.
Definition 1 An equilibrium corresponds to a price system
{
{wj}j∈[0,1] , {pi}i=1,2
}
and an allocation
{
{cij}j∈[0,1],i=1,2 , {lj}j∈[0,1] , {hpj}j∈[0,1] , {yi}i=1,2 ,
{
yh1,j
}
j∈[0,1]
}
that
satisfy the following conditions:
• (Utility Maximization): Given the price system
{
{wj}j∈[0,1] , {pi}i=1,2
}
, the
strategy
{
{cij}i=1,2 , lj, hpj
}
maximizes the utility (5.9) of each household of type
j ∈ [0, 1] under the technological constraint (5.10), and the respective budget and
time constraints (5.11) or (5.12).
• (Profit Maximization): Given the price system
{
{wj}j∈[0,1] , {pi}i=1,2
}
, the
production plan
{
{ni,j}j∈[0,1] , yi
}
maximizes profits (5.2) of each firm in sector
i.
• (Market Clearing):
For each consumer good i = 1, 2 :
∫ 1
0
ci,j · dj = yi.
For each production factor j ∈ [0, 1] : ∑2i=1 ni,j = ξ.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions (i), (ii), and (iii), an equilibrium exists and is
unique. The relative goods price p as a function of technology parameters α, χ, pref-
erence parameter γ, institutional parameter θ, labor force participation λ, retirement
age ρ, and working time ω is given implicitly by
(α · p) γ1−γ ·
α · p · ln
(
θ
1+θ
· χ·p
1+χ
χ +e1+χ
p·(1+χ)
)
+ χ·p
1+χ
χ +e1+χ
(1+θ)·(1+χ) +
1−ξ
ξ
· α · p
1 +
(
1 + p
γ
1−γ
)
· α γ1−γ
=
e1+χ − p 1+χχ
1 + χ
(5.15)
where ξ = ρ · λ · ω.
Proof. See Appendix 5.5.1.
Proposition 2 An increase in retirement age ρ, labor force participation λ, or work-
ing time ω leads to an increase in the relative goods price p:
∂p
∂ρ
> 0
∂p
∂λ
> 0
∂p
∂ω
> 0. (5.16)
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Proof. See Appendix 5.5.1.
Increases in retirement age, labor force participation and working time all imply a
rise in market work. An increase in market work makes households reduce home
production and demand more of good 1 from the market. As a consequence, the
relative price of good 1 rises.
From Lemma 1 we know that unemployment j˜ depends on the relative goods price
p. This is the channel through which market work ξ affects unemployment.
Proposition 3 An increase in retirement age ρ, labor force participation λ, or work-
ing time ω leads to a decrease in the unemployment rate j˜. This effect—in terms of
∂j˜
∂ξ
· ξ
j˜
—is stronger the smaller is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure σ = 1
1−γ .
Proof. See Appendix 5.5.1.
As stated in Proposition 2, an increase in market work leads to an increase in the
relative price of good 1. This shifts relative demand for lower types (in which the
production of good 1 is intensive) upward. This lifts the wages of some hitherto un-
employed types above the minimum wage. They find employment and unemployment
falls.
What is the role of the substitution elasticity in this effect? If substitutability
is high, an increase in market work can easily be offset by a respective decrease in
home production without the need for drastic changes in goods and factor prices.
In this case, the wage rigidity does only little harm. In the extreme case of perfect
substitutes, the relative goods price is equal to 1 and the unemployment rate is j˜ =
ln
(
θ
1+θ
· χ+e1+χ
1+χ
)
independently of market work ξ. If on the contrary substitutability
is low, substantial changes in relative goods and factor prices are required to induce
changes in consumption and leisure following an increase in market work. In this case,
the wage rigidity has larger effects.
In summary, our general equilibrium model provides a new argument why common
statements that often appear in the political discussion are wrong. They state that (i) if
working life is prolonged, the old take away the jobs from the young, (ii) if more women
work, they take away the jobs from the men, (iii) if the employed work longer work
hours, the employment prospects of the unemployed are corroded. The idea underlying
these statements is that the total amount of work to be done is fixed, has been termed
the “lump-of-labor fallacy”. However, on the contrary, higher labor supply leads to
more production, higher incomes and thereby higher demand for goods and labor.
Our theoretical model shows that this increase in the demand for goods and services
asymmetrically favors the demand for those goods and services whose production is
intensive in the use of unskilled labor. In consequence, while the induced increase in
labor supply is symmetric across all skill levels, the increase in labor demand is biased
towards unskilled labor. Given the concentration of unemployment at unskilled labor,
this shift in relative labor demand has positive employment effects.
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5.3 The empirical analysis
In this section, we present evidence supporting our view that increased market work
goes along with less home production, more outsourcing of household work and other
self-producible goods and lower unemployment. Our empirical evidence is organized
as summarized in Figure 5.3: Firstly, we investigate the allocation of time by house-
hold members conditional on their working time (Section 5.3.3). We present direct
evidence that less time is spent on home production activities the more time the
household members spend on market work. In order to see whether home production
is substituted by respective market goods and services, we secondly investigate data
on help received by the household, comprising household services, child care, care for
elderly persons and technical help (Section 5.3.4). This approach yields empirical ev-
idence supporting our hypothesis that outsourcing takes place, when market work of
household members is increased. Hence, our empirical evidence supports the view,
that (a) households with a higher labor market participation reduce their time spent
on home production, and (b) that they substitute these tasks by outsourcing, i.e.,
demanding services and products that fulfill these tasks.
We consider two margins of labor market participation, namely changes in (weekly)
working time and changes in labor force participation, particularly of women. The
effects of a prolonged working life are not analyzed. There are some recent papers
trying to explain the significant drop in consumer expenditures upon retirement which
also investigate whether these households substitute home production for some goods
and services formerly purchased at the market (Hamermesh 1984; Banks, Blundell,
and Tanner 1998; Hurd and Rohwedder 2003; Aguiar and Hurst 2004; Heathcote
2002). Given the particular circumstances and needs of older (retired) people, the link
between the length of working life and home production has been studied in Chapter
4.
The third result of our model, that this increased outsourcing of home produc-
tion raises the demand for unskilled labor and reduces unemployment, can neither be
tested nor quantified using the same data set, since there is no matching information
on sectoral production functions. To further test our theoretical predictions, we use
macroeconomic data on OECD countries and directly estimate the reduced form re-
lation between measures of labor supply and the unemployment rate (Section 5.3.5).
We find that average working hours as well as the participation rate are negatively
linked with the unemployment rate in these countries.
5.3.1 The time use data
First, we use the German time budget survey (Zeitbudgeterhebung) from 1991/92
by the Statistisches Bundesamt. We restrict the sample to West German households
headed by married or cohabiting couples in the working age group 20-60.18 Further-
more, we use the provided sampling weights in order to render the data representative.
18We exclude East German households, because they had very different labor market dynamics
directly after the reunification in 1991/92.
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Figure 5.3: Overview over the empirical analysis
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Since only one wave of the data is available, we conduct a cross sectional analysis. This
implies that we cannot account for unobserved heterogeneity. However, we can filter
many dimensions of inter-personal heterogeneity, because the survey contains a de-
tailed set of household and personal characteristics as well as regional characteristics.
The time use of each respondent is surveyed for two days. The respondents fill in a
time diary, which gives us the information on the total time spent on each activity dur-
ing a day. We follow the standard classification scheme to group activities into home
production, working time and leisure time. The dependent variable home production,
hp, is characterized as time spent for food preparation and cleanup, cleaning inside
or outside the home, caring for clothes, plants and animals, time spent for shopping,
home and car repair, and all children-related activities or caring for other people. Our
working time variable, denoted ω, is time spent working, commuting to work, taking
breaks while at work, and searching for work.19 The distribution of working hours
among the working by sex is shown in Figure 5.4. For men, it is distinctly single-
peaked around 9-10 hours per day which corresponds to a full time job plus travel
time etc. On the contrary, we see a very different distribution of female working time
with two peaks. The first and highest peak is around 5 hours a day which accords
with a part time job. The second and lower peak is again around 9-10 hours per day.
Labor force participation λ is a self-reported variable from the interview part. For a
description of the other variables used in the analysis see Appendix 5.5.2 and for the
income measure Appendix 5.5.3.
5.3.2 A descriptive look at market work, home production,
outsourcing and the demand for unskilled labor
Since the German Time Use Survey has not been widely used by economists, we start
with a descriptive overview of the time allocation by sex and employment status. We
distinguish between women and men for two reasons: First, it is widely documented in
19The last category, leisure, comprises time spent for sleeping and napping, washing, dressing, eating,
receiving medical care, and time spent for everything else.
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of mean work hours per day by sex among the working
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the literature (Beblo 1999; Van der Lippe, Tijdens, and De Ruijter 2004) that men and
women differ in their engagement in home production activities. Second, in contrast
to males, females exhibit a very heterogenous labor market participation, and policies
aimed at increasing labor force participation are often targeted at women.
Table 5.1: Time use by sex (in % of total time)
market work leisure home production
(incl. breaks, commuting, job search) (incl. recreation, vol. work)
men 24.6 64.0 11.4
women 8.4 65.6 26.0
General time use is split into three broad categories: Both, men and women, spend
about two thirds of their day on leisure activities as defined in Section 5.3.1. However,
they differ substantially in how they spent the remaining time. While men spent
24.6 percent of their total time on work-related activities and 11.4 percent on home
production activities on average, women allocate their time in the opposite manner
(Table 5.1).20
Next, we decompose time use by employment status. Two things are worth noting
from Table 5.2: (1) Working men and women spent less than half as much time on
home production activities than their not working counterparts. (2) Differential work
status does not explain the gender differences in home production time.
20Brines (1994) and Greenstein (2000) put forward sociological factors to explain these gender dif-
ferences. Beblo (1999) analyzes strategic behavior in intra-family time allocation.
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Table 5.2: Average home production by sex and employment status in hours per day
(resp. % of total time)
all not working working
all part time fulltime
men 2:46 (11.5%) 4:14 (17.7%) 1:42 ( 7.1%) 3:17 (13.7%) 1:22 ( 5.7%)
women 6:11 (25.7%) 7:01 (29.2%) 4:23 (11.1%) 5:50 (24.3%) 1:33 ( 6.5%)
Decomposing time use by working time shows that women with a part time job
spend about an hour and 10 minutes less time on home production per day than not
working women, while full time employed women spend 5 and a half hours per day
less on home production (Table 5.2). Figure 5.5 illustrates this strong and negative
relation between home production and working time which is stronger for women.
Even among men, the differences in home production by work status and hours are
sizeable: Not working men take care of the household about 4 hours and a quarter
each day while full time employed men only spend about an hour and 22 minutes on
home production.
Figure 5.5: Home production by sex and hours of work
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Next, we look at the relation between market work and outsourcing. We have in-
formation on whether a household receives help from outside the household, and if so,
how much. Received help is classified in four categories, namely (1) help in the house-
hold (cleaning, shopping, laundry), (2) child care, (3) care for elderly persons, and (4)
technical help. We summarize these four categories into one. 18.2% of all households
under consideration answered that they receive help from outside the household. 7.6%
of all households received help that was paid for.
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Table 5.3: Share of households receiving help, by employment status
Households members are...
Type of received help all both not employed one employed both employed
unpaid 11.6% 0.0% 7.1% 14.6%
paid 7.6% 2.3% 3.9% 10.0%
unpaid and paid 18.2% 2.3% 10.5% 23.3%
Table 5.3 furthermore illustrates, that the higher a household’s labor market par-
ticipation, the higher is the probability that this household receives (unpaid and paid)
help from outside. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel, Hank (2001) presents
similar numbers and states that “dual career households use professional help the
most.” The fraction of households purchasing domestic services is highest among
households in which women spend many hours in market work.
5.3.3 Does increased market work lead to a reduction of home
production?
The goal of this section is to investigate the relationship between labor market par-
ticipation and home production in a multivariate setting. In our model, households
maximize their utility from consumption and leisure as specified in equation (5.9).
Producing goods and services at home saves money, but consumes time resources that
could be spent on market labor or leisure activities. Hence, households will have to
weigh the marginal cost of purchasing certain goods or services against the marginal
cost of producing them at home.
We model the decision how much time a household j spends on home production per
day as a function of household characteristics Z, the labor force participation dummy λ
and minutes of market work by husband and wife on a diary day, ω, monthly household
net income Inc and its interactions with labor force participation, and individual
characteristics of the spouses X. The monthly income variable has been constructed
from the individual net monthly incomes of husband and wife which are given in
income brackets in the survey. We construct a continuous household income variable by
estimating an ordered probit model with known cut points for the individual incomes
and adding them up afterwards. This method which improves on the commonly used
method of taking the midpoints of the brackets as the continuous income measure, and
its implications are discussed in Appendix 5.5.3. Furthermore, we control for seasonal
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and weekly patterns T and regional differences R. The empirical specification is the
following:21
hpj = α+
∑
s
(γs · λs,j + δs · ωs,j) + (ζ +
∑
s
ζs · λs,j) · Incj
+ β · Zj +
∑
s
ηs ·Xs,j + ρ · Tj + τ ·Rj + ²j
(5.17)
where hp denotes total time per day spent on home production at day t in minutes.
The subscripts stand for household j and household member s where s can be the
husband m or the wife f .
We estimate equation 5.17 to test our argument that the higher the household’s
labor supply, the less time will be spent on home production.22 We differentiate mar-
ket work by husband and wife, because—given the descriptive evidence from Section
5.3.2—we do not suppose that male and female market work are perfect substitutes.
On the contrary, we suspect that increasing female labor force participation has
stronger negative effects on the home production of households.
Column 1 in Table 5.4 shows a significant effect of male and female working time,
ω, on the total time spent on home production in the household. As expected, the
more the household members work, the less time is spent on home production. For
example, if the wife works one hour more, home production time of the household is
reduced by 26 minutes. The magnitude of the effect is almost twice as high compared
to male working time. A t-test reveals that they are statistically significantly different.
Female labor force participation λf is not significant in specification (1), nor are its
interactions with income and income squared. However, an F-test yields a common
significance (F(3, 4359)=2.15).
One might argue that there is a potential simultaneity of the work and the home
production choice which biases our OLS results. The argument is that on the one hand,
the supply of child care affects the labor supply decision, and on the other hand, the
labor supply decision affects the household’s demand for child care. We deal with
the resulting endogeneity bias in two ways: First, we include three broadly defined
region dummies and additionally four regional variables based on a much finer regional
classification like the local unemployment rate, regional GNP per capita, the degree
of urbanization, and the size of the tertiary sector. These regional characteristics
are likely correlated with the degree of availability of child care, as it is part of the
tertiary sector, varies by population density and urbanization of the area, and so
forth. To the extent that regional characteristics are a good proxy for child care and
domestic services availability, the results from specification (1) do not indicate a severe
21We omit the time subscript t denoting the diary day for ease of notation.
22We include a participation dummy only for women, since there is almost no variation in male
participation in the data. The dummy variable captures potential fixed effects that might be
associated with market work.
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Table 5.4: Regression results
dependent variable: total household home production
all w/o kids w/ kids
(1) (2) (3)
participation and minutes of work
λf 43.87 ( 1.05) 41.401 ( 0.49) 68.326 ( 1.36)
ωm -0.248 (-17.00)*** -0.208 ( -6.81)*** -0.279 (-16.82)***
ωf -0.435 (-23.70)*** -0.371 (-10.80)*** -0.478 (-19.89)***
household characteristics
Inc 0.028 ( 1.70)* 0.029 ( 0.79) 0.026 ( 1.39)
Inc2 -2.8E-6 (-1.57) -2-2E-6 (-0.56) -2.8E-6 (-1.41)
Inc ∗ λf -0.021 (-1.17) -0.017 (-0.45) -0.029 (-1.34)
Inc2 ∗ λf 1.7E-6 ( 0.92) 8.9E-7 ( 0.22) 2.3E-6 ( 1.05)
Kids0-5 116.237 (22.04)*** 88.69 (14.47)***
Kids6-18 27.527 ( 7.94)*** 15.722 ( 3.46)***
SchoolY rsAvg -6.794 (-2.41)** -4.271 (-0.71) -5.433 (-1.70)*
SchoolY rsDiff 2.701 ( 1.25) -9.659 (-1.86)* 8.236 ( 3.57)***
AgeAvg -0.349 (-0.84) 1.237 ( 1.75)* -2.23 (-3.36)***
AgeDiff 1.101 ( 1.44) -0.265 (-0.16) 2.372 ( 2.70)***
living conditions of the household
AppSize 0.057 (0.57) 0.422 (1.75)* -0.073 (-0.67)
AppOwner 22.631 (1.84)* 16.773 (0.68) 29.994 ( 2.06)**
HOwner 40.513 (4.83)*** 57.601 (3.19)*** 22.857 ( 2.40)**
Garden 30.94 (3.83)*** 24.774 (1.54) 42.496 ( 4.45)***
Constant 627.462 (9.23)*** 383.051 (2.64)*** 784.705 (10.19)***
Obs. 4392 958 3434
Adj.R2 0.42 0.32 0.37
Note: t statistics in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.
Additional regressors (not reported here): regional (Southern and Central Germany), seasonal and
weekday dummies, and regional characteristics like unemployment rates, gross national product,
urbanization and the size of the tertiary sector.
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endogeneity problem: none of the regional variables turns out significant. As a second
robustness check, we split the sample into couples with and without children, because
we suppose that an endogeneity bias will be present mainly with regard to child care
availability. Women might decide to start working again when they can easily source
out child care, i.e. when the grandparents live close by or when institutionalized
child care is easily available. Hence, childless couples should be affected to a much
lesser extent. We find a slightly lower impact of working time on home production in
childless households —about 4 minutes difference compared to results from (1)— but
the differences are not substantial.
The total effect of female labor supply (including participation and working time)
on a household’s home production is shown in Table 5.5. The table displays the
difference in household home production time between a not working and a working
woman. Increases in market work imply accompanying pay raises which also affect
home production time and the amount of outsourcing. We take this into account
using the differences in the conditional mean incomes of households with full (part)
time working women and those with not working women in our sample. Furthermore,
we assume an average hourly wage of 18.40 DM.23 We determine working time in
a part- or full-time job from the distribution of female working hours. Part-time is
roughly defined as the lower peak value at 5 hours per day, full-time as the higher
peak value at 9.5 hours (see Figure 5.4).
Table 5.5: Net effect of female labor market participation on household home produc-
tion time (in hours per day)
not working woman vs. woman working woman working
...part time ...full time 1 h more
change in household
home production time -1:28 (-2.16)** -3:28 (-5.08)*** -0:27 (-13.09)***
Note: t-values in parentheses. ***/** denote significance at the 1%, 5% level. The underlying Null
hypothesis is that the respective linear combination of coefficients is equal to zero.
The first (second) column contains the difference in home production time between
a household with a not working woman and one with a part respectively full time
working woman: it amounts to a considerable one and a half respectively three and a
half hours per day. In the third column, we calculate the effect of one additional work
hour which reduces the home production time of the household by 27 minutes. Thus,
female market work results in a statistically significant reduction in home production
time. The reduction is larger, the more hours a woman works.
Hence, our findings suggest that: (1) The more the spouses work, the less time is
spent on home production in the household. (2) This effect is almost double as large
for women than for men, and it is sizeable: One additional hour in market work crowds
out almost half an hour of household home production time.
23This number is computed from the IAB-Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe 1992.
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We will only briefly comment on the results for the other household and personal
characteristics, since they are not at the center of our attention. We cannot find ev-
idence of a direct effect of education on home production time, that would be due
to education-specific attitudes and tastes etc. We also do not find a strong relation
between age and home production. We additionally include month and weekday dum-
mies into our estimation to capture seasonal effects in home production. For example,
the positive significant coefficients for June and July indicate that households might
save some outdoor home production tasks for the summer, e.g., repairing the house or
doing some gardening. Furthermore, descriptive evidence suggests that significantly
more home production is done on weekends than during the week. This intertemporal
substitution of home production can be explained by weekend shopping and weekend
do-it-yourself activities. This result is not echoed, however, in our regression analysis
where working time and other covariates are controlled for. The weekday dummies
SAT and SUN have significantly negative estimated coefficients, so that the intertem-
poral substitution seems to work the opposite way. The weekend seems to be mainly
reserved for leisure activities. In additional robustness checks, we accounted for po-
tential substitution effects by interacting a weekend dummy with the participation
dummy to see whether working women do more home production on weekends than
their not working counterparts, and found no evidence in favor of the substitution
hypothesis.
5.3.4 Does more market work result in more outsourcing?
In the preceding chapter, we analyzed the link between market work and the time spent
on home production. We found that more time spent on market work is associated with
less time spent on home production. In this section, we use the data on “help received
by the household” described in Section 5.3.2 to study the link between market work
of household members and the demand for these services.24 The idea is that at least
part of a household’s home production can in principle be outsourced. Our measure
“received” help does certainly not cover all components of outsourcing, e.g., it excludes
child care outside households (kindergartens, nurseries, etc.), eating out, bringing
clothes to the dry-cleaner, having them ironed and sewed and so forth. Furthermore,
only 7.6% of our sample households report to have received paid help. This low
percentage is most likely due to underreporting. In Germany, many household aids
are employed without official registration, as this would imply the duty to pay social
security contributions and taxes on both sides, employer and employee.25 For these
two reasons, we regard our analysis as a lower bound of the impact of labor market
participation on the demand for household services and the like.
24Throughout this section, we aggregate the four categories of received help under the label “out-
sourcing”.
25According to Bru¨ck, Haisken-DeNew, and Zimmermann (2003),pp.4, there are about 40.000 offi-
cially registered employees in the household sector in Germany. Estimates, on the contrary, point
to about 500.000 employees in the domestic service sector.
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We estimate the effect of households’ labor market participation on their demand
for paid services that substitute for home production. We use the same specification
as in equation 5.17, just substituting received help rh for home production hp. Since
only 7.6% of the households in our sample actually report to receive paid help, we have
a dependent variable that is censored at zero. Simplifying equation 5.17 for illustrative
purposes, we get: rh∗j = x
′
jβ + ²j where the error term is normally distributed, ²j ∼
N(0, σ2), and rh∗ | xj ∼ N(β′xj, σ2). The censored variable can be characterized as:
rh =
{
rh∗ if rh∗ > 0
0 else
(5.18)
The probability of observing positive outsourcing is: P (rh > 0) = P (rh∗ > 0) =
Φ(
β′xj
σ
). Hence, the Likelihood for the censored regression model is:
L =
n∏
j=0
[
Φ
(
x′jβ
σ
)]−1
· 1
σ
· φ
(
rhj − x′jβ
σ
)
(5.19)
Table 5.7 reports the regression results of this censored Tobit model. A woman’s labor
force participation has a strongly significant effect on the household’s probability to
receive paid help. Working time of women (in minutes per day) also has a significantly
positive effect. The effect of men’s working time is about as large. Again, we exclude
men’s labor force participation for lack of variation in that variable. Income and
the number of children aged 0 to 5 positively affect the amount of paid help. Other
significant control variables are education, urbanization of the place of residence, and
regional GNP per capita. The sample size prohibits the sample split into households
with and without children done in Section 5.3.3.26
In order to get an idea of the magnitude of these effects, we calculate the impact of
changes in female market work on purchased hours of home help (Table 5.6). We use
the same computation method as in Section 5.3.3. The first (second) column displays
the effect on the outsourcing of housework when the woman enters the labor market
and works part (full) time. The overall effect is an increase by roughly one hour
per week, or +263%, in the case of a switch towards a part time job. The effect of
taking up a full time job is slightly smaller. This unexpected result arises because
outsourcing is a hump-shaped function of women’s working time. The hump’s peak
is between 5 and 6.5 working hours per day. This finding is robust with respect to
different specifications (polynomials of different order, splines). An increase in the
woman’s daily working time by one hour raises the household’s outsourcing by 12
minutes per week (+18%) (third column). In absolute terms, the effects may seem
small. However, the numbers represent averages over the whole sample of which 92.4%
26As a further robustness check, we also estimated a Heckman selection model and got very similar
results. Our identifying assumptions were that labor force participation only affects the decision
of whether or not to hire a home help while working time only affects the extent to which a home
help is engaged. Other variables that entered only the selection equation were urbanization of
the place of residence, regional GNP per capita, and the size of the regional service sector. These
latter variables affect the regional availability of household services.
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do not make use of any paid help at all. Furthermore, our data contain only a fraction
of tasks that could possibly be outsourced. For example, we do not have information on
outsourcing of food preparation (going to restaurants, pizza service), drinks delivery,
cleaning and ironing of clothes, kindergartens, nurseries, and other services that are
rendered outside the household.
Table 5.6: Net Effect of Female Labor Market Participation on Help Received (in
minutes per week)
woman switches from not working to working woman works
...part time ...full time 1 h more
change in received help
absolute +66:44 +66:02 +11:47
relative +263% +260% +18%
Table 5.7: Regression Results
dependent variable: paid help received by the household (in minutes per day)
participation and minutes of work
λf 64.57 ( 4.12)***
ωf 0.2226 ( 2.48)**
ω2f -0.0003191 (-2.15)**
ωm 0.1663 ( 2.16)**
ω2m -0.0001385 (-1.43)
household characteristics
Inc 0.03040 ( 2.49)**
Inc2 -3.43e-7 (-0.39)
Kids0-5 56.63 ( 6.27)***
Kids6-18 3.428 ( 0.58)
AgeAvg 0.6968 ( 1.52)
SchoolY rsAvg 10.89 ( 3.71)***
TrainY rsAvg 7.007 ( 2.03)**
regional characteristics
Urban 31.66 ( 3.38)***
GNP -0.002338 (-3.33)***
TertSec 1.308 ( 1.55)
Weekend 50.80 ( 2.82)***
Constant -890.6 (-9.69)***
Observations 4392 (of which 338 uncensored, 4054 censored)
Note: t statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.
In summary, these results strongly corroborate the theoretical predictions from Sec-
tion 5.2. An increase in market work implies that households have less time and
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more money. The increase in income can be expected to entail a roughly proportional
increase in total expenditures. But this increase is not proportional across different
goods. Household income (and thus total consumer expenditures) increases by roughly
one third, when the woman takes up a full-time job. At the same time, the demand
for household services and other types of paid help rises by more than 260%. As these
services are mostly rendered by unskilled workers, the relative demand for unskilled
labor increases in the wake of increases in working time or labor force participation.
5.3.5 Is there a link between labor market participation and
unemployment in the OECD?
In the preceding sections, we looked at micro data and found that the empirical link
between market work, home production and outsourcing behavior of households is in
line with our theoretical model. In this section, we investigate whether the macroe-
conomic evidence is consistent with our theory. We directly look at reduced form the
relation between labor market participation and unemployment in OECD countries
between 1980 and 2003. Appendix 5.5.2 describes the coverage and sample statistics
of our unbalanced panel of 23 OECD countries.27
Our theoretical model predicts that over time and across countries, higher degrees of
labor market participation lead to lower unemployment. Labor market participation
in our model encompasses a higher labor force participation, longer weekly work hours,
or a prolonged work life, caused, e.g., by a higher retirement age. As data on average
retirement age are not available, we use the labor force participation of workers aged
55 to 64 years instead. Additionally, we use a set of control variables. These are (i)
union density, (ii) employment protection legislation, and (iii) GDP growth.28
Potential endogeneity of the key variables of interest, namely the two labor force
participation variables, can be present for various reasons: Unemployment and labor
force participation both vary over the business cycle. Both increase in economic down-
turns. The counter-cyclicality of labor force participation has become known as the
“added worker” effect: Women enter the labor market in recessions when their hus-
bands’ incomes decrease or when the husbands loose their jobs. This effect potentially
biases our estimates towards zero. Therefore we include GDP growth in the regression
to control for business cycle effects. Another source of endogeneity might be the belief
of some governments that shorter working hours and early retirement schemes can
be used as a cure to fight unemployment. If these policy measures are realized, then
we expect shorter working hours and lower labor force participation (especially of the
elderly) in countries and years, in which the unemployment problem is more severe.
This would bias our estimates away from zero. Therefore, we control for country fixed
effects and use lagged values of the explanatory variables. These fixed effects addition-
ally control for all time-invariant unobserved country heterogeneity. In addition, take
27For Turkey, data on working hours are not available.
28See Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) for a more detailed discussion of the institutional determinants
of unemployment rates especially in European countries.
119
5 Market work, home production, consumer demand and unemployment
first differences of all variables in order to avoid problems of spurious correlation. As
the value of the dependent variable, the unemployment rate, must always lie within
the unit interval, we use a logistic specification:
UR =
eβ0+βp·λ
all+β55·λ55++βh·ω+
P
k γk·xk
1 + eβ0+βp·λall+β55·λ55++βh·ω+
P
k γk·xk
(5.20)
where UR is the unemployment rate, λall is the rate of labor force participation in the
entire population, Part55+ is the participation rate of persons aged 55 to 64 years, ω are
average yearly working hours, and xk denotes one of a set of k additional regressors. In
order to estimate this non-linear relation with linear estimation methods, we transform
the dependent variable into:
URlogistic = ln
(
UR
1− UR
)
= β0 + βp · λall + βo · λ55+ + βh · ω +
∑
k
γk · xk. (5.21)
Table 5.8: Regression results
dependent Variable: unemployment rate (logistic)
(1) (2)
Participation (all) -5.465 (-4.18)*** -7.274 (-5.07)***
Participation (55-64 years) -0.245 (-0.38) 0.605 (0.88)
Working Hours -12.845 (-3.39)*** -7.647 (-2.00)**
GDP growth p.c. -2.615 (-7.06)***
Employment Protection Legislation -0.017 (-0.15)
Union Density 0.010 (1.25)
Constant 0.003 (0.33) 0.007 (0.76)
No. Obs. (No. Countries) 437 (23) 354 (21)
Adj. R2 0.01 0.16
Note: t statistics in parentheses. **,*** denote significance at 5%, 1%. All variables are in first
differences; explanatory variables are lagged. In all specifications, we estimate fixed-effects models.
Table 5.8 displays the regression results. We estimate two specifications: (1) con-
tains the variables of interest only, and (2) additionally includes a set of control vari-
ables, namely per capita GDP growth, an index of employment protection legislation,
and union density rates. Both columns show a highly significant link between total
labor force participation and working hours and the unemployment rate. This is con-
sistent with our theory. Labor force participation of older workers turns out insignif-
icant. One explanation might be that many OECD countries have or had generous
pre-retirement schemes in place such that at least those still participating beyond age
60 are a strongly selected group.29 If increases in the participation rates of the elderly
arise from a tightening of social security systems, then this may induce less skilled
29For example, those who did not spend many years on earning a degree or getting tertiary education,
started their working life early and can retire earliest—at least in Germany.
120
5.4 Conclusions
and less wealthy people to work longer. If this is the case, then we do not expect
substantial increases in outsourcing or sizeable reductions of the unemployment rate.
We also conducted robustness checks using additional explanatory variables like the
degree of wage inequality, and the replacement rate of unemployment benefits, and
estimated a specification without lagging the explanatory variables. Our results turn
out to be robust with respect to these alternative specifications.
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we introduce a new argument into the debate about the employment
effects of labor market policy measures targeted at increasing working time and labor
force participation: We develop a general equilibrium model showing that positive
employment effects for the unskilled can arise from general increases in labor market
participation.
The mechanism how these jobs might accrue works through the goods market.
We argue that changes in labor market participation of individuals entail changes
in the composition of their consumer demand. Longer working hours and higher
labor force participation imply that workers have higher incomes and less time for
leisure and home production. As a consequence, home production decreases, and the
demand composition shifts towards those goods and services that substitute for home
production. As the goods and services that can be produced by everyone at home
require few skills, the relative demand for unskilled labor rises. If the relative wage
does not adjust perfectly to changes in relative labor demand, unemployment among
the unskilled falls.
In the second part of the chapter, we produce empirical evidence that corroborates
our theoretical results. We use a time use survey conducted in West German house-
holds in 1991/92 to explore the main mechanism of the model empirically: The link
between labor market participation and home production and the link between labor
market participation and outsourcing of household services and other home-producible
goods and services. We find quantitatively relevant effects of labor force participation
and work hours on both, time spent on home production by the household and out-
sourcing of these tasks among working age couples. One additional hour in market
work of the woman crowds out 27 minutes of the household’s home production per
day. Accordingly, outsourcing rises by 12 minutes per week (+18%). Switching from
not working to working full time results in a reduction of home production time of
about 3 and a half hours per day. As a consequence, outsourcing rises by more than
one hour (+260%). These effects imply that increases in market work can have large
positive effects on the demand for unskilled labor.
At the macroeconomic level, we additionally investigated the link between labor
market participation and unemployment rates directly. Controlling for some institu-
tional determinants of unemployment rates, we find a strongly significant and negative
relationship for 23 OECD countries from 1980 to 2003. We take this as further evi-
dence in favor of our model.
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5.5 Appendix
5.5.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
At p = 0, the right hand side (RHS) of equation (5.15) is larger than the left hand
side (LHS):
e1+χ
1 + χ
· ξ = RHS (0) ≥ LHS (0) =

0 ⇔ ρ > 0
1
3
· e1+χ
(1+θ)·(1+χ) · ξ ⇔ ρ = 0
e1+χ
(1+θ)·(1+χ) · ξ ⇔ ρ < 0
The limit of the right hand side for p → ∞ is smaller than the limit of the left hand
side:
−∞ = lim
p→∞
RHS (p) < lim
p→∞
LHS (p) =∞
Both sides of the equation are continuous in p. Therefore, at least one p must exist
that makes both sides equal. This establishes the existence of the general equilibrium.
As stated in Section 5.2.4, we only consider parameter constellations for which
production in both sectors is strictly positive. This requires for the relative goods
price: p ∈ [1, eχ]. Within these limits, aggregate demand for good 2 is increasing in
the relative price of good 1, p, while aggregate supply of good 2 is decreasing in p.
Thus, if an equilibrium price p exists, it must be unique.
Proof of Proposition 2
The equilibrium condition is C2 (p (ξ) , ξ) = Y2 (p (ξ) , ξ). Let ηu,v =
∂u
∂v
· v
u
denote the
relative effect of u on v. Comparative statics with respect to ξ yields:
ηp,ξ = −ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ
ηY2,p − ηC2,p
The denominator is negative (see the proof of uniqueness in Appendix 5.5.1). How
about the numerator?
ηY2,ξ = 1 and ηC2,ξ = 1−
(p·α)
1
1−ρ
1+
„
1+p
ρ
1−ρ
«
·α
ρ
1−ρ
C2
so that
ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ =
(p·α)
1
1−ρ
1+
„
1+p
ρ
1−ρ
«
·α
ρ
1−ρ
C2
> 0
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which implies that
ηp,ξ = −
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ
ηY2,p − ηC2,p︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0
Proof of Proposition 3
From Lemma 1 we know that unemployment is decreasing with the relative goods
price p. Together with Proposition 2 this implies that a reduction in market work ξ
leads to an increase in unemployment j˜.
Next, we have to show that the effect of market work ξ on unemployment j˜ is
stronger, the smaller is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure
σ :
∂
∣∣ηj˜,ξ∣∣
∂σ
< 0 ⇔ ∂
(
ηj˜,ξ
)
∂σ
> 0
Market work ξ affects unemployment only through the relative goods price p (see
equation 5.8):
ηj˜,ξ = ηj˜,p · ηp,ξ
The effect of the relative goods price p on unemployment j˜ does not depend on the
substitution elasticity σ (see Lemma 1):
∂
(
ηj˜,ξ
)
∂σ
=
∂
(
ηj˜,p
)
∂σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
· ηp,ξ︸︷︷︸
<0
+ ηj˜,p︸︷︷︸
<0
· ∂ (ηp,ξ)
∂σ
?
> 0
It suffices thus to show that
∂(ηp,ξ)
∂σ
< 0.
∂ (ηp,ξ)
∂σ
= −
∂(ηY2,ξ−ηC2,ξ)
∂σ
· (ηY2,p − ηC2,p)− (ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ) ·
∂(ηY2,p−ηC2,p)
∂σ
(ηY2,p − ηC2,p)2
?
< 0
From Appendix 5.5.1 we know that ηY2,p − ηC2,p < 0, ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ > 0 and that
ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ =
(pα)
1
1−ρ
1+
„
1+p
ρ
1−ρ
«
α
ρ
1−ρ
C2
=
pα
ξpα ln
(
θ
1+θ
χp
1+χ
χ +e1+χ
p(1+χ)
)
+ χp
1+χ
χ +e1+χ
(1+θ)(1+χ)
ξ + (1− ξ) pα
independent of σ = 1
1−ρ . Therefore
∂(ηY2,ξ−ηC2,ξ)
∂σ
= 0.
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All that remains to be shown is that
∂(ηY2,p−ηC2,p)
∂σ
< 0. From equation 5.6 follows
that
∂(ηY2,p)
∂σ
= 0.
ηC2,p =
∂
(
(p·α)
ρ
1−ρ
1+
„
1+p
ρ
1−ρ
«
·α
ρ
1−ρ
)
∂p
p
(p·α)
ρ
1−ρ
1+
„
1+p
ρ
1−ρ
«
·α
ρ
1−ρ
+
∂Λ
∂p
p
Λ
where Λ =
(
ξ · p · α · ln
(
θ
1+θ
· χ·p
1+χ
χ +e1+χ
p·(1+χ)
)
+ χ·p
1+χ
χ +e1+χ
(1+θ)·(1+χ) · ξ + (1− ξ) · p · α
)
does
not depend on ρ.
∂
(
(p·α)
ρ
1−ρ
1+
„
1+p
ρ
1−ρ
«
·α
ρ
1−ρ
)
∂p
p
(p·α)
ρ
1−ρ
1+
„
1+p
ρ
1−ρ
«
·α
ρ
1−ρ
=
ρ
1− ρ ·
1 + α
ρ
1−ρ
1 +
(
1 + p
ρ
1−ρ
)
· α ρ1−ρ
It suffices to show that
∂ (ηC2,p)
∂σ
=
∂
(
ρ
1−ρ · 1+α
ρ
1−ρ
1+
„
1+p
ρ
1−ρ
«
·α
ρ
1−ρ
)
∂σ
> 0
With ρ
1−ρ = σ − 1 :
∂ (ηC2,p)
∂σ
=
1 + ασ−1
1 + (1 + pσ−1) · ασ−1 − (σ − 1)
(lnα + (1 + ασ−1) · ln p) · (α · p)σ−1
(1 + (1 + pσ−1) · ασ−1)2
For σ ≤ 1 (with α > 1), the right hand side is unambiguously positive:
∂ (ηC2,p)
∂σ
> 0
For σ > 1, this inequality can only be established numerically because the relative
goods price p is endogenous and cannot be expressed as an explicit function of the
exogenous parameters.
Numerical simulations for α ∈ [1, 10] , χ ∈ [0, 10] , µ ∈ [0, 1] , ρ ∈ [0, 1) (implying
σ ∈ [1,∞)), and ξ ∈ [0, 1] confirm that the inequality also holds for σ > 1.
This completes the proof:
∂ (ηp,ξ)
∂σ
= −
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂ (ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ)
∂σ
·
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(ηY2,p − ηC2,p)
(ηY2,p − ηC2,p)2
+
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ) ·
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂ (ηY2,p − ηC2,p)
∂σ
(ηY2,p − ηC2,p)2
< 0
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and therefore:
∂
(
ηj˜,ξ
)
∂σ
=
∂
(
ηj˜,p
)
∂σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
· ηp,ξ︸︷︷︸
<0
+ ηj˜,p︸︷︷︸
<0
· ∂ (ηp,ξ)
∂σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0
5.5.2 Description of the data
This Appendix contains a description of the variables used in Section 5.3, sample
statistics and a description of the unbalanced panel of OECD countries.
Table 5.9: Description of the Variables
Time Use Survey (Zeitbudgeterhebung) 1991/92
HP total household home production (in minutes per day)
OC paid help received by the household (in minutes per week)
λ employment status (= 0 if not employed, = 1 if employed)
ω time spent on gainful employment (in minutes per day)
Kids0− 5 number of children in the household aged 0− 5 years
Kids6− 18 number of children in the household aged 6− 18 years
SchoolY rsAvg average years of schooling of wife and husband
SchoolY rsDiff difference in schooling years between husband and wife
TrainY ears years of vocational training
Inc household income
Inc2 household income squared
AgeAvg average age of wife and husband
AgeDiff difference between the husband’s and the wife’s age
Mid region dummy (North Rhine-Westphalia, Hessen)
South region dummy
(Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria)
Urban degree of urbanization of the region
GNP per capita gross national product in the region
TertSec employment share of the tertiary sector
Weekend weekend dummy (= 1 if the interview was on a weekend)
UnempR unemployment rate in the region
OECD Data 1980-2003
Participation (all) Participation rate (Labor Force 20-65/Population 20-65)
Participation (55-64 yrs) Participation rate (aged 55-64)
Working Hours Share of average annual working hours in total annual hours (8760)
GDP growth p.c GDP growth per capita
Employment Protection Legislation EPL index, ranging from 1 to 20 (20=strictest regulation)
Union Density Share of union members among dependent workers (in %)
Sources: OECD Labour Force Statistics, World Development Indicators
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Table 5.10: Data coverage in the unbalanced panel of OECD countries
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland
1980 - 2003 1997 - 2003 1985 - 2003 1980 - 2003 1985 - 2003 1980 - 2003
France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy
1980 - 2003 1993 - 2003 1985 - 2002 1993 - 2002 1985 - 2003 1980 - 2003
Japan Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal
1980 - 2003 1985 - 2002 1989 - 2003 1989 - 2003 1980 - 2003 1988 - 2003
Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States
1980 - 2003 1980 - 2003 1993 - 2003 – 1986 - 2003 1980 - 2003
Table 5.11: Descriptive Statistics: OECD Data
Sample mean Sample minimum Sample maximum
Unemployment Rate 0.076 0.015 (LUX, 1991) 0.240 (ESP, 1994)
Participation Rate (all) 0.709 0.576 (NL, 1980) 0.866 (ICE, 2000)
Participation Rate (55-64 years) 0.484 0.222 (BEL, 1990) 0.887 (ICE, 1995)
Working Hours 0.195 0.153 (NOR, 2003) 0.242 (JAP, 1980)
GDP Growth Rate p.c. 0.022 -0.069 (FIN, 1991) 0.010 (IRE, 1997)
Union Density Rate 40.204 8.600 (ESP, 1984) 87.40 (SWE, 1994)
Employment Protection Rate 2.119 0.200 (USA, all yrs) 4.800 (POR, all yrs)
5.5.3 Income
In the Time Use Survey, income is recorded in the form of a range card question,
where the respondents are to report their income in predefined intervals instead of
giving precise amount. This survey design is often chosen to get a higher response
rate (Juster and Smith 1997; Winter 2002). In order to assign the household a con-
tinuous income, we combine the information about the lower and upper limits of the
respective income intervals with additional information on household and personal
characteristics. Interval-coded data can then be treated like an ordered response,
where the cut-points are already known. We define a latent (continuous) variable in-
come Inc∗ = xβ+e where e|x ∼ N(0, 1). If α1 < Inc∗ ≤ α2, the observed income class
is for example Inc = 2 with the limits α1 and α2, and so forth. The parameters α and
β can be estimated by maximum likelihood. In the case of interval-coded data, the
cut-points α are already known, so that only the parameters β have to be estimated.
The standard normal assumption made above changes to Inc∗|x ∼ N(xβ, σ2) where
σ2 = V ar(Inc∗|x) is assumed not to depend on x. The parameters β and σ2 can then
be estimated by maximum likelihood (Wooldridge 2002).
Table 5.12 (a) and (b) reports the regression results for men’s and women’s income.
We use these results to assign each household member its predicted continuous income
given her characteristics and her income bracket. Then, we add these individual
incomes up to obtain the household’s income. Using this method, we improve upon
the common method of choosing the midpoints as the income measure. However, like
the midpoint approach, this more sophisticated method does not take into account
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the standard errors of the regression when predicting the continuous income. When
we use our generated income regressor in the estimation of home production time and
paid help, the usual OLS assumption that ² is uncorrelated with the x suffices for
consistency in Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4. The inference on the contrary will generally
be invalid because we ignore the sampling variation in Înc, i.e. the uncertainty in
the estimate should be accounted for in the regression of interest. See Wooldridge
(2002), chapter 6 for a discussion of generated regressors and chapter 14 for a general
framework for handling these problems. In our case, the sampling variation in Înc is
very small. First, it is considerably lower than when using the midpoints, because we
do not only use the bracket information, but also the information of the explanatory
variables x about the income. Second, we observe relatively narrow income brackets
which alone are already good income predictors. Furthermore, the survey contains a
detailed set of individual information that we can exploit. For these reasons, we do
not adjust the inference in the second step.
Table 5.12: Regression results for (a) women’s and (b) men’s income, ordered probit
with known cut-points
(a) women’s income (b) men’s income
λf 875.2491 (31.0389) *** λm 1556.869 (98.0401) ***
ωf 0.3683918 (0.210427) * ωm -0.4184731 (0.242961) *
ωf
2 0.0022576 (0.000346) *** ωm2 0.001157 (0.000312) ***
AGEf 7.46488 (13.0302) AGEm 190.3022 (20.9186) ***
AGEf
2 0.0264209 (0.157244) AGEm2 -1.864858 (0.240832) ***
SchoolY rsf 358.8041 (173.604) * SchoolY rsm 1611.079 (247.493) ***
SchoolY rsf
2 -12.46794 (7.89796) SchoolY rsm2 -63.22272 (11.3045) ***
TrainY rsf -38.19013 (29.2201) TrainY rsm 62.36355 (61.7495)
TrainY rsf
2 32.3933 (6.07455) *** TrainY rsm2 38.92703 (11.1501) ***
Urban 7.497551 (23.0143) Urban 162.3689 (33.4240) ***
GNP 0.006536 (0.001982) *** GNP -0.0021455 (0.002851)
UnempR 6.404296 (7.63808) UnempR -40.27372 (10.9568) ***
Weekend 276.2312 (30.4882) *** Weekend 122.3447 (55.5153) *
Constant -3070.687 (981.37) *** Constant -12639.47 (1395.91) ***
Observations 4200 Observations 4368
Standard deviations in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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